Second, interesting to note planes don’t have deadman switches.
Second, interesting to note planes don’t have deadman switches.
My guess is basically nobody cares that much about this rare condition. It's much more likely the pilots are incapacitated rather than asleep, in which case the alarm is pointless.
But I guess it's not that rare:
- https://www.newsweek.com/pilots-boeing-737-both-doze-off-overshoot-airport-two-hour-flight-1735435
- https://jalopnik.com/tale-of-both-pilots-sleeping-during-flight-reminds-us-t-1849014190
- https://www.cnn.com/travel/article/pilots-sleep-cockpit-airline-safety/index.html
- https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-24296544
- https://www.cbsnews.com/news/both-pilots-fall-asleep-during-british-airbus-flight-incident-report-reveals/
- https://www.aero-news.net/index.cfm?do=main.textpost&id=A9AAFE58-18F4-40B5-B59A-EBE316BBE878
- https://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1932040,00.htmlFirst off, you cannot just put an alarm on everything. The sonic experience inside a cockpit is very carefully designed to give pilots the correct information at the correct time. False alarms are not only not appreciated, they are actively dangerous. If a flight experiencing an emergency situation, a blaring alarm that is incorrectly going off can prevent pilots from getting timely information.
Airbus have side-sticks (like a game controller), not yokes and you really shouldn’t be inputting on them unless you’re hand flying for whatever reason.
In all two-pilot aircraft (all commercial jet aircraft), there are two separate roles that each one assumes: Pilot Monitoring (PM) and Pilot Flying (PF). The PM’s job is usually to run checklists, communicate/operate the radio, check various indicators, and support the PF to fly the aircraft. The captain and first officer swap between these roles en route. The PM should NOT be inputting controls unless there is a good reason to do so, but for safety/redundancy, one side’s controls are never disabled unless a lockout/override is active.
Most airlines have a policy to cruise with the autopilot on, which keeps the aircraft on its plotted course at it’s cleared altitude. The time where “flying” comes into play most often is during takeoff and using various levels of ILS from just indications of glide slope to a full autoland.
While not fantastic, a cruising airbus will keep its current course and stay airborne if the pilots snooze off.
Send an alert via transponders that it has been activated.
Maintain level flight but avoid terrain. (After a waiting period in which a pilot can deactivate this feature.) Or descend to a safe altitude if cabin pressure is lost.
Activate a mode in which the plane could be remotely flown or directed to land itself.
Alert flight crew that the pilots are incapacitated.
Or the most basic: make some noise to wake up the pilots.
Your other ideas are good. But this could kill people if it misfires and takes the plane off course and too far from an airfield.
Not as quickly. Routes are programmed into an airliner before takeoff. Those routes are planned with emergency landing in mind. Left to its own devices, a plane flying its flight path is safer than one simply holding FL (while avoiding terrain).
Well we can't settle it in the comments, nor should we. So which of those options can successfully survive a detailed engineering review on its merits?
https://www.planeandpilotmag.com/article/garmin-autoland-thi...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2000_Australia_Beechcraft_King...
IMO that story shows that unless you do the remote control option (which I see as unlikely) it doesn't matter what happens...what can anyone outside the plane do except crash it earlier?
One of the Boeing 737 Max safety features is that the pilots are so anxious flying it that they are too scared to fall asleep
* No wheels fell off (https://www.independent.co.uk/travel/news-and-advice/united-...)
* No doors departed the plane (https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/06/business/ntsb-boeing-alaska-d...)
* No anti-ice ignited the engines (https://www.flightglobal.com/airframers/faa-proposal-targets...)
* No gear failure (https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=39644341)
* No unintended pitch-down (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maneuvering_Characteristics_Au...)
* Pilots well rested :)
Sounds like ATC and a nearby plane was trying to get hold of them while they were napping. Wonder how this would have been handled in another part of the world. Unresponsive aircraft for 28 mins…
This[1] StackExchange thread does give some pointers as to why that may be.
[1] https://aviation.stackexchange.com/questions/81234/is-there-...
Seems like they could address this by just changing procedures.
If one pilot wants to take a nap, require a third crew member to come sit in the cockpit and make sure the other pilot doesn't doze off. When two pilots are awake, they can monitor each other, but if one is (intentionally) asleep, they can't do that, so have someone take over that function.
See this: https://flightsafety.org/asw-article/controlled-rest/