The EU is independent of the US. There's a difference between alliance and dependency (and EU isn't coextensive with European NATO, but they are pretty close.)
(And yeah the US struggled with artillery shells too, the difference is that the US has so much airpower it had a legit reason to believe it wouldn't need them very much)
Of course, since Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, that's changed for a lot of them. There's renewed interest in taking the defense budget seriously.
So did the US until the 2001 (and, actually, the free fall in US military spending relative to GDP started well before the end of the cold war), and by the 2010s it was back falling in the US, too.
> Of course, since Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, that's changed for a lot of them.
It actually changed since Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014 for the non-US members of NATO (which was also the trigger for the NATO defense spending target.) It changed for the US after the 2022 escalation (US defense spending as a share of GDP declined between 2014 and the 2022 escalation.)
> by the 2010s it was back falling in the US, too.
Because of the wars in Iraq/Afghanistan winding down, no?
> It actually changed since Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014 for the non-US members of NATO (which was also the trigger for the NATO defense spending target.) It changed for the US after the 2022 escalation (US defense spending as a share of GDP declined between 2014 and the 2022 escalation.)
Not really, no. The US took Russia's 2014 invasion more seriously than most of Western Europe did.
European militaries didn't have to consider a large production capacity, neither stockpiling weapons since mostly weren't involved in large military actions (exceptions probably are France and the UK). In terms of efficiency that is what is expected, why waste taxes for stockpiling unused weapons?
Europe dropped the ball after 2014 on not taking note that Russia was going in a new direction, Georgia 2008 was an early warning but Ukraine 2014 should've been a massive alarm that at least some production capacity was needed. Still, it wasn't at all politically viable at the time, it'd be political suicide for any politician outside of Eastern Europe to spend more money on the military and its industry rather than education, healthcare, etc.
Since 2022 everything has changed, the change is slow but steady and will only keep happening, Rheinmetall is steadily growing production, and many other military industries are expanding across the continent, Putin made politically viable for Europe to spend on its military again.
You brought up the dependence on the USA first, I explained why that is:
> In most ways yes, but militarily there's definitely some dependence on the US. A lot of European militaries were found to have relatively bare cupboards when the time to donate things to Ukraine came.
Europe ignored it because it was politically untenable to push for military spending until 2022 when it became very clear there is a threat escalating conflicts in the continent.
I really don't understand what else I should've done with my comment... Give a solution? What else did you expect?
No, I didn't. Go back and read the chain again if you think I'm the first one to bring it up.
Heh, which of these was Grenada ?
Cynical take: Probably a military maneuver. When the world is quiet, the USA has to pick a fight somewhere to run a shakedown of its newest toys.
European defense contractors completely skipped making fifth gen fighters (other than some partnerships with the US on theirs), so there are literally no European fifth gen options on the table to even consider. This makes it pretty easy for the F-35 to cruise to victory in competitive selection processes, it's simply more advanced.
Hopefully this changes for sixth gen, with the two different European programs there. While I'm American myself, I think things work out better if there's some friendly competition.