You argue that consensus is not really required in "hard science judgements". While I haven't studied proper philosophy of science, I'd say "measure things or do an experiment and be done with it" is, precisely, among the best ways to produce/allow consensus; or rather, the capacity of 'hard' science(s) to reason about a series of phenomena in such a way that consensus is 'easy'. One could argue that precisely the phenomena that 'hard' science inspects lends itself more to be inspected under a strict scientific method, too.
I'd say that any 'fact' is dependent on consciousness and intersubjectivity; yet at the same time, some things are more factual than others. Gravity as a phenomenon is more factual than, say, the Stendhal Effect. One can be more and better reproduced under more stringent conditions, thus having more predicting power and being more likely to be 'true' regardless of who interacts with the phenomenon, or reasons about it and its implications.