The Black-Scholes/Merton equation [video]
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In the swaptions market, for instance quotes are typically for an “at-the-money forward” rate, which makes the first two components zero and all the value is tied to the vol.
The implication is that the further out the option, the blurrier the picture gets, because we're applying more Gaussian blur.
One thing that Veritasium glosses over is that BS assumes that the stock price is lognormal distributed, so it follows a geometric brownian process instead of just a regular one. That's why the drift term on a stock price is (r - sigma^2/2) instead of just r in terms of geometric returns. Volatility lowers compounding returns. This is called volatility drag [0].
[0] https://www.kitces.com/blog/volatility-drag-variance-drain-m...
The question that seems obvious, but no one ever seems to talk about, is how the failure of LTCM paved the way for the subprime crisis of 2008.
I mean, did the elite financial world fail to learn the lesson, or did it simply learn the wrong one?
My point is you can't plead 20-20 hindsight.
When the firms started making tons of money, it’s probably easy to ignore the risk department.
Margin call is another great movie. Doesn’t really explain the details of what went wrong, but I think it shows how a financial institution unravels when they accept that the risk is real and it is going to come down.
LTCM was doing ultra-leveraged short-term trades of various kinds. When they started these were arbitrages of various kinds so they had low risk and a solid edge but as more capital flowed into their fund, the capacity of those trades was exhausted and they put money into riskier other trades. Some of their counterparties were big banks who parked overnight funds in LTCM and then when they got spooked by some losses and yanked those funds, LTCM lost a staggering amount of money very quickly as a result and went bust. If you want an excellent book about LTCM, "When Genius Failed" is one of the best books ever written about the history of financial markets.
The origins of the subprime mortgage crisis were a lot more complicated than most people give credit for and in particular I really wouldn't take "the big short" as any kind of reliable guide. For a good critical view of the crisis written by someone who actually knows what they are talking about I would recommend "Fools Gold" by Gillian Tett.
Financial crises and crashes have happened since the dawn of human history and will probably continue to happen. Suffice to say that the 2008 crisis had nothing to do with thing things that caused LTCM to fail, and neither of them have anything to do with the insight behind the Black/Scholes/Merton model other than the fact that Scholes and Merton were I think on the board of LTCM.[1]
[1] Fun fact, the other one of the three, Fischer Black was a quant at Goldman Sachs. So there's your 2008 crisis connection[2]
[2] Or not. Fischer Black died in 1995.
Actual volatility (not implied!) is much easier to predict than price.
It’s also much more difficult to trade than price changes. So your intuition about this is correct though.
It is not super difficult to predict tomorrows volatility sign (up/down compared to today) with +60% success. Even textbook GARCH models do well here.
If you could do that with the price, you’d quickly become filthy rich.
there is possibility you can take trading position with expectation of vol reverting to the mean, and vol will keep increasing (what happened to tesla and gamestop short sellers)
and vice versa
When trading the VIX, you are trading the implied volatility not the actual (realized) volatility.
VIX represents the implied vol of options on S&P500 expiring 30 days into the future.
Trading the realized volatility is not easy :)
You take a view on volatility by buying or selling an option, if you are right then you will make money proportional to the options gamma (i.e. the convexity of the option is where the money comes from)
1) where there are pretty complete markets for implied volatility, looking at the past matters less to little, because there is a market for the "future volatility" you can hedge and interact with
2) when there isn't a good volatility market and hedging future volatility exposure is difficult, looking towards the past for some guidance increases in importance
Both things can get complicated at times and in both cases it isn't strictly speaking the stddev you care about, but the quadratic variation (which can be the same under some assumptions).
The true distribution of the market beliefs in future stock prices can be understood by empirically studying the volatility smile [0]. That is, because investors know Black-Scholes is not a perfect mathematical model of real world stock behavior, every strike price has a different implied volatility. By looking at these different IVs you can get a sense of what the market believes are the true probabilities of "long tail" events.
In theory, the opportunities you have to make money should be cases where you believe the market has mispriced risk. In my amateur experience, I have found that virtually every time you think the market has mispriced some extreme event, when you look at the volatility smile, you realize you are mistaken.
Lots of options trading involves taking a position on whether you think that implicit estimate is too high or too low. Generally, a long options position encodes belief that volatility is cheap and visa versa. Options are also a very specific kind of instrument and can be used to craft very specific bets on volatility. For instance, you might feel that the options at a $200 strike are pricing too high of an implied volatility compared to those at the $195 and $205 strikes.
Traders build an intuition around the model instead of treating it as in and of itself predictive. They instead try to price or take bets on certain derived quantities from it (the "greeks").
The saying goes that implied volatility is "the wrong quantity put into the wrong model in order to make the right decision".
Black-Scholes/Merton makes a lot more sense once you work it all out yourself in code.
I'd actually suggest doing this through modeling the underlying geometric Brownian motion and ensuring that your simulated results match up to the analytic formula.
Option Traders can quote each other in IV without disclosing their asset pricing models and assumptions (trade secret tech).
Great book about all this, 2017 Autobiography: "A Man for All Markets: From Las Vegas to Wall Street, How I Beat the Dealer and the Market"
"When Genius Failed: The Rise and Fall of Long-Term Capital Management"
The short story is that the implied vol is a sort of balancing price between how much the option loses in value over time vs how much you can make performing the hedge.
When trading, you don't want to wait to see an "updated" IV, you would want to respond directly to changes in important and well understood parameters like underlying price.
All the other factors, time including, are the same for everyone.
Maybe you mean that “implied volatility is really the implied standard deviation of the price over time”.
IV is essentially using prevailing prices to understand what everyone else has estimated that forward volatility to be.
Beyond that, you will also find that IV differs across strikes [1]. Still, being able to fit a vol smile from incomplete market data (and some other adjustments if you are very sophisticated) and then price an arbitrary option is pretty useful.
There are many empirical option pricing features that this equation can't explain - the "smile", the "skew", ...
If you try to fly a rocket across the solar system using only Newton's equations, it will crash. That doesn't make Newtonian mechanics useless. Almost every option-pricing engine in the market starts with Black-Scholes-Merton. Smiles and skews are all dealt with on the vol surface--it's an expandable variable.
Part of the reason a Gaussian distribution is used so much is that you need a stable distribution if you want to be able to perform algebra on your random variables. The variance of the Cauchy distribution is undefined and the variance of the Levy distribution is infinite, so Gaussian is really the go-to distribution.
I would answer- not much.
You can think of BS as a curried function. Since all the other params are fixed, you can curry and get a reduced equation that only depends on IV and underlying. If you do that, then its just - you give me iv and underlying, i give you spot. So, for a given strike(fixed), with the prevailing time left(fixed theta) under current interest rate(fixed), given the underlying, the historical vol gives you the wrong spot. You fudge it until you get the right spot. Call the fudged quantity the IV. Now plot that fudged quantity for a few other strikes and you get a smile. Then you can mess with that smile, plot the vol surface etc but end of the day, does the BS equation matter if the price of spot is going to be off and you have to fudge it with IV ? Its a good question. From an operational standpoint, the equation doesn’t matter. You can use bopm and get a more intuitive price anyways. Traders can trade the iv without knowing what effect BS has on the system.
When I was in 5th grade, they took us to the top of a tall building. We dropped a ball and measured the time it took to hit the ground. So if you square that time and multiply by 5, that’s how tall that building is. At that age I thought wow this is such magic! Then I grew up and reached 8th grade and worked out equations of motion with some basic differential calc, and derived the canonical equation s equals ut plus half at square. So since u is zero and a on planet earth happens to be g which is 9.8, half of which is about 5, that’s why 5t^2.
ok but does this equation matter ? I could have gone my whole life measuring height of buildings without knowing what is gravity.
But... what really happens (in my opinion) is... options makers or writers or whatever might set a price based on what they feel is fair/good for them/whatever
Then a bunch of people on Robinhood make memes over it, hammer the bid, IV goes to 160%, voila...
Why does "spot" price matter in that equation? Robinhood buyers + supply/demand are what drives IV in reality I feel.
Former options market maker. We basically made money because of (a) people setting prices based on gut feel and (b) retail investors buying options for leverage and then forgetting to exercise barely in-the-money contracts. The first has largely left the market; fortunately, the second came in with gale force.
> Robinhood buyers + supply/demand are what drives IV in reality
Of course. Supply and demand drive price. Volatility is a measure on price. Options are principally an instrument for trading volatility.
It's still quite generalized in that it assumes a flat volatility surface, which even traders in the pits intuitively knew was wrong (thus the emergent volatility smile after '87). What it did allow was for a single number (implied volatility) to function as the single knob to be dialed to move quotes up and down for convex instruments. Therefore, instead of calling a trade desk and working out direct price quotes, you could have an immediate frame of reference ("this is trading at 31 vol") and move the offer to, say, "30 vol", leaving the calculation to the computer because both parties shared a language.
As for the vol smile and lack of volatility surface uniformity in real markets, it wasn't an issue, because pit traders were fine pricing different strikes at different vols, and players deeper in the volatility space had their own more accurate models geared for each market/instrument.
Knowing an underlying's iVol gives a good general overview of the pricing landscape with just a single number, and then if you need more precision, you can pull up the list of strikes and ivols for each strike and see the shape of the vol surface. That just takes a few more seconds. It's very quick and very useful, from the pit trader crews with the proto-handheld computer to the sell side and buy side deals working the phones. Utility!
To expand a bit, it is also a great feature that the second level of granularity (breaking away from the theoretical flat vol surface by applying different iVol values to different strikes) isn't crammed into another overarching generalized model. It breaks the model and lets traders go, say after the '87 crash, "tail risk is trading much higher what it has been historically, and this stuff is staying permanently bid, looks like a regime shift. We don't have a generalized model for this yet but in the meantime, traders in the pit are working with this new pricing, we can all see it and speak the same language, and we'll work out the new generalized models at a later date." That's why these simple options pricing models are still useful today, even though there are far more known kinks in volatility surfaces than there were decades ago.
Utility yes, accessibility no. It quantified the previously artistic. You may enjoy Peter Bernstein’s Against the Gods.
> pit traders were fine pricing different strikes at different vols
Former algorithmic options trader. We ate the former pit traders for breakfast. Modelling the volatility surface is an entire field, and to the extent problems in finance can be solved this is sort of one of them.
I mean sure. They're related. Same way the Michelson-Morley experiment implied special relativity. That doesn't detract from Einstein specifying just how. (Derman is legit but Taleb is a hack.)
Options are a relatively tiny market, but are nonetheles key to reasoning about markets.
I assume this should always be possible using functional programming.