Attacks on Anonymity Systems: The Theory (2003)
github.com
github.com
In any case, while reading about Len, I came across this spectacularly good talk on YouTube. I learned so many cool things from the talk about how to design secure decentralized systems and how to evaluate threat models and think of creative attacks (as well as how to defend against them) that I wanted to share it with more people, thus the transcript linked here.
Even though the talk is "old" (from 2003), it still seems incredibly relevant and interesting to me, and I think you will enjoy it, too.
I have considered porting mixminion to Go and implementing it as designed.. it's pretty interesting. I think it would be neat if you added "bridges" like an SMTP -> Mixminion and Mixminion -> IRC/Matrix/etc.
Of course, you could chain something like Mixmaster -> SMTP bridge -> Mixminion or Mixminion -> Tor -> IRC/Matrix/etc.
edit:
I submitted the URL to HN as well.
https://eprint.iacr.org/2008/475
It's already in use by the Lightning Network.
The "modernized" Internet got addicted to low-latency interactive protocols. It's basically impossible to protect these from a global passive adversary. All the cool research results (mixnets) produced protections for protocols that have been proclaimed to be extremely uncool these days (like email and bitcoin tx broadcast).
> TOR is the successor to these efforts (despite the fact that it seems controlled by the NSA).
It would be smart for a global passive adversary to invest in technologies that protect people against everybody except them and then give the results away for free.
If I were a supervillian, I would definitely do that. Then I would kill people based on metadata. I'd also be more careful about letting my minions do the kind of dumb shit that gets them multi-year conference attendance bans and 11:30pm (not a typo) speaking slots.
Damn, I should become a supervillian.