All correct until this bit. They in fact want to shift it back to congress, who should do a better job in specifying what power they delegate to unelected heads of executive branch agencies.
That is one potential, down-the-road outcome of non-qualified judges being inserted into the process. Stalling oversight is the outcome that dominates all of it tho.
> congress, who should do a better job in specifying what power they delegate to unelected heads of executive branch agencies.
A law with every possible contingency can not be written. It's why Congress signals the desired outcomes the language of the law and expects qualified agency employees to bring those outcomes to fruition.
> The idea behind such deference is that expert agencies, accountable to an elected president, are better suited than federal judges to make the policy choices that Congress left open.
>At the time of the 1984 Chevron v. NRDC ruling, Doniger notes, it was widely perceived in legal and political circles that judges in the lower federal courts were inappropriately crafting policy by deciding for themselves what certain laws meant, effectively substituting their own ideas for the discernment of agency experts. “So the Supreme Court was basically saying to the lower courts: Stop inserting your own policy preferences under the guise of interpreting the law,” Doniger says.
> Now the Supreme Court could reopen the door for federal judges to decide how executive-branch agencies should go about their daily business whenever Congress has used ambiguous language
When Congress does that and there is a dispute, it ultimately falls to judges to adjudicate until Congress can update the law.