This is indeed a consequence of a physicalist/naturalist reductionist view. On that view, there is only natural entities and causes, and everything else reduces to just natural entities or causes. Therefore, as you imply, consciousness must somehow be explained by our biological brain or other natural entities/causes (note that I didn't say "arise", since some naturalists deny there's actually any such thing as 'consciousness' to be explained).
But you can also approach this from the other direction: it is impossible for naturalism to explain (or explain away) consciousness, and consciousness is real, therefore naturalism is false. That's my position. There isn't even the seed of an explanation given naturalism, and I think the naturalist's best position is to simply deny there's anything to explain. The whole project, given naturalism, is hopeless.
Again, it's not a problem of scale but rather kind. Naturalism just doesn't have the right building blocks to explain (or explain away) consciousness.
So you believe in a soul or what is the practical consequence?
Materialism (the much more common name of "naturalism") can, in principle, very much describe consciousness, if we understood the functionality of the brain enough. We already have an inkling, due to Turing: the human mind is quite possibly a computation, a mathematical object. Consciousness could then be an identifiable aspect of this computation.
I do agree though that in general, the materialist position is simply that consciousness is just not that deep a mystery, and some of the "deeper mysteries" like qualia are nothing special that even needs any explanation.
> it is impossible for naturalism to explain (or explain away) consciousness, and consciousness is real, therefore naturalism is false
I’ve always found the denial of the existence of experiential consciousness to be kind of funny. If you removed all my senses and put my brain in a vat to keep it alive, what would be left? As far as my brain is concerned, consciousness is the only thing for which I can be definitively certain of its existence.
It’s a solipsistic viewpoint, because I can only prove that consciousness is real for me. And since I can’t prove that it is real to anyone else, it’s not “science” in the sense of the societal process that requires reproducibility among peers, but perhaps it is still science at the personal level since I can reproduce the observation of its existence to myself at any moment that I choose.
Yes exactly, it is the thing that is most familiar to us, most accessible, and the only thing of which we can be certain. Descartes in his Meditations went down this path, starting with that foundation.
But I don't think you need to land on solipsism, because we don't have to believe only those things which can be proved. To me, it seems a reasonable hypothesis to suppose there are other consciousnesses. For an experimental line of thinking that leads to that conclusion, I would recommend the aforementioned Meditations.
Many are tempted to think that the physical world is the certain thing that we have, missing the fact that we experience the physical world, and so it is experience that we have access to, not the physical world itself. That I am conscious and have experiences of such and such is the thing I am most certain of. Whether there are physical things that correspond to those experiences is an extrapolation.
By way of analogy, if a civilisation had found an antenna, but has not discovered radio they might think that the internet and it's content is coming from within the antenna, because that's all there is.
So who knows, maybe god is an adtech corporation.
Or even the more limited version: consciousness exists, but doesn't have a lot of the magical powers usually ascribed to it (free will, etc).
edit: ok you're quite right there are other ways out of the conundrum like idealism
There is another monist view though, one that sometimes gets called idealism, that says there is nothing else except for mental entities or causes. I lean towards this view.
The challenge for naturalism is to explain (or explain away) consciousness (the mental). We call this challenge 'the hard problem of consciousness'. The challenge for idealism is to explain (or explain away) the physical. However, there is no analogous 'hard problem of non-consciousness' (but the explanation of this would take an unreasonable amount of words that I cannot fit here).
Well don't lean on it too hard because its not very solid ; )
There absolutely is. If the world is all ideas, then it's just as impossible to explain why different minds have a coherent shared illusion of the physical world, or even any kind of communication between minds at all. I think it's much easier to reject the concept of consciousness in a materialist world view than it is to reject the inexplicably shared physical world in an idealist world view.
Of course, there is the simple and self-coherent answer of solipsism, but that's a kind of an intellectual dead end, there's nothing really to discuss about it.
It is far from impossible. There are many idealist models. Here is one: there is a central consciousness (call it God), and God is able to give experiences to other consciousnesses, and those consciousnesses can communicate back to God.
On that model, there is a shared world because God gives experiences to these other consciousnesses as of being in a shared world. The other consciousnesses, in turn, communicate back to God what they will, and that influences future experiences that God gives to those other consciousnesses. That gives a shared illusion of the physical world.
Note that whether you're a naturalist or an idealist, you're going to postulate some things as true without justifying them. For the naturalist, they postulate the existence of physical things without explaining why the physical exists at all. For the idealist, they postulate the existence of mental things without explaining why mental stuff exists at all. If the idealist asks to be granted the above simple postulates, then a coherent shared illusion is possible. I'm willing to grant the physicalist whatever physical postulates they need, and from that I would like to see how they explain (or explain away) consciousness.
If I take a camera, a microphone, a speaker, and some other sensors and feed them into a CPU/GPU and self train it to have an understanding of its capabilities (internal/self) and the world around it (the external), this this consciousness or not? If I light a fire near this 'smart' computer via it's sensors it can detect the heat and move farther away. If I give this computer a complex task that it has to calculate multiple steps to achieve before it acts, is this not mental work?
In LLM based systems we can't really figure out how this occurs because the computational complexity of the operations is too high, much like brute forcing encryption, getting to the answer of how it's working isn't impossible, you'd just have to burn the visible universe to figure it out.