I’ve been the managing functional safety engineer for several safety-critical real-time embedded systems and safety-related components/SEooCs (including a RTOS), and something stood out to me after reading through the repository: This is not a safety-critical operating system, despite the project’s claim.
There was clearly requirements engineering and verification work done, and the authors are under absolutely no obligation to publish the requirements and methodologies. But there’s no safety manual / integrator’s guide provided, no evidence of any qualitative or quantitative safety analysis or modelling at any abstraction level having been performed, no evidence of a safety concept, and no evidence of a safety case. I recognize that this is likely intended as a PoC from the description of it being exploratory to produce a “Lessons Learned” report, but the website for the ESA initiative that’s driving this development claims that “The design of the system will be guided to support potential future qualification activities”. If that was done, there should be evidence of some of all of those work products, because that’s how you support future qualification. You cannot retroactively sprinkle safety on top of a system that hasn’t been designed with safety in mind.