There's also the benefit of having one set of controls with respect to profiles and extensions.
Is there empirical data on this? I think many in the security industry believe this. I ironically use FF if we can accept personal beliefs since I believe people attack the Chrome sandbox as a badge of honor and I can use containers to isolate state to different personas. That said also anecdata bullshit take on my part.
(2) The fact that people attack Chrome as a badge of honor is a reason to use it, not to avoid it. It's why exploits for Firefox would be cheaper.
(3) I don't think my take is spicy at all? I haven't refreshed it in a few years, but when last I did, I don't think I talked to anybody on either side of browser security who felt that Firefox outclassed Chrome (I got a long, valuable Slack thread from a FF security person that I wish I'd saved that built a claim that FF was approaching parity with Chrome architecturally). I have spicy takes, to be sure, but I think I'm giving you a pretty mainstream take from software security land.
(4) Even if you believed Firefox and Chrome (or Chrome and Safari) were at parity, it makes a great deal of sense to standardize browsers, for the reasons I gave previously. The right way to think of your browser "fleet" is as multiple single points of failure; diversity isn't helping you at all. This is one of those "put all your eggs in one basket and guard it" situations.
I don't have any particular personal reason to love Chrome. I'm a Mac person, so I guess the best outcome for me would be for Safari to be perceived as the best browser. Certainly my batteries would last longer! Every couple of years I talk to people about what the landscape looks like; if I ever get different answers, I'll be sure to update my take.
Did you ever see that written down. Or was it an assumption or rumour?
I ask because I specifically advise against that thinking and debunk the "big company = trustworthy" fallacy. But what I find is that actually there is appropriate low trust of US big-tech amongst the C level, but they are compelled to use Microsoft or whatever for non-technical/non-security reasons.
I think where this goes wrong is when Bob in purchasing confuses can use this approved supplier with must use this supplier and fails to notice said supplier about to be bankrupted in court over a multi-billion security scandal, and goes ahead anyway.
Voila! We just bought a couple million IoT bricks and doorstops that will be in a landfill next week.
We once had a city IT guy block our deployment because we were vulnerable to CVE-whatever - turned out to be a minir vulnerability in the DuckDuckGo browser
The assumption is that shit will or already has hit the fan, and the question is how to reduce your own liabilities as much as possible by throwing what you can on someone else.
Certifications were and are never about practical or literal security.
A sound banker, alas, is not one who foresees danger and avoids it. But one who, when he is ruined, is ruined in a conventional and orthodox way with his fellows, so that no-one can really blame him