Darknetlive Sold to Incognito Market
darkdot.com
darkdot.com
If they were 'reputable' they wouldn't have received kickbacks for linking to drug and cyber crime markets.
>>According to the Department of Justice, while DeepDotWeb was in operation a total of 23.6 percent of all orders completed on AlphaBay involved DeepDotWeb
Real reputable lol.
I still trust Rtings and love the website, but yeah it's totally possible that at some point they leave out a product because no revenue. I think the hit to their rep would be too big so they wouldn't, but it's always possible.
I think you’re truing to split hairs on what “reputable” means maybe?
>Some ads even contain malware...
Yeah but what does that have to do with this though? Google isn't getting a kickback from the people running the malware like the 'news website' that was seized was. Google doesn't want malware to be delivered from ads and takes many steps to mitigate it. To compare that to the direct kickback from drug and stolen ID marketplaces is silly IMO.
Remove that and you will find a new world. But do not remove the "your own moral values" filter.
When I had to do this, I came to some distasteful to me conclusions, eg that two adult siblings should be free to have protected sex. I just didn't see any way to justify not allowing that. Not many people do this.
i dont want to know "ethical people" who have academic beliefs about incest
Why do you want this? "It might help my boss make more money" short-term?
Finance your golden years - with a swarm of dark net glider guns! If one of them fails- who cares, they can spawn more of themselves as a service. Man what a utopian dystopian nightmare..
> Finance your golden years - with a swarm of dark net glider guns!
or you just take a chance, send funds and move on
Take away the oppression and the expense is significantly reduced
Need TOR to help stop corruption.
They do.
What we need is decentralized moderation.
What we need is decentralized moderation.
The best solution (utilizing a blockchain) we've found so far favors either electricity producers (pow) or the richest stakeholders (pos).
Ensuring 1:1 human:vote ratio is near impossible without centralization.
I mean - isn't that kinda normal war-on-drugs policy?
The cops aren't interested in helping you test your drugs for adulterants. They'd much rather arrest you, for having drugs.
We may not like it, but it's normal for cops.
The official policy of the united states government during prohibition for example was to poison thousands of US citizens for daring to consume a prohibited substance. People died because of it.
I don't understand that level of complete lack of empathy.
Maybe I'd feel differently if I were in a different demographic.
https://www.bbcnewsd73hkzno2ini43t4gblxvycyac5aw4gnv7t2rccijh7745uqd.onion
https://www.bbcnewsd73hkzno2ini43t4gblxvycyac5aw4gnv7t2rccijh7746uqd.onion
> Accurate URLs verified by PGP. No direct linking in order to protect against DNS leaks from accidental clicking in a clearnet browser.
How does the PGP verif work? I'm not used to it. There exists a tool here[1] but how does it all work?
I have no doubt that you can find one with similar prefix and/or suffix, but not to the degree of similarity of your example.
It doesn't.
But you could use brute force to produce something like https://www.bbcnewsd7xlp77nkq76byazcldy2hlmovfu2egnv7t2rccij... and at least some people will be inattentive enough to fall for it.
It is computationally infeasible to generate an onion address similar to an existing one. Yes you could make another one that starts with "bbcnews", but all/most of the other characters would be different. Additionally, since the BBC is using https, the cert would be different, or missing.
This is scaremongering.
The expected number of attempts to get one success at this would then be about 2²⁶⁹. Even so, a typosquatting victim would be very unlikely to make the exact right typo for the attack to work!
I think my reasoning is wrong somehow because I think there are only 2²⁵⁶ different onionsite public keys, so it doesn't quite make sense that you would have to do 2¹³ more work than trying all of them. But I'm still pretty convinced that it's going to be infeasible without a strong break of the hash function.
In terms of attacks that merely try to generate onion addresses that are merely somewhat visually similar to target ones (e.g. by matching at the very beginning and very end?), these are possible, and it would be interesting to see research about how likely people are to fall for various attacks like that. Maybe that research has already been done?
you are, except our theoretical familiarity with math and the antecedent nature of life can easily lead us to intuitions that mature to fallacies quickly.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Birthday_problem
>e.g. by matching at the very beginning and very end?)
Thankfully those smarter than us have solved this problem too - the "hashing" algorithm is so fundamentally lossy (but not too lossy to fall into the pidgen-hole paradox) 1-way, that it is mathematically impossible to have any knowledge of the end of the hash before you get it.
You can "brute-force" it backwards, sure (for some old hashes obviously) - give me a string that's MD5 starts with "Jerry" and ends with "loves math", and I will congratulate you on your waste of computational resources.
(although I think there's an explosion in the required space in that case because you need to store information about all of the values that you've already been able to produce, in order to learn whether new values collide with them!)
arbitrary may be the heavy lifter here, we can certainly birthday-paradox two address that look similar (square root, yes)
>(although I think there's an explosion in the required space in that case because you need to store information about all of the values that you've already been able to produce, in order to learn whether new values collide with them!)
bloom hash table a bloom hash table with some nerdy optimizations for backtracking, depending on whether your IO/CPU/GPU or network were the bottleneck. If you got a double-positive, skip the integer/nonce/etc.
Although, realistically, I'd be very surprised if in a quintilion PETAFLOPS you found a single 128bit number that, after being hashed twice, starts with "face" and ends with "book"
> Although, realistically, I'd be very surprised if in a quintilion PETAFLOPS you found a single 128bit number that, after being hashed twice, starts with "face" and ends with "book"
We can just calculate it. "face" + "book" is 8 characters in base 64, for a total of 8*6=48 bits that need to be set a certain way. 2^48 is roughly 10^15. Hashing once or twice barely matters at this point (2*10^15 ~=~ 10^15). A quintillion petaflops is 10^33 flops, so unless your hashing algorithm takes 10^18 floating point operations, you have an incredibly high probability of finding such a number within a second.
Just kidding - this was a much more clearer response with some actual math behind it, thank you.
This (may) explain a facet of .onion phishing attempts at a certain point in time.
~10 characters are easy enough to generate on a single machine so don't rely on a vanity-prefix and the trailing couple of characters only, but getting a new .onion address matching even half of an existing one within the lifetime of civilization is unrealistic even with state-actor resources.
You'd be better off trying to brute-force Satoshi's bitcoin private keys if you're feeling that lucky...
dark.fail has been comrpomised in the past
https://www.reddit.com/r/onions/comments/n1byhj/has_darkfail...
https://www.reddit.com/r/onions/comments/12axsiz/is_darkfail...
yes!
5uqd.onion
vs
6uqd.onion
.onion domain address are like cryptographic collisions - you must try trillons of nonces (random numbers, ya nasty brits) to even approach the chance of a collision that is recognizable in a literary sense.
Now, RAT's waiting patiently for you to copy/paste transferred funds have plenty of time - especially when they know (and so do many wallets noawadays) that most people check the first and last characters.
dark.fail has been full of fail for about 3 years straight now. you would think tor is basically dead if you use dark.fail
I will try to give a simplified explanation as best I can. PGP verification is a vital process to learn. Once learned it is easy to verify yourself. You need to know PGP if you are visiting .onion sites, it is not optional if you want any certainty.
The information in a PGP signed message is encrypted using a password (the private key) in such a way that only a different password (the public key) could unlock it. Once you have a trustworthy public key from a site/individual, you can check to see if a message was signed using the correct password in the matching private key.
If truly kept private, you can trust it is a message from the same person who gave you the the public key to begin with. That is how we know .onion urls are from the owners of the sites.
If the address ever needs to change, they will sign a new message that you can know for certain came from someone in possession of the SAME private key as the first time. Same if there is a new key pair, they sign it with the old one too, so you can trust the new one equally as the old. Well, you can trust it as much as you trust the owner to not have shared it or been hacked, bribed, or arrested.
Dark.fail tries to be someone you can trust. If you did trust them, you could trust all the addresses on their site, and thereby the public keys listed on those sites to be trustworthy as well. Dark.fail gives their seal of approval that everything belongs to whom it should on their site.
Their tool is just checking to make sure the keys match up correctly.
You cannot trust Dark.fail's seal of approval. They have proven you cannot trust them. Do not visit their site anymore. You always need to verify for yourself. Learn how.
Also, depends how the owner of the site protects their public key, and monitors the website.
I wonder if a significant of the links (if not most) are scam or honeypots.