Literally 98% of cases plea out^1, bypassing the entire system of court procedure that is supposed to resolve these issues.
1:https://www.npr.org/2023/02/22/1158356619/plea-bargains-crim...
> In fiscal year 2022, only 290 of 71,954 defendants in federal criminal cases – about 0.4% – went to trial and were acquitted, according to a Pew Research Center analysis of the latest available statistics from the federal judiciary. Another 1,379 went to trial and were found guilty (1.9%).
So 1669 defendants went to trial, and 1379 were found guilty, roughly 80%.
https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2023/06/14/fewer-tha...
1. the federal law enforcement, and prosecutors are prefect humans that only ever go after the guilty
2. The system is sooo skewed in favor of the government that fighting them is pointless, likely due to immense corruption in the system it self
Since no humans are perfect, I think the stronger case is for #2 to be reality
Imagine you offer a great soccer player a million dollars if he can shoot 50 goals in a row, and he gets to choose the defenders and goalies. He's probably going to choose children to go against him.
still not something we should be proud of
99.9% of criminal cases that go to trial in Japan end in a guilty verdict.
So maybe some humans are perfect enough?
And in most other places where it’s even an option it’s subject to much more rigorous scrutiny and pushback than here.
It will never go away here without a lot of effort, because prosecutors love it because they get to hype their “conviction rates” for re election. There are huge swathes of evidence of people pleading out while factually innocent because they can’t afford the cost (public defenders aren’t incentivized here - you need your own counsel), stress, inconvenience, and beyond.
Plea bargains, as implemented in the US, are a huge system drive by perverse incentives.
i.e a prosecutor should not be allowed to plead out a felony to a misdemeanor, that should be by default viewed as unethically coercive
If the feds have a high bar before opening a case, it's not immediately unreasonable that most of the cases are managed with plea bargains.
It might be better to look at the process beginning with arrests or beginning with investigations.
I can't find what percentage of that total pleaded guilty, but I did find[2]: "Of the 39 successful appellants in the Post Office Scandal, 35 had pleaded guilty to at least one charge against them."
Personally, I'm not feeling 100% confident in the adversarial system right now.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_Post_Office_scandal [2] https://evidencebasedjustice.exeter.ac.uk/false-guilty-pleas...
For ever Dollar a government gives to the prosecutors office, a dollar should be budgeted for public defense.
currently in most states is like 10%, if that
it's not a bad idea, but it's obviously ripe for just an additional layer of bureaucratic waste. clearly, there is a lack of trust that the police could handle evidence properly. so the natural follow up is who is trust worthy? how would it work? cops are called to the scene, but are then only there to "secure it" until some 3rd party comes along to collect evidence? what's the purpose of a detective at that point? we're not just shifting that role from a police agency to some 3rd party. are we going to re-establish the Pinkertons? if the detectives are no longer a role in the police, then more than likely those that would be attracted to that role would just join the 3rd party instead. so you haven't solved anything other than these people are no longer part of the police but are still involved.
our current system is so broken and evil that i wonder if just getting rid of it entirely wouldn't actually be better and more ethical. even with the problem of releasing however many violent offenders back in the wild. "it might be even more beaurocratic" isn't really going to convince me of anything.
i dont know what the best alternative solution is, im a software engineer. i just know that the current solution is depraved and should be torn down and replaced.