I think MCAS was one of those organizational failures. I could see myself implementing something like that. I imagine the conversation would go a little like this:

"We need to replicate the pitch performance of the 737-800. These engines pitch the plane up when accelerating and it messes up go-arounds."

"What if we have the computer just pitch down to compensate? We know the angle of attack and the engine thrust output."

<implements>

Meanwhile in another conference room:

"United is telling us that Airbus is giving them an A321 for 10% less than us. What can we cut?"

"No regulation requires us to have 3 angle of attack sensors. We could get by with 1 and stick it on the Minimum Equipment List if it fails."

"That sounds great."

Then the 1 angle of attack sensor fails the system that was designed for 3. Was it the engineer who agreed to hack 737-800 handling emulation onto the 737 MAX that failed here? Was it the engineer that agreed that the AoA sensors didn't need to be redundant, perhaps before MCAS was even invented?

These complex failures are rarely the result of one individual failing. Everyone did their job; the business saved United 10% (I actually have no idea who their launch customer was), the engineer saved thousands of pilots from being pulled off the line for re-training. But combined, it was a tragedy. Ultimately, it's the organization and its processes that failed, not an individual. As a manager, you own the organization and the processes.