However, not all organizations are happy to be contacted about security issues. Sometimes doing the right thing can still result in (threats of) legal repercussions.
https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2021/10/missouri-gov-cal...
The bug bounties also prefer seeing a working attack instead of theoretical reports. So not sure how they could have tested their attack in this situation without making actual changes.
It does seem like walking a precarious tight rope.
Once you've discovered a security hole, exploiting it to see how much access you can get is generally frowned upon.
I ended up having to reach out to someone senior I knew in the security org there to get them to swoop in and pick up the report, before it got any actual traction (I'd worked with that senior security engineer in a previous job).
For a long time Apple didn't have a bug bounty programme at all. This wasn't because they didn't care about security. It's because their own internal audits were generating enough reports to saturate the available capacity for bug fixing, so paying for more reports would have just duplicated work. Generally this is the pattern at big tech firms: you want to turn your internal security teams to a problem for a while before starting to pay out for a new class of bugs. But of course it's hard to descope a problem from bug bounties, it looks very bad.