What Happened to GE? (2021)
gatesnotes.com
gatesnotes.com
Further lessons from GE:
* Gaming the system internally or externally is something a CEO needs to actively manage and defeat, not reward.
* Trying to turn businesses based on contracts for delivery (with lumpy revenue/risks) into contracts for service and recurring revenue is a dangerous game, because you take your eye off the ball that is delivering the products in the first place.
* Conglomerates of disparate businesses never work in the long term, primarily because of the points above. Google is an example of how that affects IT/cloud/services businesses. Microsoft is an example of how to re-orient the business to focus on a specific class of customers (Enterprise) and their direct needs.
Tell that to Yamaha, Mitsubishi, Siemens, 3M, etc
EDIT: here's a list - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siemens#Former_operations
Is this a bad or good thing for sustainability?
They'd even, in the longer run, be better for their own shareholders and their descendants.
Japan’s bubble resulted in deflation because a bunch of zombie firms spent decades paying down balance sheet debts rather than resolving things quickly through bankruptcy. And the Japanese keiretsu structure mostly disadvantages businesses outside of the massive conglomerates, particularly small and medium enterprises.
So fraud?
It’s not much different to selling your house to someone and then renting it back.
https://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2007...
Somehow the projects didn't feel like diverting people and budget to makework tasks that fit the Six Sigma model as opposed to their reality. It eventually faded to be replaced by other codswallop.
https://web.archive.org/web/20120102065056/http://www.techno...
It was at the height of the 6 sigma management craze. I had 8 managers between me and the CEO. All of them were pitted against each other in a race to climb the corporate ladder. Internal competition wasn't the fundamental problem. It was how it created a culture of backstabbing in order to hit KPI targets. Managers would intentionally withhold important information from each other or hold back projects just to make their own quarterly reports look good. The general idea was you did a 2 year run at GE, climb as quickly as possible, then leave to pursue a consultant career teaching other companies the GE system of management.
The culture was driven from the top down by Jack. It looked good on paper but was eating away at the company's longevity.
The pinnacle example of the corrosive culture was when a female manager sent one of my female coworkers home because she wasn't wearing pantyhose. She pulled her into her office to explain how GE is a "dog-eat-dog" world, and women in particular need to act and dress a certain way to get ahead. And she wasn't wrong. Everyone was hyper focused on conforming to "the culture" driven ultimately by the quarterly reports, at the expense of all else. It was surreal with many parallels to a personality cult with Jack at the top.
Strangely, I enjoyed working there and seeing how the sausage got made. But OMG, if GE didn't fail, I would have lost my faith in true meritocracy... not to mention a bit of humanity.
Also, Jack Welch. :(
Why is that?
The vast majority of the bar culture problems are traceable to Welch, as is the shadiness of GE Capital.
Nature took its course, as charted by Jack Welch.
I'm the same age as Gates, so was equally immature back when Welch took over GE but I was not fooled for very long at all. Welch was 20 years older at the time, I was not impressed with the lack of acumen he had developed.
It was plain to see from almost the begining that Welch was ruining the company, he just didn't have what it takes naturally.
This was Edison's company.
>It’s also not a case of outright fraud, like Enron. It’s a textbook case of mismanagement of an overly complex business.
Resulting in financial shenanigans, like Enron.
It's just a matter of where regulators (and any underlying regulations) are functionally drawing the line between technically illegal and merely unethical financial manipulation at the time.
[0]: https://www.linkedin.com/posts/rezazahiri_revenue-valuation-...
Having used equipment from all 3, it feels like Siemens 50%, Philips 5% and GE stole some shit and glued it together as a joke someone paid them to perform.
I use MRI scanners and a huge part of my experience could be a local issue with service and application support.
What Happened to GE? - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=27535173 - June 2021 (3 comments)
Put another way, if you took every shortsighted MBA-driven business fad of the 80's and 90's and turned it into a person, you'd get Jack Welch. Sadly, his methods were very very good at juicing short to medium term profits, so firms all over the U.S. were quick to copy his methods, which did more damage to American innovation than any foreign power could dream of.
The "profits" were at least partially fraudulent -- division managers cooking the books in order to make their numbers. I seem to recall that some of them went to prison.
The Starbucks business remains almost entirely their retail service business.
In a way, the cheap bulk goods are just a way to convince people to get the membership.
Though you could make this argument for gyms, which are notorious for selling a lot of memberships to people who lack/lose the motivation to use them.
We glorify operators who keep operating - such as Elon, Zuck, and Bezos - but, few people seem to do it.
Long live the operators.
Regardless of how it happened in individual cases back then, this is still the case now, and if anything has accelerated, so it's not as worth mentioning as the wider phenomenon: Why are so many different companies in so many different industries putting out much worse business/consumer products these days? Because they're not in the business of selling to customers any more, but in the business of selling non-commodity money products to the financial sector in a little-known industry called "The New York Stock Exchange" so funds, or individuals, can bridge their shortfall between compounding obligations and shrinking currency value. GE isn't in the business of selling turbines, GM doesn't sell cars, Microsoft doesn't sell software, Broadcom doesn't sell components, Moderna doesn't sell pharmaceuticals, and Pepsico doesn't sell sugar water to children. All of them are in the primary business of selling money that's not on a pre-expected inflationary schedule, and everything else they do is just a particularly long-run guerrilla marketing campaign for that money over the other guy's in the corporate headquarters down the street. If they wanted to be in some other business, they'd either not go public in the first place or buy back their stock so they didn't have to serve two market masters any more.
This explains why going public can be such a Faustian bargain for so many otherwise successful companies that quickly and seriously trips them up; it's essentially a decision to pivot the business from a product market fit to a new sector most of the building usually knows nothing about, just because it will let them double-dip on monetizing their hard work. Is there any other situation where a move that extreme, or the same pivot for any other reason, wouldn't get laughed out of the room? I can't think of one. It turned out to work for a couple of years for google by letting them attract top talent to the advertising products of anything not called search or ads (before they've now been losing the plot just like everyone else), and combined with the good timing of running their business through the first quarter of this century made their pivot very successful, but most companies aren't called google.
It also explains a lot of surface-level counterintuitive behavior: why are too many arch-capitalists not nearly as interested in investing in innovations that price their competitors out of the market as we'd like them to be? Because they wouldn't be mostly investing in innovation but in advertising, since you can't innovate a piece of paper with "1 share" written on it (without running afoul of the SEC and co. at some point). Advertising isn't really an investment; it's more like gambling, and most of the financial sector sees gambling as an uncomfortable risk (for their suppliers anyway) even if you happen to be up a bit right now. They'd much rather see a steady "blue chip" growth pattern that's half a point above the index than the wild swings in revenue and spending that come from experimentation, so it only happens in C-suites with a culture of tolerating more gambles and their associated stock spikes. Why are so many companies moving to the same business model of skeleton operational costs and recurring subscriptions instead of trying to carve out different niches for different consumers? Because the financial world, by dollars, largely prefers the advertisement that that's how their suppliers increase the attractiveness of their quarterly reports, so the customer is always right. Why are even accelerating startups entering the big leagues so much more eager to get bought up by the bigger, more ossified old guard than try to replace them, even as it puts them at more and more legal risk? Because gaining a footing through advertising is an absolute slog of a business to cut against the grain in, much more than tech or manufacturing or grocery services or logistics or what have you, and in this age it's tougher than ever, so they make the reasonable decision to throw in the towel and drift off someone who's already got momentum.
I could go on, but I already feel like a broken record and it's mostly more of the same. There's plenty of historical particulars to consider, But what happened to GE from a 10,000-foot perspective? The same thing that happened to everyone else: the index hit 4-7٪, the appeal of being on the top of that pile looked like a mirage of water across the desert, and they pivoted, to unanimous applause until they either made it or the wheels came off. Everything else is the same story in a different setting.
Although I do think that it is a mistake to just pin blame on Welch for that. There is a pretty solid amount of evidence that the WWII-era-boom US started falling apart from the early 1970s; there were a lot of ugly trends that took hold after US traditional oil production peaked. One of the symptoms is that nobody important seems to see a model where the States are a world class manufacturer. If nobody sees a way to run manufacturing companies at as high-performance entities then it won't happen. There is a lot of blame to be assigned to the space between the CEOs.
That is to say, my thesis is that management is optimising correctly in context - but they are in a context where US manufacturing excellence doesn't make as much sense as it once did.
See also https://wtfhappenedin1971.com/ where a bunch of important changes are showcased. Modern management styles that aren't good make a lot of sense sense when considering a lot of those graphs. Financial shenanigans have a lot more payoff than manufacturing, and manufacturing gets harder as the energy squeeze happens.
We don't have cities like Shenzhen, where everything you need to get a product to market is within same-day courier range. I understand this was a feature of the old "hardware-centric" Silicon Valley, and it made fast iterations on new products a lot more viable. I wonder if we could even build a hub like that today, with property speculators and NIMBYism blocking anything short of grabbing a cornfield in Iowa and declaring it our new national manufacturing centrepiece.
We've completely ceded on education, and that was realistically where we could have competed. We could never match the labour prices of China or Viet Nam, but we could offer better trained workers. Our schools are a disaster, and it feels like we've completely lost a focus on competitiveness. It was only a few years ago, we were very fixated about being beaten in test scores, but now the focus has been lost to social battles (scares over LGBTQ+ content) which suck all the oxygen out of the room when people want to ask about actual student achievement.
We don't have the right backing for moonshot inventions. The way we lost solar panels to the PRC should be a freaking embarrassment. We knew for 40 years that people are going to want these things. Moreover, it was a new technology-- you didn't need to fight with entrenched players that didn't want to retool (like EVs)-- all you needed was a stream of seed capital and friendly loans to make sure people built here first.
This might be helped with some more government intervention-- strong industrial development finance products with a VC-esque mentality of "90% of them will fail, but a few will pay off 50-fold". The state is a good backer here, because they can take the "50-fold" in forms other than raw stock appreciation, like "securing an industrial edge for our country."
Tesla and everything Musk-associated bucked the trend for a while because of the literal personality cult surrounding him back then (a thing easily forgotten by now when everyone likes to hate him), that's why his companies were still able to get young talented engineers and working them very hard while not paying Google-like comps.
Not every talented engineer is eager for the cut-throat hustle to chase a 600k comp package (which ends up at 70k when the stock implodes). I'd think it might even be slightly less common when you get into research and greenfield stuff-- you've got people motivated by a vision and the opportunity to deliver it.
Messaging like "We have the financial and structural backing to keep the project alive indefinitely" and "This is a job for life-- if it takes you 20 years to make the breakthrough, we're willing to wait" might appeal to those people, even if the compensation is a bit lower.
Similar (and related) discussion when it comes to education, people earning 600k per year will be able to provide better education opportunities to their children compared to the passionate but earning-less-money people, and if you're part of the second group at some point it will become harder and harder to explain to your spouse that your kids won't get the same chances in life compared to your friends' children because you're going for passion over money, unlike said friends.
I know that all this sounds very mundane but it's part of day to day life, maybe the Soviets had a good idea when they basically built scientists-only cities in the middle of Siberia or somewhere like that.
Why is that a problem? Isn't that what "building" a hub means?
What do you think Shenzhen was before it got the SEZ designation?
Nothing else matters more than finance, and it's shareholder value above everything else (consumer value, employees' well being, return to society be damned) is the ideology Welch instilled in generations of MBAs that went to control most corporations.
When everything is judged on a single metric it ends up eaten by Goodhart's Law, the corporate game is to manipulate the books well enough to increase share value, the finance market does not care if layoffs will impact the company's competitiveness in 5-10 years, the finance market does not care if the company is eroding their customers trust (e.g.: Google killing off products willy-nilly), if the books look good and costs are down while revenue is up then share price go up.
It will crumble, it's not sustainable, the main issue is when will it crumble and how destructive it will be for normal people.
This doesn't make sense to me. Are there no 5-10 year derivatives?
There are still fundamental investors out there
None from the quant traders train like Jump, etc.
I do wonder how much of an attitude of "we don't need everyone to be successful, we just need enough" there is among policy makers. At this point, it seems that it's more cultural than a mere policy reorientation could fix to make the average student academically competitive again.
Indeed, but also aggressively pushing that kind of content in the first place
It's simplistic to think there was a single cause of failure. Sure, toadyism might delay bad news, but how exactly did they lose their market and product advantages in each of their businesses?
Partly I think it's just too easy to steal expertise once it can be packaged and processed, whether business or engineering or manufacturing. A lot of very expensive value probably just walked out the door. I suspect that has been the business strategy for most of the up-and-coming engineering and product companies today. I wonder if there's some way to quantify that hypothesis?
He goes on to mention a few things for the downfall:
* Lack of understanding of financial investments by the management and executives
* Encouraging hearing 'good news' and hiding 'bad news' by leadership, which meant they were ignorant of many festering problems that needed fixing
* Diversity in enterprise -- lack of ability for anyone to understand how all the pieces fit together
* Cooking the books to keep Wall Street happy
I think perhaps you took something from the article that wasn't present, or I missed the part where he attributed 'simplistic' causes.
However, in my personal opinion I think Gates is too close to the situation and the actors to have a qualified and unbiased opinion. Refusing to blame Welch for anything besides being slightly ignorant of financial complexities illustrates that he isn't willing to look at Welch's leadership critically.
And yet, companies these days follow the same path and predictably crash and burn.
I have some hope that Samsung will learn from GE, and decide not to fully discard its more recent-era reputation for quality and excellence.
Chinese companies have been buying reputable brands, and building new reputable ones (not the disposable random-name spamming brands that Amazon lets ruin searches).
Maybe Samsung will figure out how to compete in the demand for good quality. As a consumer, I started to think they were moving in that direction in some categories, from their earlier budget-brand rep in computer products, but looks like maybe not.
(Example: There's been price-gouging for remaining new-old-stock Samsung 2.5" Pro SSD, because Samsung discontinued it. By reputation, people consider it better quality than any brand's current 2.5" SSD offerings.)
Commercial appliances are the way to go for reliability. They are 3-4x the cost but for some appliance categories that's palatable. E.g., we were able to buy a Speed Queen but haven't found a commercial fridge we're comfortable buying.
Commercial isn't all upsides, either, since you are committing to owning the same unit for longer and paying for a series of repairs over time (or DIY if you have time and expertise.) The bulk of the retail market would rather put that money into a new unit every 8-10 years. We're with the crowd in some appliance categories, not all.
https://www.cringely.com/2009/01/22/bob-the-impaler/
> The real problem at Microsoft is one that every other public company would love to have – they make too much profit. So unlike every other public company, Microsoft traditionally manages its earnings not by cutting expenses but by increasing spending. It’s a legacy technique invented years ago by legendary CFO Frank Gaudette and embraced by Bill Gates and Jon Shirley because it accomplished the task of meeting Wall Street expectations, allowed the company to hide spectacular true profit margins, while still generally keeping anti-trust officials off Microsoft’s back.
They’ve brought out a heat-pump based low-energy use combined washer/dryer* that supposedly performs great - something that can’t be said for existing combo or low energy systems.
I was surprised to see innovative appliances from GE! I thought they had been reduced to re-badging cheap, mediocre systems produced by other manufacturers. I hope this means the company is on the right track again.
*https://www.geappliances.com/appliance/GE-Profile-ENERGY-STA...
Signing off now to do a big load of dishes by hand.
They had a tech come out and repair it, so the sound is only half as loud now, but still much louder than any (non-Samsung) ice maker I've ever heard.
https://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2007...
Great to see the self awareness here.
There were many fans/followers through out US corporate boards - just like sports coach lineage, there were Jack's lieutenants taking over US corps. I have not followed their success/failures. All I remember was my then boss's total admiration for his management approach - I did not stick around.
I always assumed he caught the great bond bull market run at the right time and GE Capital made him the captain of US industry - his is one of the main reasons of US decline in manufacturing. If not for silicon valley - we/US will be in a poor state
The loss of American manufacturing directly threatens this pre-eminence, which in turn threatens a lot of what made this world the way it is.
I'll never be able to understand the "Genius of Jack Welsh", but I don't suppose I'm really missing that much :)
They are stuck in a perpetual performative.
PCBs: "Neither does Jack Welch."
https://www.forbes.com/advisor/investing/ge-stock-split/#:~:....
GE’s all time high share price (split adjusted) is $377.68 on 8/28/2000. It has lost nearly two-thirds of its value in the past 23 years, and that doesn’t account for inflation.