Comment by cromka | Hacker News Reader

Comment by cromka | Hacker News Reader

Can someone explain why the focus is on FAA, while there's also EASA and others? Do they also allow Boeing to self-inspect and self-evaluate themselves like FAA does?

Can FAA and Boeing be really the only ones to blame here? If Boeing was in bed with FAA that much and they were dropping the ball on safety, shouldn't EASA's own process take note of that and extra-scrutinize Boeing planes during certification for European sky compliance? Especially that it would play in Airbus' advantage, and I am sure some allegiance between the two is definitely in place to some extent at least.

How did, for example, EASA allow the MCAS on 737 Max? I mean we know Boeing abused the FAA trust in their process, but why did EASA not raise concern over the same?

Something is missing here and I don't appreciate that somehow everyone seems to forget that those planes are absolutely not certified by the FAA for use by the rest of the world. At the very least, EASA is as shitty at certifying those planes as FAA is. Or, actually, is even worse, considering that in theory the reason FAA allowed it is because Boeing took advantage of them, meanwhile EASA should have done the full re-certification?

I don't recall if it is just by handshake agreement or in an actual treaty but the country where the manufacturer of a plane operates is the one designated authority over that manufacturer.

FAA issues Airworthiness directives and sets rules Boeing has to follow. EASA largely defers to the FAA (not always but in almost everything).

Similarly the FAA follows EASA when it comes to issues with Airbus.

Both FAA and EASA requirements are roughly alined anyway so it doesn't make that much difference.

Boeing has been coasting on their engineer-led culture from the past. They're only allowed to self-certify on things that are not "safety critical" so having the FAA review that designation seems more useful.

FWIW when Boeing merged with McDonnel-Douglas the GE protégé crew took over. The decision to move headquarters was done deliberately so the machinists and engineers couldn't go complain to the bean counters in person.

Also think about Boeing setting up a factor in South Carolina and fighting so hard to prevent that factory from unionizing. They're focused on giving labor a smaller share of the pie... on some of the most expensive (and formerly profitable) things humans build, with a decade-long order book where every single unit they make is pre-sold years in advance. (Recent screwups have hurt them badly though).

Do you want an airplane built by an accountant-run company that cares about finding the cheapest most disposable workers to build the airplane? Whether it matters or whether the union sucks is irrelevant. The fact that Boeing management was so determined to screw the workers who assemble these planes says a lot and none of it is good.

> FAA issues Airworthiness directives and sets rules Boeing has to follow. EASA largely defers to the FAA (not always but in almost everything).

> Similarly the FAA follows EASA when it comes to issues with Airbus.

> Both FAA and EASA requirements are roughly alined anyway so it doesn't make that much difference.

Thanks. That then explains it. Although I have a feeling this mutual trust has its expiration date and I would be surprised if EASA didn't actually start raising concerns over the FAA's credibility.

I believe that's only true for planes flying over/through other countries, and it is not universal. In order for a plane to be sold in EASA governed countries it has to be certified by the EASA. So in effect, the 737 is getting certified twice. In general aviation there's this common misconception that the Cirrus SR line can't recover from a stall, which is because the FAA drops spin recovery testing if you ship with a BRS (parachute). Reality is, when the SR line was certified by the EASA it was required to demonstrate spin recovery. Another discrepancy is that the EASA does not recognize "experimental" has a category of aircraft, so an FAA classified home built experimental that flies to an EASA country would not be allowed to take off after unless the national government has rules that allow it (also applies to ultralights).

That's true. Aircraft that do not cross borders are only subject to the home country's laws.

FWIW I'm very glad in the US we still allow experimental and home-built aircraft. That's how we got aircraft in the first place and many experimental planes (most?) are built from kits engineered to similar specs as certified aircraft, they just don't go through certification.

However EASA does not actually make Boeing go through a full from-scratch certification again. For the most part EASA reviews the FAA's certification and does not actually put the 737 through a from-scratch certification. This is part of the various "Bilateral Aviation Safety Agreements".

For certain hard requirements (as you noted) there may be disagreement on the rules and the manufacturer may be required to do additional certification with FAA or EASA for the differences but again it is not usually a from-scratch process - it only covers the differences. Technically other countries have similar processes and their own agreements but FAA (being the origin country of powered flight and home to the most aircraft manufacturers) and EASA (home to Airbus and also highly involved since the early days of powered flight... the Wright brothers toured France with their flier to much fanfare, disproving a lot of skeptics in the process) are the leaders and everyone else mostly just follows them rather than inventing their own rules and certifications.

EASA generally respects FAA activities unless something's extraordinarily fuggity fuggity boop. The reverse is also true, so you can get EASA auditors in a US plant. . but woo boy, there is no way to express the sheer panic we would all feel when we learned our pet FAA DER was going to be replaced by some steely-eyed Aryan bastard from EASA with his micrometers and tiny little notebooks. Those guys did not screw around. Speaking anecdotally, of course.

I suspect that the EASA/EUROCAE guys were often "accidentally" brought in when FAA was getting sick of us trying to slip stuff by them. Sort of like, "Try that Consumables trick with me again, and I'm sending Hans"

Not much of a sense of humour around work, the Germans.

There are indeed several other examples of this partial delegation of authority for decisions concerning safety, either to industry players or to third parties, though the FAA "ODA" mechanism is probably the most prominent. EASA's mechanism is similar in many respects, but more focused on properties of the oversight entity within the designer-manufacturer firms than on properties of the individuals doing the work. I wrote a discussion paper on precisely these issues a few weeks ago, which discusses some of the questions related to independence from commercial pressure, access to expertise, and so on:

https://onedrive.live.com/?authkey=%21ALZ0IuyZGHImolY&id=D37...

Woah, amazing!

I don't know if that's at play, but the specific door configuration that Alaska 1282 had is apparently not that common in Europe. I'm sure EASA will take note though.

> I'm sure EASA will take note though.

There are no 737s operated in that configuration in Europe, so while EASA accepted FAA's grounding notice, it didn't really affect the EU.

But that's beyond the point. The point is those flawed quality controls that Boeing does on behalf of FAA could in theory affect other areas, not just the plug door. And so I wonder if EASA also allows Boeing to self-certify, or do they perform the checks themselves?

Pretty sure airplanes in Europe have safety critical bolts in them, and pretty sure they need to be torqued right and double checked.

So the doors are kind of a distraction from the apparent fact that Boeing has forgotten how to make airplanes which do not threaten the lives of all those in and below them.

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