The problem was not really the software in isolation, but that pilots expected the 737 NG to behave exactly like the old version - because Boeing decided it was too expensive to retrain pilots.
Is that what you meant by "the problem wasn't the software?" Because the pilots should have been trained to unplug the computer to stop it from crashing the plane?
Afaic, the fault apportionment was Boeing documentation > airlines >> pilots > Boeing technical design.
Edit: Also, how does the fault lie with the airlines? Boeing didn’t document the existence of MCAS in the flight manual or training materials.
>> Because the pilots should have been trained to unplug the computer to stop it from crashing the plane?
Yes.
The fault lies with the airlines because I don't for a second believe they didn't put pressure on Boeing to get the MAX certified without mandating retraining.
And then once that was done, didn't dig into the details too hard about what changes were made.
I have a low tolerance for 'I set up all the conditions and incentives to encourage you to break the law... but you should take all the blame when it explodes.'
At some point, the customer has to take some responsibility for what they asked for.
If you listen to podcasts, these two episodes of Causality are excellent:
https://engineered.network/causality/episode-33-737-max/
https://engineered.network/causality/episode-50-737-max-ethi...
Back when I flew regularly before covid, I was tempted to create a bunch of these and hand them out to the flight crew for the flights I flew on.
They introduced MCAS in the aircraft for to balance by software a hardware issue, a big design negligent issue which can lead to stalling. It is beyond to trim an aircraft, and because of this there is a big difference in the scale of the values that the algorithm manages from a trimming.
It is not my field, but I think it is not a simple factor, and that it should not be put this over the Pilots like if it were a normal aircraft that received a simple update. Every pilot flying that plane should have been warned that it was not a classic plane with a classic update.
If this type of behaviour by aircraft manufacturers becomes the norm, costs over safety, we as passengers will suffer it, as other passengers unfortunately suffered it, while they blame the Pilots. In addition that nowadays the China's aircraft manufacturing industry wants to enter global market. Some days ago I read they want permission (homologations approvals) for to enter in the European Union.
PS: They also cut costs retiring backup sensors, delegating responsibility for a vital system due the MCAS to the buyer as if it was an unimportant feature; disaster was the order of the day. And the spending cuts were not limited to that, as we have seen in recent days.
> They introduced MCAS in the aircraft for to balance by software a hardware issue, a big design negligent issue which can lead to stalling.
> Every pilot flying that plane should have been warned that it was not a classic plane with a classic update.
I was mean,
> They introduced MCAS to use software to attempt to balance an aerodynamically unbalanced aircraft with a high stall tendency, in order to avoid designing a new aircraft.
> Any pilot flying that aircraft should have been warned that it was a plane that didn't want to fly aerodynamically, with software forcing it to fly without backed redundancy. It was not mere trimming.
In the 737 MAX, the only way to disable auto-trim also disables powered trim (the thumb buttons). As grand parent says, at a certain step in the sequence it was not physically possible for a pilot to trim the plain back to stability manually. It simply can't be done.
In the 737 ng, there was a button to do just that. That would have been useful.
And that's even ignoring the fact that all symptoms were very different from those present in a runaway trim situation as described in the manual and learned by the pilots.
The user of the parent comment is remarking about time.
The aircraft can be certified without MCAS?
By what I read, MCAS is there for to avoid entering into an aerodynamic stall when the aircraft is approaching a high angle of attack, due it's using larger motors for what classical 737 was designed for. It's balancing an unbalanced aircraft using software to repeatedly adjust the horizontal stabilizer.
It is not my field, but I'm not even sure if it should be called to trim, it sounds like a euphemism for what's going on.
Retraining has its own problems. No matter how well retraining is done, pilots still make mistakes from doing the right thing for the previous plane that is the wrong thing for the one they are currently flying.
Adjusting airplanes to fly the same way is a major safety advantage.
Unreported by the media, there was another MAX incident before the first crash. The crew had no knowledge of MCAS, but did follow the emergency runaway trim procedure, and continued the flight and landed safely.
Turn off the motor, and the trim is manual. There is a crank right there in the cockpit. If it is too hard to turn, change aircraft configuration to reduce the forces required to. Pilot know how to do this. This pilot stuff, they understand the forces on the flight controls and what impacts them.
Boeing made an engineering mistake. The pilots also made an operational mistake. Unfortunately, both mistakes at the same time were fatal.
I pray that pilot training has improved. And that Boeing has made systems level changes to the aircraft that will preclude it happening in the future.
And that is how aviation becomes safer every year; at a significant cost of customers lives.
"Significant" might be inaccurate.
It looks like FAA Part 121 accidents over the last 10 years with fatalities have been... 4. [0]
For a total of 6 fatalities.
[0] https://www.ntsb.gov/Pages/AviationQueryV2.aspx; 2018 (1 passenger fatality) https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Pages/DCA18MA142.aspx ; 2019 (3 crew fatalities, cargo flight) https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Pages/DCA19MA086.aspx and (1 passenger fatality) https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Pages/DCA20MA002.aspx ; 2022 (1 ramp fatality) https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/G...
I'm sure there's been a study somewhere that attempts to untangle all the factors that differ between commercial carriers and GA, to see which safety is most sensitive to -- continuous highly professional maintenance, highly trained and experienced crew, rigorous airliner certification regime, etc.
> The probable cause of this accident was the inappropriate response by the first officer as the pilot flying to an inadvertent activation of the go-around mode, which led to his spatial disorientation and nose-down control inputs that placed the airplane in a steep descent from which the crew did not recover.
Also, overspeeding the airplane makes it much harder to turn the manual trim wheel. The cockpit voice recorder on the EA flight recorded the overspeed warning horn, which the crew did nothing about (they were at full power, should have pulled the throttles back).
The LA crew restored normal trim twenty-five times before crashing. What they never did was turn it off after restoring normal trim.
What Boeing did (and is STILL doing) is expect pilots to know or remember obscure NON-PILOTAGE (and in the case of MCAS, BURIED) trivia to prevent disaster.
Now... what's the more-responsible approach? Expect pilots to pilot, or expect them to recall an ever-growing list of workarounds to incompetent system design?