> You're saying that the software itself should be held liable, instead of the people that created it.
Respectfully, I don't know how you're interpreting it that way. Until we demonstrate that the current generation of AI is genuinely intelligent, instead of clever algorithms, a piece of software is no more or less liable than an individual firearm is after it's been fired at someone. My observation is that your argument appears to be that there is something special about humans learning and creating derivative works from that learning over humans using a tool that does the learning and create derivative works.
> There is a possibility that you're not saying that, but it's the only interpretation of your comment I could come up with.
That's fair. I just don't get it.
> Because your comment consists entirely of comparisons of software to human brains about whether or not something should be considered legal, and this only makes sense if the software itself can be held liable.
Human brains and software are both tools. The question I'm invoking is what is it about a person doing the learning and the derivative creation that's different from a person (since, as you say, software itself has no personhood) using an artificial brain to learn and perform derivative creation.
I think the disconnect here may be that I'm operating from the assumption that of course there are human beings liable for the software, but your interpretation of what I'm saying is that software in a vacuum should effectively have personhood applied to it. These are two different things. I'm referring to both humans/brains and software as the interchangeable variable in the question of why the choice of tool means applying entirely different legal principles.
Sorry if I wasn't clear or still am not being clear here. I wanted to make sure I was being understood correctly, but if all we can do from here is agree to disagree, that's fine, and I'd offer to just shake hands.