The book also has one of the best and most succinct descriptions of Turing machines and the theoretical underpinning of computer science that I have ever read. Even if you’re an AI maximalist you should read the third chapter of the book.
The book also has one of the best and most succinct descriptions of Turing machines and the theoretical underpinning of computer science that I have ever read. Even if you’re an AI maximalist you should read the third chapter of the book.
Aren't we? Casual chains upon our matter produce emergent behaviors using the same physics and chemistry that our mechanistic creations rely upon.
Certainly those behaviors and results do not produce the same repeatable, predictable results as our clockworks but that is the whole point of the field of AI (as opposed to the marketing corruption/term that is currently in vogue, so GAI if you prefer), to produce system and algorithm structures designed with architecture and patterns more like our own.
Perhaps you believe in the ghost in the machine hypothesis? The magical soul that is more than the emergent evolving pattern produced across time by DNA replicators? That this undefinable, unmeasurable spirit makes us forever different?
I feel sarcasm in your last paragraph, but it feels rather dishonest, in the sense that you voluntarily use rather crude and ridiculous formulations, as if it was the only alternative. But there is some arrogance in thinking that we, smart as we are, finally got the final answer about one of the hardest questions in philosophy and metaphysics. Materialism is not proven: it is a basic methodological assumption of modern science - meaning that we do not have the tools to either prove or disprove it. Newton, Gödel and lots of other renowed scientists are knowed to have opposed materialism. Let's accept that the question is open.
On this topic, I always recommend reading the report of the Galileo Commission, which is a manifesto by a wide range of scientists and philosophers to reduce the stigma associated with even questioning this fundamental dogma.
Of course my description is of a hypothesis rather than ground truth.
It turns out that there isn't consensus over whether "The Hard Problem Of Consciousness" is actually a problem[0] but I need to admit I didn't know that before reading your comment. You may have been too kind in your assumption of my competence level on the subject. As adjunct, my writing was about my own currently highest probability expectations rather than a mature reporting of the state of the field of experts. It did not seem worth (then or now) writing to such a standard on a public discussion forum, even this one.
My last paragraph wasn't written with sarcasm (sorry to have given easy opportunity to read that in it) but it was a bit rushed, clumsily written, and unimaginative. Poorly written as it was, my curiosity was sincere (its been some time since I engaged with the state of the art) as was some of my dismissal. I have found it common that people have a belief in the uniqueness of humans as a platform for intelligence that frequently has its roots in sentiment and/or unexamined beliefs. Of course there are individuals whose thoughts meet a much higher bar. It is also the case that faith as a basis of belief does not invalidate the belief.
There is so much we don't know. We only recently explained how aspirin works[1]. That didn't stop it from working well during our long period of usage prior to our understanding. I'm comfortable with that an its analog here, that I don't understand consciousness and its mechanisms completely. I seem to experience it and it seems to result from what is, despite my incomplete knowledge of what that "what is" comprises. However, there is an imbalance of evidence for the material hypothesis and it seems plausible that emergent dynamics are sufficient to explain.
So... Yes, materialism is not proven and yet I currently hold it as the explanation that makes at least a partial contribution to the more complete truth. Further, that it is the explanation with the greatest volume of evidence and support. I suspect that it is sufficient for the emergence of intelligence and even consciousness in ourselves and as such sufficient for (through the same mechanisms) the emergence of intelligence and consciousness in our artificial constructs. Note that I also suspect we are still some distance from that inflection point.
Thank you for the reference to the Galileo Commission. I had not heard of it and am always happy to consider new perspectives and challenge those which I have held.
[0] https://survey2020.philpeople.org/ [1] https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/14592543/
With the subjective experience as an emergent property, things such as a society, a country, an economy could become conscious, in the sense of having a _subjective_ experience of their own existence as entities separate from the rest of the world. If we accept the "consciousness as an emergent property", we _have_ to accept that possibility. Which, to me, is not less wild or unlikely than, say, the "theory" of a field of consciousness "received" or "captured" by physical systems with certain properties, the same way a radio can receive radio programs. There are additional reasons to want to consider alternative explanations, but going into them would rrquire much more space - if interested, I would point to the report of the Galileo Commission.
So it does not change anything to physics, really: materialism is pretty much the best methodology to unpack the laws of physics: whatever you observe, see if you can find more elementary physical processes that explain it.
I am just a bit irritated by bold statements which assume that we know for certain that consciousness is an emergent property of physical processes. We do not, and the reason why this is such an accepted fact is more sociological than scientific - Newton and others decided to focus solely on physical processes as a methodological tool, and over centuries, the undeniable success of the approach in making discoveries _and_ building practical tools gave it an ontological status it did not have initially (Newton was for instance a very convinced Christian). Which makes me keen to remind that, because in the current scientific culture it is shameful to even ask the question.
And, this may be petty, but the self-comparison to the maligned Galileo is rather off-putting.
I don't understand this, all the programs I've ever written make decisions based on some factors.
Are you talking about free will? If so, what is free will?
Now, a program which is objective driven and can infer from new inputs might be something else.
Just like humans try to maximize the stability of their structures via a reward system. (it got slighty complex, faulty at times, or the tradeoff between work vs reward is not always in favor of work because we do not control every variable, hence procrastination for example, or addiction which is not a conscious process but neuro-chemically induced).
This is a very philosophical discussion, but if I had an infinitely-powerful computer and could simulate an entire universe based on a series of instructions (physical laws), would the beings in that universe that created societies not be "acting on their own"?
If the instruction set is limited and defined by someone else, I believe it doesn't.
I think, re. the simulated universe, that for us, they wouldn't have free will because we know causality (as long as we are all knowing about the simulation). But as far as they would be concerned, wouldn't they have free will if they know that they don't know everything and whether the future they imagine is realizable?
If they knew with certainty that something was not realizable, they wouldn't bother, but since they don't know, either they try to realize a given future or they don't.
Partial information provides choice of action, therefore free will.
So how would an agent based system connected to a multi-modal LLM/AI fall into this?
Just because it feels as though I do things because I can doesn’t mean that is actually true.
Choice stems from uncertainty, partial knowledge. It might be an illusion for an observer outside of the system, but as far as a participant within the system is concerned, there is choice, then there is free will.
I am writing this because I ca n but I don't need to do it. I have futures where I don't do that and do something more rewarding instead and still. As long as I am aware of the choices, then I have free will.
> Weizenbaum makes the crucial distinction between deciding and choosing. Deciding is a computational activity, something that can ultimately be programmed. It is the capacity to choose that ultimately makes one a human being. Choice, however, is the product of judgment, not calculation. Comprehensive human judgment is able to include non-mathematical factors such as emotions. Judgment can compare apples and oranges, and can do so without quantifying each fruit type and then reductively quantifying each to factors necessary for mathematical comparison.
Okay, so what is judgement? I haven't read that particular book and I don't quite remember his argument from interviews and lectures I saw, so this might be wrong, but I'd say it's for example saying "this is fair" when you measure the slices of pie you cut a cake into. That is, calculating that they're of equal size is pure computation; but there is no way to compute that when sharing cake with your friends, the slices should be equal.
Just like you can compute how much clean drinking water an average or specific person needs a day, with at least some accuracy, but when it comes to the question "should there be life in the universe" or "should people die of thirst", no computation could answer it. You could choose to write a program that decides it based on a random seed or a super complex algorithm taking a billion factors into account, but and then that program would decide the question, but it's essentially still something you did / chose.
It's little more than arguing for a "soul" with no evidence for any effect that can't be explained by cause and effect.
You say this as if we are even close to understanding much less reproducing the human brain completely, which probably would have to include the web of relations with all sorts of other living things that also go into the judgements we make, and the emotions we have while making them. Until you actually do draw the rest of the owl, it's not exactly "religious" to say there's no owl.
> Until you actually do draw the rest of the owl, it's not exactly "religious" to say there's no owl.
The "real owl" here is to assume the human brain does something non-computable, in violation of all known physics and logic.
And "computable" and "computable for us" are very different things. It's not about the machines or algorithms we might make one day, provided that we fully understand everything that goes into our our thoughts and emotions with nothing left unaccounted for, and everything turning out to be countable; it's about the ones we are actually making, back then and today, and then in some cases outsource our decisions to.
For something to be computable, it only needs to be possible to show that it is logically possible, by e.g. decomposing the problem into elements we know are computable or showing an example.
The existence of the human brain absent any evidence of any supernatural element is strong evidence that human reasoning is computable, and it's a reasonable, testable, falsifiable hypothesis to make: If you want to counter it "all" you need to do is to show evidence of any state transition in even a single brain that does not follow known laws of physics. Just one.
Alternatively, even just coherently describing a decision-making process that it is possible to construct a proof wouldn't be computable using known logic.
Either would get you a Nobel Prize, in either physics or maths. Absent that, even just a testable hypothesis that if proven would increase the likelihood of finding either of the above would be a huge step.
In the absence of all of that, it's pure faith to presume human reasoning isn't computable.
A computer can do all the calculations to decide on if it's a good idea. Given the inputs of the time they have spent together, the number of glances that are passed between then in the halls between classes, if he doesn't have a date yet or not, etc. The probability adds up to ask.
So the machine decides to ask.
The girl feels it. Has all the time they've spent together has made her feel a certain way? Maybe a weird tingle each time their arms touch. Is that glance in the hall this morning not just an accident, but him going a little out of his way for her to notice? She's asked around and knows that no one else has asked him, but doe he really not have a date yet? Can she overcome the bit of anxiety about asking a boy to the dance? Will she be able to accept the risk of rejection knowing that the chances may be high he says yes?
Only she can choose.
The determining factors driving a computer program can be fully quanitified; the sets of inputs and conditions is finite, can be reasoned over, and described fully.
That's basically the fundamental description of computing, in fact, and what makes a Turing machine.
The determining factors "IRL" are effectively infinite, a causal "chain" of infinite (or near infinite) complexity that expands backwards to the Big Bang, (or whatever) and sideways around the planet and beyond. There is no catalog you could make of all the "causes" that could isolate things enough to truly reason over and describe them all.
And so, yeah, to say it's all just "little programs" is the most ridiculous reductionism, that basically purposefully neglects to see the complexity and depth of the world around us.
I personally take a strongly determinist, materialist philosophical position. But I would never ever express that in terms of "programs" or anything similar.
The entropy of the observable universe is _finite_. https://physics.stackexchange.com/questions/4118/how-many-by...
"Does Quantum Mechanics Rule Out Free Will?" - https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/does-quantum-mech...
This post of yours sent me looking for this and I ended up with (now reading) Agassi’s provocative (& brutal) takedown of this book. As to the content of the book, Agassi pointedly mentioned Weiner. I will of course read Weizenbaum after this. (thanks.)
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/286058724_Computer_...
p.s. continuing on, the review turns very positive. Initial vitriol apparently more related to the “two worlds” matter.