I worked on a product that rotated the TLS certificate frequently. And it actually showed up a number of times in questions from customers or vendor security questionnaires about whether we rotated the certificates and how that happened.
But what we were never asked was whether old certificates were cancelled... which in that system they were not. So it didn't matter how many times we rotated our secrets, any old or leaked secret in a backup or elsewhere was still completely valid. But we had met the security theater that those rotations happened.
So I expect what you do, is that changing a password would cancel all sessions using that credential. But that's kind of hard to do, so we'll just leave that side buggy and untested, because we did the important part of the theater that said we can change passwords.
I'm confused, did you rotate your certs or your secrets?
Edit: relevant, especially flow2k's answer, which explains why this is _not_ just security theater https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/85963/what-is-t...
This does still leave the problem of the old certs being valid though. This only makes sense as a security practice if the certs are short-lived, which theirs apparently weren't. If the certs live much longer than the rotation window, this really is just security theatre.
I do think thaumasiotes has a point and GP's company probably misinterpreted the rotation requirements and short lifespans were implied in the requirement.
That's very true.
> and GP's company probably misinterpreted the rotation requirements and short lifespans were implied in the requirement.
Or GP didn't know that the company was indeed using short expiration times, and somehow confused it with certificate revocation (called "cancelled" in the post).
Huh? You haven't "rotated" your credentials until the old ones are invalidated. Adding new credentials isn't a rotation.