“Yes” means “no”: The language of VCs
jacobbartlett.substack.com
jacobbartlett.substack.com
The only thing that actually means "yes" in VC land is when the check clears.
What I'm exhibiting is probably more correctly described as cynicism. I've worked for a few startups that were sure they were hearing 'yes' from VCs and we ended up running out of money thinking a check would come any day now.
There's an old saying, "I'll believe it when I see it." Cynics and startup employees expanded this to, "I'll believe it when the check clears."
And then there's me over here, who knows you can claw back a check that has 'cleared' for about 30 days, saying "I'll believe it a month after the check clears."
It’s more often the small funds, the inexperienced family offices, and the junior associates that don’t have authority who string companies along forever. They don’t have as much authority or funds to actually work with, so they have a lot of time to string you along.
Lumping all VCs together really doesn’t lead to accurate descriptions of how the industry works.
> Good VCs are professionals and have no interest in wasting your time or theirs.
"Good" VCs has less to do about professionalism and more to do about pedigree. Professionalism and "good"/"bad" VCs are not mutually exclusive things.
1. It's a "no". (Clear, unambiguous.)
2. Here's why. (E.g. not believing in the space, issues with customer background or another part of due diligence.)
3. We make mistakes all the time and hope you prove us wrong. (I've pitched the partner at Sequoia who invested in FTX. His name's Alfred, super nice guy and fully aware that screwing up is part of his job. "No" isn't a value judgment.)
4. Happy to talk again for the next round. (If they're a multistage fund, e.g. you won't hear this from First Round.)
It's all very predictable. The one real "why" you won't typically hear back on is strength of the founding team. They won't tell you when they think you're the problem. But product, space, GTM, basically anything else they're happy to dissect.
This is true for all of the firms that people have heard of. Of course there's a long tail of bad VCs, too, generally podunk firms few people ever encounter anyway. Avoid TechOperators out of Atlanta, for example.
In reality the money never arrived, they forked in few times 250k. The other investors who bartered a deal all brought in their share. My takeaway is that even the most reputable investor has absolutely no limit in saying yes and doing no.
The motivation for everybody was greed, and that was buzzing around due to the fact a large investor was involved. They know that and they used it. But in the end in this world signed contracts and wire transfers are the only credible thing.
One of the largest investors in a given location might not be "top-tier" in the overall VC market.
If successful, acquire before any competitors even fully understand the potential. Worst case they hire the top talent if the venture fails. See Shell GameChanger[0] for an example.
I don't have any experience in this business, but why would anyone think otherwise? Did you spend your own money on a verbal promise of investment without any signed document??
1. Engage the firm and reach a decision that they'd like to invest.
2. Negotiate and sign a term sheet. (The only part of this that's legally binding is that you won't continue shopping around while negotiating the full deal with them. That said, it's extraordinarily uncommon for things to fall apart after signing a term sheet.)
3. Negotiate and sign the full deal. (This goes beyond just a contract, e.g. you'll be amending your articles of incorporation to reflect changes in board composition and a million other things.)
Virtually all breakdowns are in steps 1-2. Maybe the firm doesn't want to invest, or they aren't offering a compelling valuation, or they aren't flexible on dilution, or they only lead and you want another firm to lead, etc.
Keep in mind these are VCs, not PE. VCs make their money from outlier companies, so the competent ones don't optimize for worst-case outcomes. You'll never see a dirty term sheet (e.g. liquidation preference > 1x) from Sequoia, for example, because they don't return 8x on a fund by squeezing pennies out of failed startups.
You can't be mad at the no because you learn so much from their response that you feel thankful.
But the people who are in the bottom 80% tend to match with others in the bottom 80% as well. And so this kind of story resonates well, to the tune of 200+ upvotes.
Not criticizing anyone, but it's a trap that people fall into, both founders and VCs, employees and employers. Where the perception of these entities is biased by inexperience.
Honestly I prefer the approach of being extremely straightforward with expectations. Make your pitch, but also make it clear that you aren't interested in playing games and would prefer a clear "no" if that's the decision.
It should run on it's own and not need investor money. You shouldn't be focused on getting VC's, you should focus on developing an app that actually turns a profit.
It's not that difficult. Anyways, I found your story really interesting. Good story :)
But yes, after learning a lot from my various startup scars, I don't believe I'll be seeking VC dollars for an app unless:
- I am creaking under success with an impossible cloud bill - I am a late-onset cofounder of an already successful co that needs and app
Who is going to tell him/her?
Or, never reach sustainability and eventually go bankrupt - this outcome is actually still good for the founders since they probably walk away with millions in their pockets (from paying themselves seven-figure salaries).
Whatever gets them there fastest is the 2nd priority.
If something is an obvious winner - why handicap it by limiting investment to what it can make on its own?
What if it relies on network effects, or economies of scale?
As much as founders think otherwise (they have to!), there is no such thing.
Things like Neura Link, Carbon capture, fusion and such.
Most or close to 98% are just building an "app" or an app with a website such as yelp but for dogs, dogs but for cats or other tools that other founders should buy such as sales and leads management etc etc.
Mostly - meaningless.
Most founders I met were doing similarly well-founded work. You're thinking about a tiny fraction of the VC market - the moonshot startups that make the news. Most people are raising money around very reasonable ideas, of course, since VCs obviously have to minimize risk for some of their investments.
> You're thinking about a tiny fraction of the VC market - the moonshot startups that make the news.
Exactly, that's why I implied that it's a very very small number. May be less than a fraction.
CRDTs would be interesting area to watch. :)
Perhaps I misread, it sounded like the opposite.
My product's big thing was to extract the data from logs and into a graph data structure. The thing is that I've just taken "huge amount of scale + nice, immutable log" and turned it into "huge amount of scale + evil, mutable graph". Building a massive-scale graph datastructure that can be mutated over time is... hard. Like, "hope you've been keeping up on your academic papers" hard.
One of the key optimizations I leveraged was to represent the graph as a CRDT. Every Node has a `merge` function that follows CRDT semantics.
This allows me to collapse states together in a way that converges.
Security queries have some interesting properties:
1. They often care about thresholds, meaning that they inherently work well with a lattice (once a you've hit a "bad" state you will always want to investigate that state - this is unlike, say, operations where if it "recovers" you can ignore it)
2. They almost always filter out data
These two properties combine nicely. It means that if our alert is a threshold, and our data only 'grows' in one direction (thanks CRDTs), we can reject queries using stale data and not worry about invalidating any caches.
Edit: Or the business model is to be acquired by a FAANG who fears they need to get into your area and care more about optics to their bosses/shareholders than how financially sustainable your startup is.
The huge wins have all been IPOs where the business is still growing/trying to dominate the market, and not where they're in that monetisation phase. At least that's what I've seen. I don't think there's a single case yet where the "dominate and then monopolise" plan has actually worked?
[1] https://investor.uber.com/news-events/news/press-release-det...
You're saying the same thing as the grandparent comment and in various places in the world this would be considered dumping/subsidizing and illegal.
Yet here we are and the enshittification continues.
If you have a great idea for an app or a product and you've started developing it but you need to hire more people to bring that idea to fruition. Rather than spending years of your own time and money to maybe get the idea off the ground, if other people like the idea and want to help contribute via an investment, why not?
Surely your business major would have described the idea of seeking an investment or capital via a business plan. The challenge is that these VC vehicles push this idea of providing an investment tenfold and they have their hands across large industries and portfolios. To the point where they can both invest when you grow and when you fail.
Indeed! But VC investors are a very different animal than other investors (who may not even be investing cash -- in my past ventures, more than half of my investors were my vendors who invested in my company via their products and services instead of money).
If you're starting the sort of business that needs an enormous amount of startup capital, then VC is where you turn. If not, then you're far better off going with normal investors.
What VC wants to see is not the same as what other investors want to see, and finding the right expectation to match your business goals is a critical part of success.
Doing so on your own dime (or a bank loan) is stupid. Doing so on the VC's dime is smart because you can not only walk off scot-free when the whole thing inevitably WeWorks into the ground, but can start over again in a different vertical.
Most actually are. It's just that the big ones tend not to be, and there are lots of startups that want to look and act like the big ones.
As someone who raised VC money for a SaaS, the answer is that operating a SaaS requires employees. I had two choices - attempt to operate it myself and incur a lot of personal costs, or raise money to pay for those operating costs at no personal cost.
Contrary to the other posts, the goal was in no way to operate at a loss for a long period of time or to get some sort of exponential growth at all costs or whatever. It was literally "do I personally want to spend 10s of thousands of dollars and attempt to operate a complex system 24/7, or do I want to take literally 0 financial risk and be able to pay other people to help me".
You can make a good case that most of your costs are fixed. So that if you have 100x as many customers it’ll cost you $0.03/month to provide the same service to the customers, but they still pay $3/month.
You need VC money to acquire customers and grow. Then your business will become profitable because of the economics of scale that are inherent to software.
As the best time for VC investment is generally at the inflection point of the exponential growth curve. When revenue can't keep up with what it costs to supply the ever faster growing demand. Which, for many companies, will be shortly before an outright acquisition. And usuaully 5-10 years, minimum, after slow customer growth. Assuming a good business but not necessarily a unicorn in terms of market position.
But at that point wily founders may instead look to keep their company and seek a loan.
Very important to remember that when you go into fundraising mode, you are dedicating a bunch of time to doing this, and that the time you will spend doing it is time you will not spend building your product or focusing on your customers.
200k is pre-seed level. When I raised a 500k pre-seed for my latest startup, I explicitly avoided VCs (too much effort), went only to angels. Pitching to them taught me what I should focus on, and when I understood the potential of what I was building (and saw the enthusiasm to go with it), I cut the fundraise short at 100k: No more time to waste, I had to build.
Also worth mentioning that constraints are good. Having too much cash to build your MVP is like having no deadline. A fire under your ass (in the form of bootstrapping) can force you to be creative and focus on immediate revenue.
I tried VC:s and didn't work (I pitched Netflix before Netflix and was told laws would crush it). Then I tried bootstrapping and getting customers and the veil was lifted from my eyes! Cannot recommend it enough. Don't waste time with VC:s, put that time into getting customers. If you are successful you can always sell the business to someone later on if/when you decide to retire or try something new.
That is code for: "You aren't going to find anyone who shares your idea of what your valuation should be so we are safe telling you we'll invest if you find a 'lead investor' because that person doesn't exist."
It gets funny/twisted when you do find a lead and go back and now there is some other goal post that is keeping them out of "this round."
It's probably really hard to get traction when it's not obvious who your customers are, and this description reveals that. Your customers are the entities that are paying you. Is this supposed to be an app for mechanics to find work? Is it supposed to be an app for people with car problems to find someone to fix it? Those looking to get their vehicle serviced aren't going to want to pay the finders feed on top of the cost charged by the mechanic, which means those people are not your customers. What are the cases where someone would pay for your app? Are mechanics having trouble finding work? Are the mechanics the customers of Fixr? Do people with car trouble have it often enough that they'd pay for such a service vs whatever else they'd do?
"Talk to us again when you have traction" indeed. Or "Talk to us again when you know how to recognize traction."
There's so much survivor-biased bullshit in the industry, though. Founders who raised millions on an idea with no MVP, no customers, no traction. Everyone laps it up and repeats it on social media and then there's another 100 founders who are wasting their time and savings on ideas with no clue. The ecosystem soaks up their savings and spits them out disillusioned and drained of cash.
I guess if you play the game you can get your hands on a lottery ticket with pretty good odds. But seriously fuck these people and their egos.
I'm pretty sure if you build really solid tech or a growing company they'll come chase you, so I am really hard pressed to figure out why people should pay all that much attention to who they are and what they think at all.
In terms of everything else...
My go-to example is Lemlist (and their "Lempire" of related products). The founders built their own cold email agency, grew that to millions just through sheer labor, then built software to automate that process and now they're at a 200 million dollar valuation from more than 10 to 15 million dollars in annual recurring revenue. They have lots of marketing channels: organic SEO via content marketing, Facebook group with frequent events like interviews with other agency owners and salespeople, YouTube videos that are then recut and repurposed to TikTok/Instagram/Facebook videos, partnering with influencers, paid advertising, and of course, cold messaging other salespeople and agencies via LinkedIn and email. Most technical founders do not know or have the patience to do any of this. If they do, though, they could similarly grow to such an ARR in a few short years, as Lemlist started only in 2018. Similar examples include GoHighLevel and ClickFunnels which are almost at or over a 1 billion dollar valuation each, both bootstrapped. The ClickFunnels founder for example sold his software via live demos (both webinars and in person events) where you got X% off but only if you booked right at the end of the demo, which apparently drove quite a high percentage of their initial sales.
I'd highly advise founders to start a marketing agency if only to understand marketing in a real capacity and how to deliver results to paying clients. I have done so via a cold email and paid ads agency for various niches before and I believe it's helped me immensely with future products. Best of all, you learn to be truly aligned with your customers and providing them direct value because they are paying you every month. If you make a mistake, you must fix it, you have no backup fund of venture capital previously raised in order to skate BY, especially now that ZIRP (zero-interest-rate phenomenon) is over.
I find that businesses that are spin out from agency models are particular, inherit a strong characteristic and outlook similar to agencies. This is not a critique of their model per say, but an observation that leads me to be hesitant to take advice from agency-born models and apply to more typical product-focused B2B or B2C settings.
This leads me also to note that that the nature of content exposes us to a lot of people who believe in posting content. I'm not against it, but would like to fight the common urge towards content as the best strategy to go to market. However, given that the medium is message, we don't hear from people who don't need to post to do business.
Yes, I don't think content is the only way, and I don't believe most of their growth was from content, anyway. It seems like it was just sending out lots of messages to people and hoping they're interested. Content marketing is a secondary mechanism, it is inefficient to get you your first customers, and it is definitely not the best go to market strategy as you say.
I mean, one side of this spectrum is doing affiliate marketing or direct-sales/MLM. Other point on this spectrum might be for an engineer to go get hired as a social media "manager" (lots of "jobs" like this on Upwork).
What possibilities do you have in mind?
>In our first-time founder naïveté, we took this to heart. Our startup lived or died on whether we had traction.
Ummm... this seems pretty genuine, as opposed to a polite no? If you don't have something compelling to differentiate you from the cacophony of other founders who want preproduct dollars, then of course you need to demonstrate the viability of the product.
If you already had traction, you wouldn't need to kiss the ring
They’re telling you you’re pitching at the wrong stage. Growth and early stage doesn’t invest before traction; that’s the purview of angels and possibly seed investors.
It's the "win by doing lots of cold sales" model, but for VCs: if you talk to enough founders eventually a startup that does way too good for your seed/preseed ticket size will actually accept your terms and give you 25% of their company for next to nothing.
If you are talking to just one investor, you are doing it wrong. It's a parallel process, not serial. Kissing a lot of frogs serially looking for Prince Charming will slowly kill your morale, waste your time and investors quickly learn that others have passed on your deal.
Think of it more like drafting a football team. You want all the potential investors on the field at the same time. That's how deals close in weeks, not months.
If your investment round is taking so many months, something is wrong. This is why YC and Techstars do a demo day. Parallel pitches to a large audience of investors is the technique to close a round quickly.
That was basically their way of saying "we don't believe in you but we don't want to miss out if someone else does". We didn't really want investors like that so we bootstrapped instead.
You can tell the potential lead, “we have $X in soft commits, so if you become our lead, our company will have total $X + $Y funding.” It makes your pitch to the lead more compelling.
Michael Seibel had a video a long time ago from a YC VC class, and related his strategy to work around this, of setting a very short deadline --- like, do all the meetings inside of a week, and tell people "get your term sheets in by the weekend". The idea was: don't give investors an opportunity to stall, and, by stalling, send an adverse message to all the other investors.
(I don't know if this works at all anymore, but it gives you an idea of what the issue is here.)
- most VCs will have at least a few days delay on when they are willing to meet you
- intros are required, and often intros come out of other VC meetings. This means you can’t shotgun everything
- if a VC wants to meet after your “deadline”, will you actually say no? Who has more power?
If you are a hot deal or Michael Seibel himself, the short deadline probably works. For mid level startups it’s not as easy.
I hated VCs most of the time. Now I'm trying to be useful, and to not waste anyone's time. I try to say "no" very quickly, and try to be very transparent about my thinking process.
Some founders really appreciate this. Some others don't. And that's fine. I want to be the VC that I would have wanted to meet when I was a founder, that's it.
People love to complain about the European VC landscape, and how little capital there is compared to the US and so on, and they’re not wrong, but this to me is a stand-out positive. We felt taken seriously by everybody, just about nobody wasted our time.
3000+ investor cold emails, 100+ meetings, 3 term sheets, 1 deal.
Reading this it makes me wonder if this isn't the best strategy.
Which would reflect negatively on their judgement, in more or less a worse manner than it would when risking money on something that fails.
The implied choice then becomes to probably lose money but retain reputation, or to protect money at the possible cost of reputation. Funds can't invest in everything, even if passing on something borderline is a repuation risk. The "not a no but no" third option seeks to both retain reputation and protect money.
Yup, often hilariously. Basically summarized in this scene (especially the very end of the clip):
The theme is repeated both when Monica reveals her shameful secret of having passed on Slack, and when Erlich turns down the ferret / pig startup: "I'm not passing, exactly, I'm just not saying yes" (paraphrased).
125k is barely one year's salary and your 7% of ownership gone forever and that's the deal for almost all accelerators.
On top of that - the connections, reach, prestige might be meaningless or irrelevant to your particular product and market.
Until you actually see money in your bank account, consider every single thing they say as a no. No matter how much they kiss your ass, and no matter how much they throw term sheets at you, until you see money in the bank account, it’s a “no”.
If they want to say yes, they will have the money in your bank account that day, but if you get any excuses, then it means they are stringing you along.
“Look down. Is there a term sheet in front of you?”
Terms sheets are not legally binding.
Money talks.
100%
Ideally, get someone with a high level of influence to invest or just get them on your board. Having their name in the decks increases future investment by vulture capitalists by at least 420%. Once VCs see those names, their typical DD process goes out the window. All they see is the name and gamble millions/billions just because of this.
Some notable examples of this are “theranos”, “ftx”, “frank”. Shit it even stretches back to the 1990s with infamous con artists like Jordan Belfort or Bernie Madoff.
Remember those college frat bros that cheated off you? Those frat bros and sorority sisters are often connected to high wealth individuals. Higher chance of this at “Ivy League” universities.
Remember. It’s not what you know. It’s WHO you know ;)
> When they say: “Talk to us again when you have traction.”
> They really mean: “If you prove there is a market opportunity and that you can execute as a management team, then we might consider you. But because I don’t believe either of those things will happen, I will not be taking a risk on you”.
I mean, the general tone of the article is "VCs speak an ambiguous language because they're doing a dance with founders." One hand, sure, of course, that happens in literally every sales negotiation. But "Talk to us again when you have traction" seems pretty clear that the VC doesn't believe in either your market thesis or team, and they're basically saying "prove us wrong". I just don't see any guile here.
One thing I noticed about the tale was lots of focus on the product and MVP things. I think more efforts on Customer Development before MVP can provide a lot of traction signal to VC.
If you asked someone on a date, and they said, "Get back to me when your abs are showing," would you actually surmise that you were a good match and just needed to do more crunches?
Am I the only one not living in this bubble. I cofounded a boostrap business. Having cash to hire and not have to work two jobs would sure be nice, but if I am raising it would not be to be on Forbes list, it would be to build an actual business. The vanity of those people sometimes.
Can you f*cking believe that the publication on Medium I originally posted this to edited that sentence out!?
All these anecdotes boil down to VCs saying “if (false),” where what drives the false proposition is your job to guess about and may be useless.
And if that proposition were true, the startup might not need their money or contacts.
this is a myth https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eskimo_words_for_snow
No they don't, why should anyone sane pay for working capital with equity. If all a VC brings to the table is cash, than they are functionally a bank loan with really terrible terms.
One can tell a bad idea when you have to explain its value proposition to people, at that point it is a vanity project already non-viable.
Rule #14: "Never outsource economic control structures, or one may end up indentured"
I'm very sorry, but I just laugh my ass off because of all these kinds of words related to money and investors.
Second sentence of second paragraph, actually.
Now when they don’t say yes/no abruptly and just asks more questions, they are interested and that’s a better gauge
1. Nobody is entitled to venture capitalist funding. It is not an oddly named and run social works program.
2. VC funding is not a home run. It is not free money. If the only way you can launch a tech business is venture funding with the hope of hitting it out of the park before the funds’ cliff, perhaps consider if the return justifies the effort.
I have a bootstrapped side project, Tunnelmole, turning a small profit and growing at a slow and steady rate on its own. I'm the engineer so I only really pay hosting costs, which are covered by the revenue, although in the early days I had to cover this.
While venture capital is an option, if it continues to grow, it's entirely possible the venture capitalists may not be needed.
But it depends how my own efforts go, there's still a long way to go before my current methods become ineffective.
The ending of the piece helps to confirm exactly what you said - really, you want to bootstrap unless you are going so gangbusters that a lack of quick cash is damaging your ability to grow.
> 9. VC funding is cool and all, but essentially, it is a waste of time if you haven’t validated your market: bootstrapping to get paying customers quickly is the most effective tactic available.
> 10. In all honesty, you don’t want to take external funding unless you have intensely strong user growth; and being unable to hire becomes your bottleneck.
Or you have a business that needs capital to get going.
Also, the actual title or the one HN moderated it to?
I think men a tendency to trivialize that message because it scares us a bit. It's a message of rejection and shame so it's uncomfortable and we naturally to want to twist it around until it isn't threatening anymore.
Everyone minus 1 at least anyway.
1. No product:
-> went to stanford or harvard -> funded (no questions asked)
-> held director level at faang -> funded
-> everyone else -> probably not funded
2. Have product: -> not prestigious -> need real ARR with good growth
-> prestigious -> need a product
-> everyone else -> not funded -> Have previous success (as founder or as employee) in same space -> fundedIf you don’t become a +$100mm company (and have the ability to cash out at that position) it seems to be a pretty rough deal honestly.
Your salary should also increase to become competitive with the market as your company continues to raise.
If the founders know what they're doing and you are bringing outsize value to the company, your salary should far exceed the market salary as your company gains success.
"Founding X" doesn't count for shit.
Being part of a team that built a hugely successful product teaches you a lot - it teaches you about the counterintuitive dynamics of superlinear growth. That is a very important mindset to bring to the table if you want to create a successful VC-funded startup.
http://www.paulgraham.com/superlinear.html
tl:dr: Just make a product that's so cool it'll go viral in it's respective market.
It is usually at best quadratic because there is some kind of network effect at play - the number of edges in a complete graph with `n` vertices is `n(n-1)/2`.
The point is that the value of your product to your users should increase with the number of users OR the marginal cost to you of maintaining the product should decrease with the number of users.
"Superlinear" captures that more effectively than "exponential".
Superlinear but subexponential growth can still be pretty impressive, though, especially if it's fast (who cares about 0.1% weekly growth?)
One thing to add - in my experience, you need to spend money to go from merely superlinear to (locally) exponential.
This is the original reason that VCs exist.
If you go to an intelligent decisionmaker at a VC firm with proof of sustained superlinear growth and plan for how their capital will allow you to increase the rate (and higher derivatives) of your growth, they will almost certainly invest.
The reason that VCs have to specialize by industry or look for signals like Stanford/Harvard/whatever is that it's very difficult to validate or invalidate proof of superlinear growth. This requires specialization or, if lazy, social signals like the university you graduated from.
(I'm definitely in the middle-class bucket)
-> went to stanford or harvard -> funded (no questions asked)
I'd edit this to -> white male went to stanford or harvard -> funded (no questions asked)
Source: I know lots of female and non-white Harvard grads who didn't get funded. I'm a non-white MIT grad and also found funding very, very difficult even when we had a product. We almost continuously had to spend >1/2 of our working hours just trying to get funding. Hundreds and hundreds of coffee chats plus travel time. We were building hardware, so bootstrapping wasn't an option.White male Harvard grads I know routinely got funded very quickly, though. They often had time to get actual work done. Even still, most of them didn't succeed in the end.
By whom? By other white people? Homophily is a real phenomenon in every ethnicity.
But if you're saying that white people get advantages by non-white people, then it's a cultural issue of those non-white people who, for some reason, have internalized racism (look up inferiority syndrome).
Me too. The reality is that people don't always take my merits seriously.
I'm male though. Females have it much worse. I have heard lots of horror stories (both behind their back in "locker room talk" and directly from them) where their actual merits are effectively ignored and all focus is on their body. It's insane.
The entire concept of "warm introductions" is harmful to women.
Because most VC partners, CEOs etc are men. And so you have this power imbalance where young, women founders feel like they are forced to build relationships with typically older men.
And like you said there are plenty of horror stories (my partner was one) where this power imbalance gets abused.
-> went to stanford or harvard -> funded (no questions asked)
-> held director level at faang -> funded
It's the chain of trust. It means that the investor is already 2-3 handshakes away from the founder, and hence can discuss certain things that require utmost discretion, and have reasonable grounds to believe they won't get double-crossed on that (because it would erode away the trust along the handshake path).- attention
- trust
the outside capital is real, quickly landing a lead investor that gets the other investors to close comes from controlling the pools of capital
your family’s donor advised fund and private foundation are the lead investors, or they are the only limited partners in the private equity fund thats functionally a family office
this same capability allows for top university background too, or nonchalantly dropping out of it
in the mean time you get all the headlines in the world, alongside your PR agent, and you’re a genius star Stanford drop out that gets funded no questions asked
The “friends and family round” is actually more important than the stanford aspect, if we were really min-maxing here, but it all goes hand in hand as people with that support system do things together
the reason it is important to view it this way is because this is all window dressing for a bourgeoisie that doesnt want to be seen as different. in turn, it makes everyone else think they really have a chance of receiving the same consideration from their ambition and cognitive abilities. the answer is to just have capital and a predilection for de-risking with other people’s money.
this would be difficult to know from a passing glance, they wont necessarily say any combination of “Charitable Non-Profit Foundation”, although I have seen that on cap tables and other disclosures
they can be any entity type and trusts. Trusts dont need to have “Trust” in the name
donor advised funds are not separately incorporated, and may also be on the cap table as the sponsoring charity
and again, as a limited partner in a fund, neither would show up on the cap table, just the fund they invested through
I've never heard it considered a sign of exclusivity. CMU, Stanford, MIT, yes. But Harvard? It's not exactly known for a rigorous engineering program, and even less so the last fifteen years or so.
If you've been to Harvard, you are on a first name basis with highly ranking finance people. It's not a coincidence that among all the dot com carnage, Amazon emerged as the ecommerce champion: they lived thanks to Jeff Bezos being able to get continued funding despite making continued losses. For that, you need, among other things, good contacts into the finance industry and know how they work and think.
A membership in the exclusive club of Harvard graduates gives you the ability to find customers, advice, funding, employees. Stuff that makes it more likely that your company is more successful.
If someone can get in front of VCs, presumably it doesn't matter if they know a bunch of other rich people from school. I really don't get the sense that VCs are impressed by someone's ability to convince some nepo hedge fund manager to invest a few million.
I think they're impressed by business accumen combined with technical chops. If you want to bootstrap, then yeah, maybe a school with the most amount of money matters so you can get a huge seed round.
But you think people with strong ideas and impressive technical backgrounds who get in front of VCs are going to be less impressive by less technical people who rub shoulders with finance bros?
Certainly Harvard/Yale is a good choice if you're going into medicine, law, or I dunno, maybe banking? But tech? I wouldn't think it's a top choice at all.