Just good enough is also a question of risk appetite. If the business decides it wants to "accept the risk" rather than take whatever measures necessary to remediate a risk, that's up to them.
Just good enough is also a question of risk appetite. If the business decides it wants to "accept the risk" rather than take whatever measures necessary to remediate a risk, that's up to them.
Cybersecurity organizations usually have no idea what "just good enough" is, for the reasons I stated. So you end up with commercially impractical security requirements, and then vigorous sucking of teeth and requests for "compensating controls" (usually: do something equally impractical) and then demands that the business "accept the risk".
I've worked with a bunch of people in "compliance" professions (like line 2 compliance teams in banks, operational risk teams) but this attitude is significantly more common in cybersecurity than in other cases.
Just good enough often times is an orgs own policies and standards, and security teams catch when things aren't meeting those standards.
Your complaints are a lack of maturity in your cyber security organizations. There are cases where a business can absolutely decide its "good enough". But that decision is made by people other than those that point out the vulnerability. It's usually done by which ever team handles security remediation or they talk to someone who handles that analysis as part of the remediation process if the fix seems prohibitive. Cost to fix can also go down as new solutions become available or infrastructure changes and a new design makes it easier to build in a fix/control/detection or whatever. So re-evaluating "accepted risks" periodically to see if its something that's easier to implement is also part of it.
Cybersecurity shouldn't be in the business of saying no (unless its something insane like storing passwords in plain text on open shares), we're here to say, "here's some problems we see", here's where we think we can help, everything else is up to the frameworks and policies your company has set to adhere to or someone at a higher level to say cost exceeds risk, we accept the risk until such point cost comes down, etc. Cyber should also be helping to put in systematic controls that make good controls the default, and good practices easy to implement, so that ops and devs don't have to think about it.