Some things, e.g. id/ego/super-ego seem truish, but only because they package up already accepted things. It's like a "theory" in the Arts: a way of thinking, of analysing, a framework. It's neither true nor false, but may be convenient terminology.
Neither is Popper's Falsification Theory. The only thing that pointing this out demonstrates is that a theory does not fit under Popper's specific definition of normative science... which in the philosophy of science itself is not held in particularly high regard.
So what you're basically pointing out is that, according to one very specific philosopher of science, Freud is more philosophy than he is normative science. Which is something that I think virtually all advocates of Freud would uncontroversially agree with.
Sounds perfectly falsifiable to me: you just need to show a well accepted scientific theory that cannot be falsified even in principle.
However, Popper's seems more a principle or a criterion than a theory. By which I mean, you're free to refuse it and incorporate any amount of non-falsifiable statements in your "science". I just suspect it won't have much predictive power.
So? That's only a problem if you assume Popper's epistemology.
Who give a hoot we live in Descartes' demon and anything could be not real? The elephant is in the room. Id/ego/superego is clearly a thing, either that or you're not familiar with the field, or you're not living in shared reality! Malignant egalitarians who think everyone's opinions are just should really learn to push back harder on things that have, like, one in a trillion odds on being false.
The only thing up for debate are the definitions, functions, and boundaries of these three.
Also, weren't a bunch of results junked because there was a nasty bug in the CT code?