Insecurity would be escaping the VM it runs in. In a native compiled binary you have infinite permissions and can make system calls. You can't do that in a webasm VM.
Webasm is not insecure because a C program that crashes also crashes in webasm.
You still haven't shown any evidence of escaping the VM or actual insecurity.
If someone is dumping privileged data into a VM that's insecure no matter what, why would you blame webasm?
"Why would you blame WASM" is the right question. As I have said in LITERALLY every single comment so far, blaming WASM instead of the alleged hype people is where pjmlp is wrong. He's not wrong in the assertion that insecure programs may remain insecure when run in the WASM sandbox. But you refuse to listen. This conversation is like talking to a much less polite ChatGPT.
What specific marketing are you talking about? Link what you're referring to.
Ask him to link to what he's referring to.
He posts this stuff in half the webasm threads I see. Like you he never has anything to back it up and you both get very upset at people asking.
This is my last response in this thread. You've displayed a profound inability to think. I can't be part of this anymore.
I replied to you because I thought (and still think) you were wrong and/or misunderstanding what pjmlp was saying.
I can disagree with two people at the same time. I don't see the issue.
It is still worth looking at and is actual information, so I appreciate that.
In order to be useful, your wasm application will likely have to be able to make systems calls, or whatever its equivalent might be on your particular host environment. If you can corrupt internal state, you can control the arguments to these calls. The severity of the issue will depend on what your application is allowed to do: If all it has access to is a some virtual file system, the host will still be safe. But if that virtual file system contains sensitive data, results may nevertheless be catastrophic if, say, it can also request resources over http.