It would be healthier to assume multi-polarity and lean into it.
Look no further than the other news that came out this week re: government spying via push notifications. (https://www.reuters.com/technology/cybersecurity/governments...) Consumers rationally trust the few big companies which are incentive-aligned to protect their data and government then goes after those few big companies. I thought this was particularly galling:
> In a statement, Apple said that Wyden's letter gave them the opening they needed to share more details with the public about how governments monitored push notifications.
> "In this case, the federal government prohibited us from sharing any information," the company said in a statement. "Now that this method has become public we are updating our transparency reporting to detail these kinds of requests."
People might want to think about how AirTags and Find My Phone work...
rotating BTLE identifiers controlled by a pseudorandom sequence derived from a key, and tunneled over end to end encryption?
Who is saying that? Certainly nobody anywhere in this HN thread. It is, however, fair to say that the only guarantor of privacy and security is a network of trust. There are plenty of examples where trust is partially decentralised, the most notable being the system of certificates used for establishing trust in HTTP over TLS.
There is a quote in the top level comment of this thread that says that.
> It’s untenable that there’s unsanctioned client software for a messaging platform for which privacy and security are a primary feature.
All they're saying is that the existence of third party software compromises Apple's ability to make blanket statements about the security and privacy of this one specific platform. An unofficial third party client breaks an established network of trust — which is an objective fact. If you doubt this, then you really should use this Chromium fork I just developed. Use it to log into your internet banking. Don't be scared. There's nothing to worry about. See, there's a lock symbol in the address bar and everything.
Can a bad actor slap a green lock on an insecure browser clone and harm users? Certainly. And yet, in a survey of the systemic threats to security and privacy on the open web, such attacks are relegated to the margins.
Apple encourages a popular narrative that centralization and control beget trust, and from there may enable privacy and security. Look no further than the comments on this HN post to see the narrative echoed!
It's fair to point out that it's not literally what Gruber wrote, but readers will fill in the negative space around his uncritically apologetic commentary. To state the implied message: trust in Apple's way, and remember that third parties (who are not accountable to Apple) will ultimately deprive you of privacy and security!
The web browser ecosystem has its own (different) problems, but iMessage lacks requisite variety to back up its particular claims to privacy and security (see that Reuters article for a preview).
I skipped past that because that wasn't what I had expressed disagreement about. Though now you elucidate further I'll say I fundamentally disagree with your "actual point" as expressed. While I agree that systems of distributed trust are fundamentally healthier, they are an order of magnitude harder, and rely upon educating users. And some percentage of users will always be impervious to education — see the continued prevalence of phishing scams for example.
A system which relies upon trusting fewer entities is inherently less fragile and less vulnerable to exploitation. It's true that systems can be designed which rely on users trusting a large number of entities, and can sometimes result in a more educated user base, but they're much harder to implement and much, much, much, much rarer in the real world.
But if we have centralization on the scale of a society, then anyone interested in any of the groups using that centralized source of secure data storage/transfer will be drawn to look for the flaws in that source. And there are always flaws, either technical, legal (as with the government spying mentioned elsewhere in the comments), or otherwise. And once any group manages to infiltrate that one source, they get access to everything dependent on it.
Sure, decentralized security is harder to get together, meaning we have an initially-high violation rate that decreases over time (though this can be supplemented by security-conscious users taking their own steps to protect their data). But centralized security at sufficiently large scales essentially guarantees a breach impacting everyone within its domain; and the kind of trust that would be required to sustain such centralization also anti-correlates with users independently adding additional layers of security to their systems.
This seems like a much greater risk than just accepting that users who are "impervious to education" will be vulnerable to certain social-side exploits, while everyone else will be reasonably safe.
That it’s not currently a problem is due to 25 years of strongly pushing for privacy & security.
We’re still not there (see Google & adblockers in chrome)
We’ve also got examples of Apple making misleading statements about the security and privacy of their platform, as a result of government gag orders.
That recent disclosure makes me suspect that every vector that they do not disclose explicitly as being private, is very much not private. To that end, the platform is clearly neither private nor secure if you value privacy from the government.
…so I’m not particularly concerned about third party software being a cause for concern anymore.
I think this is key. The problem is the security of iMessage as a protocol is dependent on trust between client (implementations). Which is actually not that great from a security perspective.
I don’t mean that there are necessarily vulnerabilities in the protocol (there very well may be), but that the protocol is not something that Apple is willing to depend upon to uphold their desired security guarantees.