Rubberhose FS does protect you from rubberhose cryptanalysis. That is the point.
You can argue, that it over-protects you, which might be just as or even more dangerous, and that is a fair criticism.
But I don't see how you can argue that it "doesn't protect" you.
Then, is there anything that can protect __you__ from rubber hose cryptanalysis in this sense?
If not, what does my parent comment even mean?
If you want your data to be safe from the rubber hose, you need to have inconvenient access requirements. If your laptop can only be unlocked when 5 keys are turned 'simultaneously', and the keys are held by the ambassadors to the UN with security council vetos, that's going to be hard to accomplish for you, and likely difficult for any one else. Any one of the ambassadors could plausibly lose their key, and then the data is gone, etc.