Lex Fridman Podcast: John Mearsheimer [video]
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You on the other hand, not only do you lay out a heart throbbing argument full of moral claims but you severely misunderstand the argument you're even arguing against. You don't have to agree with JM but at least make sure you understand what he's talking about.
conveniently forgets the March 2022 assault on Kyiv, capital of Ukraine.
The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent
Most Western observers want Ukraine to rid itself of nuclear weapons as quickly as possible. In this view, articulated recently by President Bill Clinton, Europe would be more stable if Russia were to become "the only nuclear-armed successor state to the Soviet Union." The United States and its European allies have been pressing Ukraine to transfer all of the nuclear weapons on its territory to the Russians, who naturally think this is an excellent idea.
President Clinton is wrong. The conventional wisdom about Ukraine's nuclear weapons is wrong. In fact, as soon as it declared independence, Ukraine should have been quietly encouraged to fashion its own nuclear deterrent. Even now, pressing Ukraine to become a nonnuclear state is a mistake.
A nuclear Ukraine makes sense for two reasons. First, it is imperative to maintain peace between Russia and Ukraine. That means ensuring that the Russians, who have a history of bad relations with Ukraine, do not move to reconquer it. Ukraine cannot defend itself against a nuclear-armed Russia with conventional weapons, and no state, including the United States, is going to extend to it a meaningful security guarantee. Ukrainian nuclear weapons are the only reliable deterrent to Russian aggression. If the U.S. aim is to enhance stability in Europe, the case against a nuclear-armed Ukraine is unpersuasive.
[1]But, he does give Putin a pass on the invasion itself. Couldn't Putin have won the desired concessions with just sabre-rattling and having a skirmish on the border instead of a full on invasion, which is slowly destroying both Ukraine and Russia.
[1] https://www.mearsheimer.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Mears...
Our metaphors for nations in the Lakoffian sense[1] erroneously guide us toward the conclusion that "countries are people". Countries "want" this or "dislike" that is specifically an example of personification identified in chapter seven.
This is a dangerously leaky abstraction that when taken for granted lead to the naive conclusions you've identified like nations calling each other up and resolving some misunderstanding.
Partially, the fact that diplomatic negotiations are closed and the public has no mental model of how negotiations actually work can be blamed too. That doesn't necessarily mean that negotiations should be made public (how would that work?), but that it is a complicated contributing factor.
Political viability plays a hugely underappreciated role and simply telling the body politic "you're not going to get your way this time,"(like children) doesn't and will not work.
1. See Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1981). Metaphors we live by. University of Chicago Press.