Incredible.
Here is a video that explains it. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mDTnl4E9FiY
Incredibly dystopian. Since at least nine years ago, there hasn't a single place on the surface of the planet where you had any total and absolute privacy.
I'm not saying it's good or bad. But it is inevitable, and we need to adjust to that reality.
https://radiolab.org/podcast/eye-sky-2306
"Persistent Surveillance System" google blackholed of course
After all, who could object to a safety measure?
I think he is wrong that everybody spying will help, when everybody discussing online doesn't. But it is useful to think about what world will be like when everybody can surveil.
It’s certainly an asymmetrical field but, especially moving forward, I doubt it will be an entirely one-way street.
Hence, people will choose to record every minute of their lives out of fear of something similar happening to them.
It's also in the country's favor to overclaim their capabilities.
I am generally pro-situational-awareness of things in public spaces.
Which don't exist.
The idea of privacy disappeared a long time ago. FB/Cambridge Analytica/IG/TT/SC is just the surface.
They aren't necessarily convenient places, but it's not like you can't find any privacy just because there are cameras up high pointing down. It's actually probably far less intrusive and privacy destroying than the electronic device you likely carry everywhere with you that reports you location and could (if it doesn't already) keep track of when it can't report and relay it when it can again.
If you think the trade-offs of that make it worthwhile most the time, consider that there may be trade-offs here that are positive that you are discounting with what we're discussing here.
Suppose we design walkie talkies such that two or more units can be hooked up together in a daisy chain. While the devices are daisy chained, a button can be pressed on the head walkie talkie which will generate a random symmetric key, like 256 bit AES or whatever. This is sent over the daisy-chained bus to all the others. They flash an LED or something to indicate they accepted the key. After that they can be split up and will all use that key.
That being said, the more important question is, how's the temporal resolution.
These types of signals wouldn't be obscured by clouds, presumably.
Whoever they were, they're enough on our side(i.e. the west) that we chose not to name and shame them.
My guess is a Ukraine NGO but it could have been anyone with a couple hundred thousand dollars given the equipment required to accurately plant the explosives is so common now.
Any serious military is tracking all known imaging/SAR satellites and uses their fly-by times (which are entirely predictable) for moving stuff covertly. I.e. you want to be out in the open in Area 51 testing a new RQ-180 derivative only when no one can be looking at you right now.
Also, there are global ADS-B satellite relays, and frankly I don't know why this data wasn't logged for MH370 - it must be explained somewhere. There's a guy on Twitter who captures those on a custom antenna + BladeRF setups (this data is plugged into adsbexchange for oceanic routes coverage). AIS relies even more on satellite relays, as the curvature of the planet limits signal propagation much more than for airplanes. What you see on any AIS website is mostly from a satellite.
The logged transmission round trip GroundStation -> Sat -> Aircraft -> Sat -> GroundStation provided an non unique "arc of travel" across the globe that was used by Australia to narrow the search area to a truckload of ocean floor that was substantially smaller than the entire planet.
The archived versions of the logs saved by the Malaysian gov are:
https://web.archive.org/web/20160304040818/http://www.dca.go...
Alternating sat routing would have given a more definitive fix and removed the ambiguity.
Your source conveniently omits weird data in the logs that start at 18:39:55UTC (a bunch of zeros, like something errored out).
Satellite pings switch to IOR at 15:59UTC and never change back to POR despite the plane flying east towards it. Going east until 17:21 UTC the plane should have pinged POR but doesn't
The specific issue I have with hyper focused attention on these specific logs and hoorah about "weird data" is that I haven't seen much in the way of properly comparative analysis of a super set of broad fleet Inmarsat logs ... these in general are the trailing edge of quality data, riddled with nuls, semi handshakes, line noise, etc.
Transponders are for positioning, black boxes for logging important flight data, diagnostic interfaces for mechanics in hangers ... and component level Inmarsat .. pretty much not more than a curiousity of "because we can" that's occasionally useful when a properly formed messages truly indicates an inflight issue.
Ping routing and ping times were never meant to be consistent nor used for gross "half-LORAN" positioning .. this is all happenstance after event signal engineering hack work.
It’s possible that NRO has a later observation of MH370 than any that have been publicly disclosed, but it would be sheer luck to have, like, video of the disappearance.
Edit: to their defense… my laptop was compromised at the time due to a Realtek chip supply chain hack that was persistent. The exploit was associated with “redgobot”.
If you have to put this disclaimer into your work, we already have a problem.
Incredibly worrying, as a member of a nation state with conflicting interests with the USA.