I don't have a youtube video for you, but I do have a book recommendation: Thomas Schelling's "The Strategy of Conflict" from 1960.
The writing is extremely clear and accessible, by the standards of nobel-prize-winning economists.
To nitpick: Hope they're never used again.
I'd also argue that all of the states that have nuclear weapons have historically used them as a bargaining chip or trump card. Employing them, on the other hand..
To add to more Nuclear War / Strategic Theory info is another RAND fellow,
Herman Kahn[0][1], and his book On Thermonuclear War [2]
[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Herman_Kahn
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_latency
> Nuclear latency or a nuclear threshold state is the condition of a country possessing the technology to quickly build nuclear weapons, without having actually yet done so.
> There are many countries capable of producing nuclear weapons, or at least enriching uranium or manufacturing plutonium. Among the most notable are Japan, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, and Australia.
> Taiwan and South Korea have both been identified as "insecure" nuclear threshold states—states with the technical capability to develop nuclear weapons and the security motivations to seriously contemplate such an option.
What do you think it changes about proliferation?
That is the bottleneck how nuclear non-proliferation is enforced. You can hide your intentions, but you can’t hide that a lot or energy is flowing into a process you don’t have a good explanation for. Because of this detecting a sea water sourced extraction would be even easier than a nuclear program based on mined uranium. (Because you need to enrich from an even weaker starting condition.)
What happens after detection is either diplomacy (they ask the country to stop nicely, reminding them of the consequences) or force (bombing the facilities).
At first I thought "surely that cannot be right", then did some calculation and it seems you are right?
This report[1] states that: "Uranium is a naturally occurring radioactive element that is present in nearly all rocks and soils; it has an average concentration in U.S. soils of about 2 pCi/g (3 ppm)."
I took the 3ppm figure from this and assumed that means 3g per million gram of soil. (This assumption might be a mistake, but I don't know how better to interpret it.)
Then I googled and found 1000 square meter to be a reasonable size of estimate for the lawn size and 1400 kg/cubic meter seems to be a reasonable soil density.
Then just multiplied these together "1000 * 1 * 1400 * (3 / 10*6) = 4.2" and found that indeed. As a rough estimation your statement seems to be right! (I mean of course you did know this :D I just wanted to show how I checked in case others are as surprised by the statement as I was.)
(not an affiliate link, just grabbed it off google quickly) https://www.amazon.com/Dead-Hand-Untold-Dangerous-Legacy/dp/...
Is a fun read. Get the audiobook version and think of it as a long youtube video playlist that you play in the background.
How fortunate then are we that the first really existentially threatening technology we developed was the atomic bomb? It's a technology that is so obviously destructive, and so distantly related from any useful application, so alien in its method of function, that it's perhaps the only technology in history to be near universally seen as too dangerous to use at scale. It requires both secret knowledge and immense industrial capacity to make even a single device, nonetheless enough devices and delivery systems to actually pose that existential threat, and thus we only need a small handful of large nation states to agree not to use them. It's arguably the very easiest existential threat to handle. Since developing them, we have become cognizant of our civilization's threat to itself, and now every advancement we make is met with the question "does this pose any existential risk?" which our forebears never asked, and which we ourselves might not have asked otherwise.
But it's not just that we developed nukes first. The timing down to the month was critical. Our first nuclear weapons were dropped in the last days of the worst war our planet had ever known. We only had a few, and the decision to drop them was made by people who did not witness nor fully comprehend their destructive potential. As it happened, in the peace that came about after the end of the second world war, there was an opportunity to observe the devastation the bombs had wrought, for the hatred that had led to their use to subside, and for the nuclear monopoly to be broken before another major war could start. But imagine if the bomb was developed a bit earlier, say midway through WW2, we might have dropped dozens or even hundreds of bombs, completely normalizing their use and irradiating large sections of continents before anyone really second guessed it. Conversely, if the weapons were developed in peacetime, either before or after the war, then the threat might go completely unrecognized and no one would think twice about opening the next war with an all out nuclear attack, or perhaps without the wartime funding we would just never have developed them at all and never recognize our species' ability to destroy itself. It's very well possible that if we had discovered the neutron a few years earlier, or if the US had not committed so many resources to the Manhattan project, or if Japan had surrendered a little earlier, we might now be extinct.
Many people have described the so-called Nuclear Peace that followed the second world war, and which holds to this very day, and while some disagree about its reality, I think it's a very real thing that has been one of the major reasons why no two major nation states have gone into open war since WWII, but the question of timing for nuclear weapons development as a cause for these weapons leading to the underlying psychological causes of the nuclear peace is interesting.
I personally do believe the Nuclear Peace is still very present in geopolitics. I can very easily imagine say, China invading the obvious target of eastern Russia, or Russia having launched a broader invasion of eastern Europe instead of just Ukraine were the background threat of nuclear bombs not always looming behind all these potential acts of war between major powers.
Even back in the late 40s and early 50's, when Stalin was alive and very much in love with the idea of launching yet another war to conquer even more of Europe, I think he was specifically restrained for the same reason. Just a few examples among many.