There is no way to verify key fingerprint of your recipient right now. So server can just man-in-the-middle you providing third-party key and read all messages silently. It is not e2e encryption if you have to trust the server. Period.
>Verification of safety numbers is a good security practice for sensitive communication.
It is perfectly OK for a user to trust, say, Tutanota to not take an affirmative action to get access to their messages. We need a way to express this sort of tradeoff and providers should be required to put this expression where the user can see it and understand it.
Understatement.
Tutanota published a ranty blog post accusing Microsoft of suppressing competition in the email space. Because they didn't understand how fucking Azure works or even how corporate security works.
They literally let users register email addresses for @tutanota.com At the same time, they are using @tutanota.com for internal corporate and such they had an Azure AD Tenant already registered for that domain.
They complained that their tutanota.com email users couldn't register Microsoft accounts and this was all part of Microsoft's ploy to eliminate them.
No, they compromised themselves and unless they grew a brain, are still compromised for corporate communications.
As a first step, we are currently addressing cyptographic authentication of incoming messages. Our development team is implementing this feature as part of the work on tuta crypt, our pq messaging protocol. It will be released within the next months. However, we have to admit that easy and automatic key verification will take some more time as we are still researching best options to implement this.
Presto