I do think that the introduction of software has probably made price discovery more efficient and gives landlords more confidence that if they raise rents, they will easily have offers even if the current tenants leave.
I do think that the introduction of software has probably made price discovery more efficient and gives landlords more confidence that if they raise rents, they will easily have offers even if the current tenants leave.
For some of the more desirable and built-up urban neighborhoods, small individually owned properties are all but bought up and almost all of the units are in large complexes owned by large corporate landlords.
I live in NYC. The housing market sucks here - but I don't think its because of collusion in setting prices. The supply just isn't as high as demand (and millions of voters who already own property seem fine with that)
But if we consider that people would consider living in the larger commute area, the article says:
> Across a wider Washington-Arlington-Alexandria area, more than 90 percent of units in large buildings are subject to RealPage pricing
And these large building are the bulk of the housing stock in these areas, they're not competing with single family homes or duplexes in these areas.
I'm not suggesting an app couldn't help coordinate prices in this instance, but I am suggesting that as long as the buildings are owned by other people they still have strong incentive to compete with each other.
If I own a building and the app suggests I raise prices, but then the units don't fill, I'm just going to lower prices.
> If I own a building and the app suggests I raise prices, but then the units don't fill, I'm just going to lower prices.
Yes, but if everyone raises prices together, people won't just choose to be homeless. Collusion is anti-competitive because it ensures that the participants wont compete with each other on price. They all raise rates together so people are stuck: their rent went up, but so did rent everywhere.
In a competitive market, some will raise rates, some will keep them the same, some may drop them. Those differences in strategy is what creates competition. When everyone cooperates to do the same thing, it eliminates competitive pressure.
It would be interesting to see if how rent markets change if more data becomes available. In the auto-industry, a car dealer can offload the unit to the wholesale market to minimize loss, whereas a landlord is less liquid.
The inventory pressure is there in both situations. An unsold car after 30-60 days is a problem both because of typical retail business dynamics and additional factors with general vehicle depreciation and high maintenance overhead of a vehicle compared to other capital goods, but the exit strategy is there and risk exposure can be limited.