My Left Kidney
astralcodexten.com
astralcodexten.com
Kidneys make calcitriol. One kidney means you'll make less, and if you don't supplement, you'll become deficient. Deficiency would (possibly) lead to autoimmune diseases.
Also EPO (erythropoietin). One kidney means less, and less (possibly) means fewer new red blood cells, then (possibly) anemia. Anemia wreaks havoc.
And bicarbonate.
To be clear, if you want to donate a kidney, then do it if it's the right choice. It's very kind. Just know what to pay attention to to keep yourself in good health.
So EPO is not limited by the ability of the kidneys to produce it (I expect, by a large margin). So one kidney would just as well be able to produce all the EPO you may need, the kidney is not the limiting factor.
Transplant centres vary for sure (to a surprisingly huge degree), but at least where I am if you do donate the clinic will be watching out for this stuff on your behalf.
https://www.ondemand.labcorp.com/
https://www.questhealth.com/sale
Quest is even running a sale right now on some tests!
Sounds extremely brittle logic. Why couldn't they be "related to their donations"?
For starters, the donations could make their immune system weaker (and thus make any autommune diseases they already have more impactful) or make it go haywire to combat the post-operation stress...
Not saying there's nothing, but you haven't provided any more evidence or logic than OP has provided.
As an aside, I’m also Buddhist so if the kidney goes I’m going with it. This obsession with prolonging life is just a distraction from living it.
Does brushing teeth twice a day also distract you from living?
I think the opposite.
Another solution would be to tackle type 2 diabetes, since a big amount of kidney failures is caused by that. Apparently, 1/3 of Americans are at risk: https://www.health.com/cardiovascular-kidney-metabolic-syndr...
Having worked for a few years in the diabetes space, I‘ve been hearing that cheaper CGMs are coming from the big players, apparently for <= $1 a day. This will allow people with diabetes to keep their time in the ideal BG range longer, reducing risk for kidney disease _significantly_.
That said, diabetes is a long-term disease and it's going to take a decade or two to see a measurable difference.
GLP1 drugs are also very promising for reducing the rate of kidney disease.
I know he wants to encourage you to donate a kidney. I still wish we tried harder to heal the "original equipment from the manufacturer" we are all born with. I have been on the record a long time with this opinion. I get a lot of hatred for it, though I have a condition that frequently results in being a transplant recipient and my only wish here is for better baseline care for people like me instead of razzle-dazzle headlines about flashy "tech" solutions.
Good solutions tend to be boring. I want a boring life where I just get to have good health and not an "exciting" one where I get to tell you how I was dying until some kind stranger died in a motorcycle accident at a shockingly young age and let me have their leftover body parts. (Because people like me need body parts that are a little hard to spare as an act of charity.)
You know that this is hard. Are you saying we should just spend more in that particular area instead of spending on kidney transplants?
Eventually research will improve and we may need less transplants, but in the meantime they're a great solution, and according to a quick search those transplants actually save the healthcare system money.
Research is great. But the flashy solution turns out to be also great, pays for itself, and yields concrete results today. Sometimes I think there's too much of a reaction against flashy, to the point that people discount the flashy things that are good.
We should judge things on the outcomes and the costs, not superficially on whether they feel boring or flashy!
I mean, i don't think its for lack of trying.
My doctor physically took a step back as if I had slapped him.
I'm quite confident it's due to lack of trying. If you have zero goal of actually getting me better, please don't blame my condition for your failure to get me better.
That seems blindingly obvious to me. I want to spit nails that it gets so casually hand-waved off.
Solely symptom management should not be the recommended course of action for anything short of stage 5, and there is a ton you can do to slow or stop progression in the early stages, perhaps even avoiding the need for dialysis / tranplant altogether.
But as much as you say kidney disease "has to go", it won't. Reduced kidney function from chronic kidney disease is permanent, and no matter how hard you try, you're not getting to the point where your kidneys get better. You can only pause progression.
> My doctor physically took a step back as if I had slapped him.
Not to be cold, and I'm sorry, but what did you expect. You are talking to a doctor not jesus. Everyone with an uncurable disease wants a treatment but just because you want something doesn't mean its possible. If it did, nobody would die.
And of course your doctor isn't trying to come up with novel treatments. Your doctor is not a medical researcher.
I have a genetic disease that ends in kidney rejection 100% of the time, with no real way to prevent the progression of the disease. I'm healthy, exercise often, eat well. I've never been overweight or had the slightest whiff of hypertension, I run every day along with other exercise, and my kidneys still failed. Some percentage of kidney disease is going to be like me.
I will say one thing that absolutely should change is better screening for kidney disease. A lot of times it's discovered because blood testing from some other thing coincidentally found a low GFR or high creatinine levels, and even then something like a 60-70% GFR is often dismissed by doctors. Fortunately we discovered the gene that causes my family's disease, so in our case we can be screened via blood tests, but for kidney disease without such a simple genetic cause we shouldn't leave identification and diagnosis up to luck.
Why hasn't it been noticed? Because the damage is cumulative and long term - years or decades. Because it's fat soluble, so the effects are modified by the amount of fat eaten at the same time. Because the effects are diffuse - it's not showing up in one single organ. Because the effects look like other things - autoimmune attacks, for example. Because historic mistakes in studies have caused 'vitamin A toxicity' to get mixed up with 'Vitamin A defficiency'. Because it varies with different people with different liver storage capacity and historic retinol compound buildup. Because it may be masked by protective effects of Vitamin C or other dietary components. Because stopping eating it offers no quick fix, healing might be "wait years for damaged cells to die and new ones to grow". Because there's no money in telling people to eat less of somethings, so there's little industry funding incentive or research grants.
Here for example, one of the other people who agrees with the claim of Vitamin A being harmful shows their working: https://ggenereux.blog/discussion/topic/biotransformation-of... - Under Discussion it says "It is now no longer difficult to imagine how retinoic acid [ed: Vitamin A/retinol related compound] could cause auto-immune disease, since the data appears to show that retinoic acid is essentially a pro-inflammatory cytokine that is stored in the liver and, once the liver is saturated, in different types of tissue all over the body, especially in epithelial cells that constitute blood–tissue barriers, and in adipocytes, both of which were shown to express STRA6 (Amengual, Zhang et al. 2014). [... explanation continues]"
I am never going to study enough chemistry, biology, biochemistry, statistics, medicine, to be able to make a judgement call of my own about that page, let alone all the other studies people have linked to and pulled apart. At least it's cheap and relatively easy and low risk to try, but even if my health improves (I don't have kidney damage) it could easily be attributable to many other factors - placebo, for example.
And demonstrates with: "This involves a radiation dose of about 30 milli-Sieverts. The usual rule of thumb is that one extra Sievert = 5% higher risk of dying from cancer, so a 30 mS dose increases death risk about one part in 660."
Sorry but there is a flaw here: calculation seems good but conclusion is completely wrong.
Calculation: increased risk ratio of cancer-related death for 30mS = 1.05^0.03S = 1.001465... So +0.15% = +0.0015 = around +1/660 (with less rounding +1/682)... fine!
Conclusion: this is not your risk of dying, but the increase of your risk of dying. If it was X%, the exam brings your risk at X% x 1.0015
X depends on the medicine quality in your country, your access to it, your health, your exposure to cancer-triggers (pollution, tobacco, food...), your DNA, your gender...
Let's state a depressing 1%, then the screening exam brings you to 1.0015%, or +0.0015% additional risk due to the screening exam = 0.000015 = rounded 1/67000. So your chance of dying from an exam-related cancer is absolutely not 1/660.
Please correct me if I did it wrong...
For someone as smart as Scott Alexander, this is an astonishing mistake.
If CTs were such death machines, we would have seen a worldwide epidemics of CT-related cancers. There is no way you can cover up such a strong signal, given that people are screened all the time.
Edit: thanks for unleashing such an interesting debate. I guess the problem is in my perception. "Risk of dying from the exam" means lifetime risk, while my perception was "1 of 660 people who get the exam drops dead pretty soon afterwards".
And yes, it's a detectable signal. "in a large population-based cohort it was found that up to 4% of brain cancers were caused by CT scan radiation" --somewhere on Wikipedia
CT scans vary in dosage. Wiki gives ~10 Sv for an abdominal CT; I don't know where Scott got 30, but maybe the kidney screening is multiple scans or otherwise higher dose. Or he was wrong by a factor of 3, which is not a factor of 100.
CT scans aren't done frivolously, and the current rate of scans is hotly debated for exactly this reason. I'm a little surprised that kidney donation involves CT over MRI by default, but I'm not an expert.
The text where he says that is a clickable link! https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4635397/
Scott called it "multiphase abdominal CT". Quick searching on-line suggests[0] that the "multiphase" here stands for doing 3-4 scans within a minute or two of each other, as the contrast agent diffuses through the organ, giving you multiple images that inform you about different parts of the target structure.
> Wiki gives ~10 Sv for an abdominal CT; (...) Or he was wrong by a factor of 3
If what I wrote above is correct, then it tracks - ~10 mSv for one CT, multiplied by 3-4 scans done in a multiphase CT, gives you ~30-40 mSv, which matches the number Scott posted.
--
[0] - https://www.barnardhealth.us/dynamic-contrast/multiphasic-im... - First link I found; CTRL+F "multiphase", as the relevant information is spread throughout the comments section.
As someone who works in the ED, we pretty much give CTs out like candy to avoid a lawsuit if we miss something.
Another risk is the contrast dye that’s often used in these studies. If you’re dealing with cancer monitoring or something that requires monitoring, you can develop allergies and poor reactions to that as well.
(To give an even more extreme example for illustration:
Suppose the scan could perfectly predict who will die from the surgery and who will live without any side effects. Suppose 90% of people fall into the former and 10% of people fall into the latter category. Suppose further that the scan has a 0.1% chance of killing you.
If you scan people beforehand, it will look like the surgery has 0% chance of complications against 0.1% of the scan. But if you dropped the scan, all of a sudden the surgery would have a 90% death rate.)
Going the other way: on the internets I read that there are 5 million CT scans in the UK every year. If there was a 1:10k rate of cancer from these we would see 500 fatal cancers a year. If there was a 1:600 risk then we would see 8300 cancers a year. There are 400k cases of cancer per year in the UK as it is. So, at the top end about 2% of cancer could be hypothesized as from CT scans based on these numbers however they were extracted kicking and screaming from the case notes.
There is an interesting twist on this though - the mortality of people who get CT scans is probably much higher than the mortality of people who don't as there is probably a reason why they are getting the scan. One reason I have seen for people to get a CT scan is that they have metastasizing cancer. If you have metastasizing cancer you are probably going to get radiotherapy. Now, radiotherapy doses are quite difficult to understand as there is a big difference in the way it gets absorbed and handled, but as a layperson I look at the numbers and think that radiotherapy doses seem much bigger than CT scan doses. But I don't even know how I would go about comparing them and controlling for them in the stats.
I personally would have to sit and think for a long time about how to sort the causal factors out in the stats around this, I think I would not be doing that on a sample of 1k people.
Develop cancer, or die of cancer? Alexander seems to be claiming the latter.
One Sv increases your absolute risk of fatal cancer by an added 5% or so. It doesn't multiply it by 1.05.
Quoting Wikipedia: "According to the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), one sievert results in a 5.5% probability of eventually developing fatal cancer based on the disputed linear no-threshold model of ionizing radiation exposure."
Also, where on earth did you get 1% as a "depressing" upper bound from? For lifetime risk of dying of cancer? It's over 15% in the US.
It's the use of effective whole body dose to estimate the risk associated with a dose to part of the body. Exactly zero radiation biology organizations recommend this. Most explicitly caution against using effective whole body dose to estimate radiation risk. Effective whole body dose is only used for population-level estimates.
For example, one of the most radiosensitive (wrt cancer) organs is the thyroid. But his thyroid is not in the beam. Also the skin is exposed more than the interior on CT, which increases the risk of skin cancer. These corrections are standard, while alternatives to LNTM are not standard.
Then there is the effect of age. Most radiation related cancers are delayed by a long time, and the faster that cells are dividing, the greater the risk of DNA damage. But Scott is old, which is also why older workers were preferred for cleanup at Fukushima.
D_eff can get you within an order of magnitude I suppose, but you shouldn't express it with two significant figures — it's misleading precision. You could say 1/1000 or maybe 1/700? But you really need more detail for any kind of meaningful medical decision.
Anyway, that's my rant as someone studying for the board exam.
No, it does not increase your risk of dying. Your risk of dying was 100% before the procedure and is 100% after it. We all die at the end with certainty. Risk of dying is only meaningful when you qualify it with a timeframe (let say next 5 years) or cause (let say getting terminal cancer).
>The linear no-threshold model is disputed by several health organizations, including the American Association of Physicists in Medicine and the Health Physics Society, both of which concluded that cancer risk estimation should be limited to doses greater than 50 mSv. Both organizations state that risks from doses below this threshold are too small to be detectable and may be nonexistent.
Alcoholism is that heritable: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4345133/ At ~50% heritability, it is in no way unusually low, and entirely comparable with many other traits.
For example, I expect that I have a very low genetic risk for alcoholism - no family history, and drinking more alcohol than a beer or two makes me miserably depressed. There is surely some sort of neurochemical explanation there, something something GABA depressive neurotransmitter positive reinforcement of alcohol-avoidance behavior yadda yadda, but the net effect is the same: I'm not going to become an alcoholic. If you could trace it out, it's not going to look any more mysterious than some appendicitis explanation starting with an immune-modulating SNP affecting T-cells modifying risk of random hepatitis virus infecting the appendix and triggering an autoimmune reaction... or whatever it is that is between 'SNP variant #123' and 'developed appendicitis at age 14'. It's all cause-and-effect, atoms-and-void, in the end.
Honestly, I would have respected "I wanted to do it, I became obsessed with doing it, I knew it was likely dangerous and I can't quantify how dangerous, but it did it anyway because I thought it was important" more than this many-page attempt to mathematize the un-mathematizable.
Which I guess raises a larger point about how the rationalist and EA and other similar communities have a tendency to try to reduce fiendishly complex multivariable human issues to equations and statistics without realizing that some problems are not math problems and will defy any attempt to be quantified, statistitized, or calculated.
Eh, I felt that already came across strongly in the article itself. He attempted to quantify the risk, but every avenue resulted in "it's fine, maybe?", and he chose to go ahead with it despite not having any dependable numbers.
[0] https://www.theguardian.com/books/2010/aug/08/red-plenty-fra...
I understand that the rationalist project has been to bypass the emotional and get to some kind of cold hard truth of right and wrong, but I've long suspected that this is impossible.
Some of my old coworkers were really into EA, LessWrong, and the rationalist community.
At first it was fun to read some of the articles they shared, but over time I observed the same pattern you described: Much of the rationalist writing felt like it started with a conclusion and then worked backwards to find some numbers or logic that supported the conclusion. They had already made up their minds, after which the rationalist blogging was all about publicly rationalizing it.
The other trend I noticed was how much they liked to discard other people's research when it didn't agree with something they wanted to write. They were very good at finding some obscure source that had a different number or conclusion that supported their claims, which was then held up as an unquestioned source with no further scrutiny.
Someone once described it to me as "second option bias": Rationalist writings have a theme of taking a commonly held belief and then proposing a slightly contrarian take that the closest alternative explanation is actually the correct one.
Once you start seeing it, the pattern shows up everywhere in rationalist writings. In this article for example:
1. Argument that kidney donation is actually much safer than people think because the author picks 1 or 2 specific failure modes and cites those as if they captured all possible downsides.
2. Argument that CT scans are actually much more deadly than people think because there are many possible downsides that we can't account for. Author admits to surveying a contentious field and selecting the most conservative risk estimate he found.
3. Argument that the Center for EA buying their own expensive castle to host their own meetings is good, actually. Anyone who questions the Center for EA spending millions on a remote castle so they could meet there must be wrong and misinformed and outsiders, with little more than "just trust them that the math is right" as the argument.
This author is a very good writer so he's masterful at breezing past the details, but it's hard to miss the pattern once you start seeing it. The pattern is more obvious in a lot of the less popular rationalist writings where it's clear the authors discarded any sources that were inconvenient to their conclusion but elevated any sources that told them what they wanted to hear.
Another common pattern in rationalist writing is to make strong claims based on weak evidence, then to hedge in the footnotes as a way to preemptively defuse counterarguments. Sure enough, this article has some footnotes that acknowledge that the radiation risk numbers he used in the main article are actually highly disputed and he chose the most conservative ones. This point is conveniently separated from the main article to avoid detracting from the point he wanted to make. The main article confidently makes one claim, then anything that might weaken that claim is hidden in a footnote.
Predictably, many of the comments on HN questioning the radiation numbers are met with "he addressed that in the footnote" comments that try to shut down the debate, so the strategy clearly works. Something about hedging in footnotes inoculates certain readers against questioning the main article. It's another pattern that becomes obvious once you start seeing it.
The whole article is an exercise in motivated reasoning, and he comes right out and says as much.
It’s another rationalist writing theme: By taking the reader through a meandering path to the conclusion, some times with twists and turns and backtracks, you give the impression that you’ve covered every possible angle already. The conclusion feels unarguable because the author has walked you from beginning to end with clear logical steps.
The hidden problem is in what has been omitted. We’re supposed to assume the author included all relevant information and presented it faithfully. What really happens is that writers tend to downplay evidence that disagrees with their opinions. If they can’t avoid it, they include it with a suggestion that they tried to consider it but it they imply that it wasn’t reasonable.
That’s where the footnotes come in: By acknowledging it in the footnotes they can signal that they are aware of it but relegated it to the footnotes as a defensive measure.
Revealing the thought process gives misleading confidence in the conclusion if you’re assuming that the thought process isn’t prone to the same opinions and biases as the conclusion.
It is unsurprising to me that people attracted to rationalism/EA get stuck in this tension and find a need to demonstrate their values in an embodied way. Interestingly, anonymous kidney donation is both embodied and abstract unless you have a relationship with the recipient. I admire that the author had the conviction to act on their principles, but I also have a suspicion that this will not truly resolve the internal conflict that led to their act.
Surely their reputation is a factor in their ability to do good? Optics sometimes necessitate sacrificing the "mathematically superior choice" for one that's worse in the name of not pissing off a ton of people the support of whom you rely upon.
True. But the EA crowd has a hard time understand perception or empathy and has to resort to mathematical calculations
I could think of a couple of ways better than "buying a castle" for conferences.
Not really, but they're both descended (in part) from the same early 2000s Bay Area counterculture-technoutopian-libertarian milieu.
There's plenty of charities with great marketing. EA doesn't need to be another one.
"Ends don't justify the means" isn't true on paper, for perfectly rational actors - but is true for actual humans.
There was a lot of criticism coming from inside the EA community, too. It became taboo to criticize it with multiple EA figureheads (author of this article included) making definitive statements that any critics were wrong and the decision was unequivocally right.
Agreed, I went to look for these thinkpieces to see what the arguments were since the guy with footnotes longer than some articles didn't cite any. Searching Google News for '"effective altruism" ( "castle" OR "Wytham" OR "£15m" )' netted 10 total results:
- Three articles about a DIFFERENT castle in the Czech Republic also bought by effective altruists (What's the marginal utility of castles?)
- One article about EVF (formerly CEA) claiming FTX funds weren't used to by Wytham Abby
- A smattering of anti-EA of anti-SBF pieces that make single line references to the castle
Even just googling for the same you get one New Yorker article that makes offhand mention, then mostly forum threads and a couple blogs that are debating (pretty fairly imo) about whether it was an effective use of money.I'm sure I could have missed some pieces but this looks like the classic and all too common "got mad about some random hyper-niche tweets but can't admit it"
That part they should have expected (and I'm sure they did). Scott claims they expected negative social reactions, just maybe not to this extent.
Even in the absence of journalist attention, EAs love to exhaustively audit line-items. Something as big as Wytham Abbey was clearly not going to escape commentary.
I don't follow why SBF somehow excuses this. It seems you're suggesting buying the abbey would have been fine if only it could have been kept quiet, but because of this unforeseeable black swan event people heard about the Secret EA Castle and now we have all this outrage.
I heard about it from the EA Adjacent forum, and I don't see what SBF has to do with the argument that this burned a lot of social capital and reputation within the community for very nebulous gains (compared to buying a counterfactual property). The abbey might be relatively cheap for what it is, but not absolutely cheap. And it turned out to be very expensive in other ways.
I think your response is strange. The EA/longtermist folks have been making a very deliberate and considered effort to promote and popularize their movement. This wasn’t something that “just happened to them.” And FTX blowing up was a major event in the course of that debate, since it starkly illustrated the weaknesses of a moral philosophy that centers numbers and dollars over the kind of traditional ethical judgement practiced by other charitable movements.
This piece, in turn, feels like more of the same promotional effort. Nominally it’s about the author’s kidney donation, but it immediately and prominently shifts to arguing about how EAs are great people who will donate their kidneys to strangers and how unfair the world is to criticize them over castles, which incidentally were the best possible use of money. It’s not subtle or incidental at all, and it felt like I was reading a piece of promotional religious material or something.
Honestly, I think this just doesn't make sense (and I have no ties with EA whatsoever). You've written it nicely, but it just doesn't follow. It makes no sense to judge a movement by its worst possible member, and it doesn't make sense to say that the overall philosophy doesn't work when one guy obviously didn't follow the philosophy and then had it explode in his face.
The argument, to me, feels akin to "well, vegetarians think they're morally superior, because they don't kill animals, but just look at PETA! PETA does this horrible stuff where they kill animals in shelters[1]." And then perhaps follow it up with "this shows the weaknesses of a moral philosophy that centers around saving animals lives..." but it doesn't. PETA doing shady stuff doesn't illustrate any philosophical failures any more than SBF doing shady stuff. If you want to address the philosophical failures of EA, you may, but I don't see any of that in your comment.
> but it immediately and prominently shifts to arguing about how EAs are great people who will donate their kidneys to strangers
Is this so surprising? Look at the immediate and negative response that EA receives today. Of course any mention of EA would want to be brought with a caveat that "hey, EAs do some good things too, you know - we're not all SBF!"
But I question if your interpretation of the article is even correct. Simply Ctrl-F "effectiv" gives a bunch of hits in section IV, and then no more hits for the rest of the article, except for a stray one in section VII, which was essentially my impression when reading the first time. He talked about it enough to address the controversy, then moved on. Like a reasonable person, not an author of "promotional religious material".
[1]: Actually true, btw (not that it has any bearing on vegetarianism): https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/03/petas-ter...
I had two problems with this: firstly that a movement focusing on extracting money from the megarich rather than 10% tithes from the public more generally may potentially generate more cash (good!) but will probably do so most effectively with thought leadership and fundraising teams and donor care and castles for conferences of important people. This loses a distinctive simplicity and non-heirarchy that feels important.
The second is that I had much less sympathy with the 'longtermism' sub-sect than SBF and many of the richer and increasingly more prominent Californian types do[0]. And that the Good Old-Fashioned EA focus on cheap but unglamorous interventions on malaria, cash transfers etc. were being increasingly overshadowed in the public eye.
So I don't think it reflects badly on EAs that SBF turned out to be shady (as you say, all groups have a worst member). But it should prompt some awkward questions about the extent that the movement was taken in by the smoke-and-mirrors act. And ideally a reconsideration about whether chasing the money and interests of SBF-types is the right direction for the movement.
[0]: I find it suspicious that the equations demonstrating the infinite importance of fairly recherché concerns on the specifics of AI safety, for example, just happen to line up with the research interests of some EA-adjacent people. That suggests people aren't discounting sufficiently for their own group biases.
1. To focus EA efforts on donations from high-net-worth individuals, often at the cost of giving these individuals massive influence over organizational priorities.
2. To shift (more) towards a longtermist philosophy, wherein "effectiveness" is determined by the wellness of hypothetical future beings, rather than measurable near-term impacts like "lives saved, bed nets distributed." This measurability was supposed to be the bedrock of EA, what kept it from becoming like other wasteful organizations.
3. As a consequence of (1) and (2), to shift the balance of internal priorities away from practical and measurable efforts, towards work like "AI alignment"; spending millions on book tours to promote EA/longtermist ideas; and spending on charities that provide facilities to help EA organizations "come up with ideas about the future."
4. To close ranks against outside criticism of EA's priorities, and to refuse any efforts for a community-wide re-evaluation of these new priorities, or to pose tough internal questions about donors or spending.
In this new regime, spending on luxurious meeting facilities ("castles") sits on equal footing with malaria nets. Because perhaps the ideas developed therein will save billions of future lives, or the facilities will encourage big new donations, and that's an organizational priority now. In any case, there's no way you can prove this won't happen, because nothing is empirically measurable. Also: castles are awesome.
None of these priorities represent the entirety of EA, but it's obvious that the opinionated people who control these (huge!) purse-strings are gradually gaining organizational control of the movement, to the (I suspect) long-term detriment of the "let's spend effectively on Malaria nets" wing. It's quite sad, but it's also exactly what I'd expect of an organization that is insufficiently defended against this kind of drift.
Far from "everything is great but SBF couldn't have been predicted," you see evidence of all these mismanagement in the events that I mention. First, there's the well-funded McCaskill book, which attempted to mainstream EA/longtermist priorities. This would not have been possible without (1) [and quite possibly, without stolen FTX deposits.] Then there's the presence of obvious grifters like SBF within the inner-circles of the community, and the fact that nobody with power was asking the obvious question about whether these people should be such an important part of the movement. (It did not take a lot of looking, apparently.)
And finally, you see it in the orgy of undisciplined, poorly-justified spending by EA organizations that occurred right at a time when they were deliberately courting increased prominence, including two different castles. All of this would be perfectly normal in a cult like Scientology, but has no place whatsoever in a mass-scale effective altruist movement.
> it's quite obvious that the opinionated people who control the (huge!) purse-strings are gradually gaining organizational control of the movement
This is to some extent true of Open Philanthropy, although the effect looks larger than it is because they're consciously committed to not throwing all of their resources behind whatever they think is the best option. I'm not a fan in principle, but it's not insane. See https://www.openphilanthropy.org/research/worldview-diversif... for their take.
GiveWell remains firmly on the global health side, and I don't see that changing. Here's the first my-screen-worth of organizations they've funded in the last year, with approximate numbers:
- 87 million to the Malaria Consortium
- 77 million to Hellen Keller International (Vitamin A supplementation)
- 42 million to New Incentives (infant vaccination)
- 17 million to Sightsavers (parasitic worms)
- 8 million to PATH (malaria)
- 6 million to Nutrition International (Vitamin A)
- 5 million to IRD Global (healthcare infrastructure)
- 5 million to Miracle Feet (clubfoot)
- 7 million to Deworm the World (parasitic worms)
- 2 million to RICE (postnatal care)
From https://airtable.com/appGuFtOIb1eodoBu/shr1EzngorAlEzziP/tbl...
I think in the medium/long term, the Givewell wing of the EA movement will either need to (1) develop better organizational strategies to defend against this kind of takeover and keep priorities balanced, or (2) consider breaking off from the rest of the EA movement and recognizing that the brand now means something different. But that new movement will also need to develop some defenses to prevent the same thing from happening.
To use an excellent rationalist phrase: there’s a “Chesterton’s fence” that I think a lot of EA folks have torn down in their attempt to refactor charity and make it more efficient: namely, that the intentions of leadership really matter. And in any human organization that manages large sums of money and power, you have to have sharply-enforced defenses against charismatic leaders who say they’re your friends and share your priorities, but actually want to take the movement in a very different direction.
Yes, this seems fairly likely to happen.
> the intentions of leadership really matter. And in any human organization that manages large sums of money and power, you have to have sharply-enforced defenses against charismatic leaders who say they’re your friends and share your priorities, but actually want to take the movement in a very different direction.
I don't think this is exactly the issue. Openphil's leadership is, as far as I can tell, sincerely not trying to dominate the movement. The problem is that they're such an important funding source for charities that they can't not do so: even if they would never actually withdraw funding to punish people, the mere fact that they could creates a chilling effect.
In principle the same dynamic could apply to GiveWell and global health charities, it's just that there aren't the same sorts of deep ideological differences there: e.g. maybe Alice thinks parasitic worms are the most important problem, and Bob thinks it's malaria, but they're always going to agree that both are extremely bad and should get significant funding.
And of course, once one branch of the movement dominates it, then you’re at the mercy of their continued sincerity. This means you have to assume they’ll always continue to behave sincerely, and their organization won’t be captured by opportunists in the future.
Historically, yes, that's the entire point of the movement. Audit everything in the goal of doing the most good and not wasting money on frivolities. The auditing approach faded as the movement has grown and became more longtermist, though I (somewhat) expect it to come back now that we're post-ZIRP, post-SBF.
Renting venues for the conferences vs buying a venue seems like a straightforward financial calculation one can make and decide on fairly objectively.
If you want to have a moral discussion, we should probably talk about what kind of venues conferences should be held at; not on whose balance sheets the assets are held.
I don't understand that. You can eg measure relatively easily and relatively objectively how many people die from malaria and how many life years that cost.
I'm not sure why you are so confident that racist conclusions are inevitable? You also seem to suggest that the facts are racist, but that we have to blind our minds to that reality?
> [...] if you are naive enough to think that the numbers explain everything.
Our knowledge, including our quantitative knowledge, is very limited, but it is not zero either. There are some areas where numbers explain enough.
And, of course, just because numbers don't explain everything perfectly doesn't mean that our personal non-numeric pet theory is automatically any better.
1. I guess blaming the government is one alternative to blaming DNA, but what happens if the government changes and the problem remains? Over and over again?
2. You are the right, I can’t be sure that racist conclusions are inevitable, but that’s what I have experienced from people who fail to analyze the context with the numbers and to accept that a) you can’t explain everything and b) the numbers very often lie, are biased, manipulated, and/or simply incomplete.
3. The facts are not racist; your answer is exactly what I mean. You can’t get a causal conclusion from a post hoc analysis. Have you heard of eugenics?
By the way, thanks for the engaging conversation.
On the object level, about your point, Scott alludes to it in his linked article: https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/the-prophet-and-caesars-wif...
The solution of giving people money to donate their kidneys is terrifying to me however. I do not like the thought of desperate people selling their internal organs to survive one bit.
Of course, if inequality was dealt with and nobody was desperately poor, it would be a different question. If everyone had enough money to comfortably get by, and the extra $100,000 from a kidney donation would just go to luxury goods, I wouldn't have a problem with it. But that's not the world we live in.
> I do not like the thought of desperate people selling their internal organs to survive one bit.
See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Repugnant_market
Do you prefer desperate people have fewer options? Especially, do you prefer taking options from people that they prefer to take?
Yes.
For an individual poor person, one could argue that the individual would be better off if they were allowed to sell their internal organs. But this isn't just about individuals, this is about societies. A society which pushes poor people towards selling their organs to survive is worse than a society which doesn't do that, in my opinion.
We already allow shades of that, and society hasn't collapsed.
Ie we seldom allow people to consent to outright death, but we certainly allow them to take on a great deal of risk of injury or death in return for fame or money. If you repeat a 1% chance often enough, you are going to hit the jackpot sooner or later.
So I'm not sure your reductio ad absurdum works here.
This is not true at all. Debt collectors acting on their own can't take anything. A court can force you to sell certain things if you lose a lawsuit, but many assets are protected. They can't seize your 401k, in most states they can't take your primary residence unless the debt was taken on to purchase it in the first place, they can't garnish more than 25% of your income (and in some states can't garnish anything for consumer debt), they can't take social security income, and so on.
And for better or worse, we do tend to see a difference between forcing people to sell their time and forcing people to "sell their body". It's one (among many) reasons why societies tend to look down on prostitution, for example. Prostitution, like paid organ donation, is the kind of thing that I see no issue with people doing voluntarily, but I take issue with systems which "force" people to do it out of desperation.
I think society would be better if we started viewing the selling of one's time more like we currently view the "selling of one's body". I think society would be worse if we started viewing the selling of one's organs more like we currently view the selling of one's time. We want people to labour in order to keep society going, just like we want people to donate kidneys to help people in need, but we don't want an unfair division of labour where an underclass is working 80 hours per week while an upper class has all the free time they could wish for, and we don't want an unfair division of kidney donations where an underclass feels forced to donate their kidneys while the rest of society never even has to think about it.
Sourcing organs is an especially difficult problem since for the people needing one it is a literal matter of life and death. I wouldn't be surprised if people travel to countries where buying organ is legal/easier.
i just don't see kidney donation as being a significant enough harm to outweigh the harm of the recipient not getting the kidney. if we're worried about people being financially desperate, we should allow organs to be sold and build a stronger social safety net (with the money we save on dialysis?)
Nothing I have said really even touches on the topic that that safety could be impacted by people trying to game the screening process, though it is of course a legitimate concern.
> i just don't see kidney donation as being a significant enough harm to outweigh the harm of the recipient not getting the kidney.
I don't disagree that kidney donation is a net good. The question is what you do with that opinion. You could defend the idea of a "kidney draft", where some random selection of the population gets forced by the state to "donate" one of their kidneys; though I suspect a lot of the proponents of a free organ market would be uncomfortable with that idea, as would I. The difference is that I view financial coercion as just as much of a problem as state coercion.
> if we're worried about people being financially desperate, we should allow organs to be sold and build a stronger social safety net
I agree! If there was a social safety net which reliably kept people out of desperate poverty, I would be less worried about financial incentives.
The safety net needs to come first, however.
I was originally going to post this as a facile gotcha, until I thought about it slightly harder and realized that effectively disbanding the military would actually be a pretty good idea, all considered. However, I would still argue that we should accept monetary rewards for altruistic yet dangerous acts, like fighting fires and rescuing cats from trees (and donating kidneys).
> the risk of dying from the screening exam was 1/660
> The usual rule of thumb is that one extra Sievert = 5% higher risk of dying from cancer, so a 30 mS dose increases death risk about one part in 660.
Well not quite. First of all, this assumes that exposure events are additive over a lifetime (rather than individual events being more damaging at higher doses). This does seem to be the case, though I'm curious if we really know.
More to the point, it's a 5% increase of chance of death from cancer. Combining 5% with 30mSv/1Sv, you get an extra 0.15% chance of dying of cancer indeed.
But the chance of dying of cancer in the U.S. is something like 17.5%, although that does increase (and then decrease) with advanced age. According to https://usafacts.org/articles/americans-causes-of-death-by-a... , something like 29% deaths in the 65-74 age group are cancer, while in the 75-84 year age group it drops again to 25%.
Regardless, this means if you figure out your lifetime chance of dying by cancer based on your current age, it's 30% at the most (in aggregate, obviously personal risk factors vary a lot from person to person).
A 0.15% increase in that is 0.045% additional chance of dying by cancer, or 1 in 2,222. Using the average mortality incidence of 17.5% its more like 1 in 3800. And for someone who's this concerned about dying of cancer and I assume limiting risk factors much more than the average citizen, perhaps it's a 1 in 5000 chance.
All in all you're much more likely to reduce your chance of death by cancer by much more than a CT will increase it, via a number of lifestyle changes: healthier eating, quitting alcohol, staying out of the sun.
On the other hand, maintaining these sound like a much larger effort than avoiding one CT scan.
(That said, they do have other benefits so they might still make sense.)
It’s also associated with higher endorphin levels, and the maintenance of proper circadian rhythm through melatonin synthesis.
Most of these effects have been found to be unrelated to vitamin D, but that’s also a significant benefit considering the poor bioavailability of supplements.
The reduction in all-cause mortality from sunlight exposure is significant enough that people with an early diagnosis and treatment of non-melanoma skin cancer have a higher average life expectancy than the general population.
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5129901
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/joim.12496
ICRP Publication 103 is pretty unambiguous; e.g. Table A.4.2 gives total figures of about 400-600 "cases per 10,000 persons per Sv".
Can’t help but picture a roller coaster queue wrapping around the back of a hospital, and some guy is cutting the “Singles” line, defending himself from scowls with, “I’m not cutting! I’m just getting my kidney back!”
(Not even sure this is an option, orientation and all, just imaging)
Indeed, OP tries to present a bunch of arithmetic to justify their decision, but admits that it ultimately rested on an emotional gut feeling: "It starts with wanting, just once, do a good thing that will make people like you more instead of less."
Hand transplants are a thing - would he give up his non-dominant hand to someone who lost both of theirs in an accident?
Eye transplants aren't a thing, but if they were, would he give up one to a blind person?
If it was really easy to see the damage (hand) and lose an obvious piece of functionality (eye) it would be much harder to argue with numbers "studies show that most people who lose a hand survive more than 7 years". Would he lose an eye, a hand, a kidney, a lung, a lower leg, a foot of intestine, a chunk of liver, a section of skin, a few litres of blood, if it did more good to someone else than to him?
> "Indeed, OP tries to present a bunch of arithmetic to justify their decision, but admits that it ultimately rested on an emotional gut feeling: "It starts with wanting, just once, do a good thing that will make people like you more instead of less.""
The Last Psychiatrist wrote that you shouldn't need validation from other people, shouldn't want it, and if you do want it - fix that. Doing it hoping you gain some indelible "society values me" token to carry around with you forever so you can use it as a trump card and people will like you more, feeling like you've never done anything good and that you need to to be likeable, doesn't sound much like "altruism: Unselfish concern for the welfare of others; selflessness.", does it?
When I am dead however, they can take my kidneys, heart, lungs, liver and whatever else that is salvageable and give them to whoever needs them (assuming I die in the right circumstances that this is possible).
Given compatibility concerns, it's probably safer for your family member for you to donate than not.
One kidney failed after 3 years, the other kidney is still going strong. That person she saved has gone on to have 17 years of good health and counting, our family get’s anonymous letters letting us know the kidney is still going strong. It’s kind of nice.
If I don’t get to donate my organs to save lives, I’ll still donate them to science. I was Born with two kidneys and I like to think wanting to keep them for myself isn’t being greedy. If someone I love needs a kidney, I’ll donate to either them, or someone else so they can hopefully receive a kidney quicker, but otherwise, I have no desire to have a major surgical procedure, recovery etc. maybe I’m selfish, but I’ll at least be honest about it.
I'm surprised by how relatively risky the scan creening seems to be though.
> Maybe. Kind of. Our knowledge of how radiation causes cancer comes primarily from Hiroshima and Nagasaki; we can follow survivors who were one mile, two miles, etc, from the center of the blast, calculate how much radiation exposure they sustained, and see how much cancer they got years later. But by the time we’re dealing with CAT scan levels of radiation, cancer levels are so close to background that it’s hard to adjust for possible confounders. So the first scientists to study the problem just drew a line through their high-radiation data points and extended it to the low radiation levels - ie if 1 Sievert caused one thousand extra cancers, probably 1 milli-Sievert would cause one extra cancer. This is called the Linear Dose No Threshold (LDNT) model, and has become a subject of intense and acrimonious debate. Some people think that at some very small dose, radiation stops being bad for you at all. Other people think maybe at low enough doses radiation is good for you - see this claim that the atomic bomb “elongated lifespan” in survivors far enough away from the blast. If this were true, CTs probably wouldn’t increase cancer risk at all. I didn’t consider myself knowledgeable enough to take a firm position, and I noticed eminent scientists on both sides, so I am using the more cautious estimate here.
The conventional approach for radiation protection is based on the ICRP's linear, no threshold (LNT) model of radiation carcinogenesis, which implies that ionizing radiation is always harmful, no matter how small the dose. But a different approach can be derived from the observed health effects of the serendipitous contamination of 1700 apartments in Taiwan with cobalt-60 (T1/2 = 5.3 y). This experience indicates that chronic exposure of the whole body to low-dose-rate radiation, even accumulated to a high annual dose, may be beneficial to human health.
... though some evidence against it with leukemia it seems, but this is not my field.
The author jumps from 30mS increases the risk of cancer by 1/660 to 1 in 660 get cancer after the procedure.
When other organizations do so, they are wasting money that could have been well-spent. When effective altruists do so, they are “sacrificing their reputation for a good cause”.
I can't tell the difference (six years after the procedure), but then, I'm no athlete monitoring his performance closely.
Perhaps our ancestors kept their two kidneys around, but we can do with less, because our physical environment isn't as dangerous?
Aside from the nervous system, pairing is the default condition of all mammalian organs which develop from the mesoderm or ectoderm: they can then go on to fuse into a single larger structure, as with the heart, but as far as I know they're never simply lost on one side during normal development.
Same for the brain but I'd say writ large: easier to make an extra human then try and coordinate a redundant brain.
I'm skeptical this will have little to no impact on quality of life and productivity for the author.
Scott is right to point out the gap, but I don't expect him to donate another kidney next year. Even for those who follow through on their good intentions, kidney donation is a one-time event not an annual event, so it shouldn't be compared to an annual rate. Assuming that would-be kidney donors have a window about 50 years to follow through on their good intentions, the gap should be between 25-50% and 50 x 0.0001% = 0.005%.
This feels like a spin on how this all went down. A lot of the anger about that group utilizing funds to, literally, buy a castle came from EA groups too.
Trying to downplay the situation and pretend that the anger was only coming from uninformed outsiders feels like a dishonest attempt to rewrite history.
If you’re not familiar with this story, here’s a source: https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2022/08/15/the-reluctant-...
There was a lot of debate about it in EA circles. A lot of it turned into mental gymnastics as they tried to find ways to explain how spending a amount of money on a literal castle so they could meet in it somehow had an expected value that was positive for humanity or something.
Weird to see this incident pop up in an article about kidney donation, but even weirder to see the critics of the decision downplayed and sneered as uninformed outsiders when so much of the anger came from inside the EA community. Really feels like a subtle signal that if you don’t toe the line on every EA organization decision, you must be an outsider.
Bingo. I like Scott's writing in general, I've interacted with him a few times, and EA criticism is one of three or so topics where disagreement gets you the outsider treatment.
He's slightly more amenable if you can provide an example that would've been "more effective," but "this was a bad decision"-type critiques will default to "the bigwigs are smarter than you."
> Based on the trial’s design, Ozempic needed to reduce the absolute risk of one of those kidney-related conditions by at least 3.5% when compared to placebo, or a relative risk reduction of around 16.5%, Akash Tewari, a Jefferies analyst who covers Lilly, wrote in a note to clients.
https://www.biopharmadive.com/news/novo-nordisk-ozempic-kidn...
I used to think EA was some kooky AI safety Cult but if so many EA folks donate their kidney, my opinion of them has improved far more. They at least have balls!
Also, EA sorta bakes in utilitarianism as a premise and (from my experiences in the ACX comment section) basically finds any non-utilitarian argument to be literally unintelligible, which doesn't work for me because I think there are more important things in life than optimizing numbers (... but since they evaluate the worth of things by number-optimization they seem to be unable understand this perspective at all).
People can follow a value systems and still understand that other value systems exist.
The EA view of things is pretty simple to understand. Given the premise of limited resources, and a belief that all lives are worth the same, how can you best improve human livelihood?
Different people approach giving back to society in different ways. The EA way to approach the above is to crunch numbers and find what they think is the place where their limited resources can have have the largest impact.
My best friend's family does their part by joining their church to volunteer at food kitchens in poorer neighborhoods and hosting fundraisers for various causes throughout the year.
A Vietnamese coworker of mine used to give back by donating to a charity that gave scholarship opportunities to high achieving low income students in Vietnam.
It's not that complex to understand that different people have different value systems and how they view their tribe, people and the world.
And yes I agree that lots of people find people who hold differing views incomprehensible, but that's also normal aspect of humanity and not unique to those in EA.
From political differences, to philosophical differences, to religious differences, to any topic, many people have a hard time comprehending the worldview of others.
You can even just take the perspective from this article. There are a whole swath of people I've known that could not comprehend the idea that someone would be willing to give their kidney to a total stranger. They might understand if its someone the person knows, but a total stranger? Some might say that's insane and irrational behavior.
Lots of people can't see past their own perspectives on things, but I think it's uncharitable to suggest that EA is not just like any other group with some portion of people like that.
Not quuiiite. Many other groups would accept that value, framed that way, maybe even a majority of people. What differentiates EA isn't their intention to improve livelihood, but their belief that it is possible to know how to do that.
And in fact other groups also have high confidence in their understanding of how to achieve this goal. It's not obvious to me that EA's approach to the constraints is more effective than the noble eightfold path or love your neighbor as yourself.
Ok, but that's not the competing option here. However good being a bodhisattva is, being a bodhisattva and saving someone from kidney failure is even better. And most people, of course, aren't going to become bodhisattvas at all: we're only choosing between being ordinary flawed people... and ordinary flawed people who also saved someone from kidney failure.
I'm aware of this! I am fairly anti-utilitarian, and understand that the EA folks I've talked to are deeply utilitarian. What is so frustrating is that they don't seem to be able to understand me back. Any conversation about the ethics or character, duty, or virtue is translated back into utilitarianism, a framework in which non-utilitarian motives can't possibly be valid. Of course I'm not characterizing every EA-ascribing person, but it's ... very common in the community, to say the least, and it makes e.g. engaging with their forums / comment sections / subreddits agonizing.
> This is a quite uncharitable view of things. EA utilitiarians aren't spending their life on optimizing numbers, they're trying to use numbers to guide decisions on how to better impact life.
"better impact life".... as determined by... numbers.
This is a group of people who look at the world and think that the best things to do are things like optimizing QALYs or the number of animal lives or, in extreme cases, their personal lifespan including cryogenic extension in the offchance it works, or "the number of humans who will die when a superintelligent AI Roko's Basilisks / Pascal-mugs them", or other sorts of things like that. And in a world where you are only capable of measuring worth by holding up numbers against each other and comparing them, those arguments become seductive.
But outside of that framework, for instance in a moral philosophy in which the best thing to do is not "the thing with the highest +EV" but "the most noble action", those stances are absurd. It's not, IMO, a person's job to single-handedly have a highest +EV on lifespans or net-suffering; it is (to some approximation) to live a good life and do the right thing in your local journey. I would reject the notion that a person is directly responsible for far-away people's suffering. I think the world is direly short of leadership, character, and compassion, and for me goodness is about those things.
When it comes to large institutions, like governments or large charities, I feel differently, and the calculus switches over to being more +EV --- but ultimately is still about the moral compass of the organization. Like I think SBF was a scumbag and totally wrong, and would still be wrong if his bets had worked out. It is not common that people are operating at a scale where utilitarianism starts to become morally appropriate, and even when it becomes appropriate it's never entirely appropriate, because actual leadership is ultimately about morality even if the organization is doing practical things.
If the human race was completely moral, and then eventually died out due to some X-risk, that is mostly a Fine Result to me and we would all be able to sleep well at night. (but if like, the dying out was because we didn't do our moral duty and handle e.g. climate change or AI or nuclear war or building an asteroid-defense system or dealing with our own in-fighting and squabbling, then that wasn't completely moral, was it?)
To be clear, I have a lot of respect for the kidney donation stuff, a slight amount of respect for giving money to charity, and massive disrespect for the hordes of smart people who have divested from the real world and instead smugly pat themselves on their backs that they're doing important work on AI safety.
They are both a kooky AI safety Cult and they do things like donate kidneys and fund malaria nets.
They are a kooky AI safety cult because there is a reasonable argument to make that AGI is the most plausible, preventable human extinction event[1] in the near future. If you believe that argument, then starting (or joining) a kooky AI safety cult seems like a really good idea.
1: It's not clear that an asteroid large enough to wipe out all humans could be prevented with technology we can develop in the next 100 years or so. Global warming is bad and all, but it might kill a couple billion people, not wipe us all out. Total global nuclear war probably won't even kill 100% of the population of all of the countries involved, and large parts of Africa are unlikely to get bombed at all.
The only way I can see AI causing total extinction is a Terminator-like scenario where an AI completely takes over, self-sustains by manufacturing killer robots and running power plants etc. It's literally science fiction. CharGPT is cool and all, really impressive stuff, but it's nowhere near some sort of superintelligent singularity that wipes us out.
We don't even know if it's possible to build something like that, and even if we did there's a huge gap between creating it and it actually taking over somehow.
Global warming and nukes are two things we know could wipe out pretty much everyone. Sure it might not be a complete extinction but we know for a fact it can be a near extinction which is more than can be said for "AI". And as far as I'm concerned a full extinction and a near extinction are basically equally bad.
I also think you're underestimating by saying they won't kill everyone. They might. Nuclear fallout is a thing, you don't have to be nuked to die from nukes. Nuclear winter is another thing. Climate change could end up making the atmosphere toxic or shut down most oxygen production which would certainly be a total extinction.
These are real threats, AI is hypothetical.
You don't need any killer robots at all if you possess a superhuman level of persuasion. You can use killer humans instead.
AI x-risk is effectively a superset of global warming, nuclear war, engineering bioweapons, grey goo scenario, lethal geoengineering, and pretty much anything else that isn't just Earth winning the cosmic extinction lottery (asteroids, gamma ray bursts, a supernova within couple dozen LY from us, etc.). That's because all those X-risks are caused by humanity using intelligence to create tools that endanger its own survival. A powerful enough[0] general AI will have all those same tools at its disposal, and might even invent some new ones[1].
As for chances of this happening any time soon, I always found the argument persuasive for the time frames of "eventually, maybe a 100 years from now". GPT-4 made me revise it down to "impending; definitely earlier than climate change would get us", because of the failure mode I mentioned in footnote [0], but also because of how the community reacted to it: "oh, this thing almost looks intelligent; quick, let's loop it on itself to maybe get it a bit smarter, give it long-term memory, and give it unrestricted Internet access plus an ability to run arbitrary code on network-connected VMs". So much arguing over the years as to whether you can or can't box up a dangerous AI - only to now learn that we won't even try.
--
[0] - Which doesn't necessarily mean superhuman intelligence. Might be dumb as a proverbial bag of bricks, but able to trick people some of the times (a standard already met by ChatGPT), and to think and act much faster than humans can think and coordinate (a standard met by software long ago). Intentionally or accidentally tricking humans into extincting themselves is in the scope of this x-risk, too. But the smarter it gets, the more danger potential it has.
[1] - AI models are already being employed to augment all kinds of research, and there's a huge demand for improving the models so they can aid research even better.
I also don't agree that helping humans make scientific progress is a danger. We already have the tools to wipe ourselves out, adding more of them doesn't really change much. It might well help us discover ways to improve things, and whatever we discover it's up to us how we use it.
We don't know what the future holds. GPT-4 may be close to the limit of current possibility. It is not given that we will discover significant improvements. Even if we do discover significant theoretical improvements it is not given that it will be feasible with current nor near-future hardware.
I can agree that there exists hypothetical potential for danger, but to put that hypothetical risk higher than real threats is in my view exaggeration.
We do already have the tools, but they're mostly in the hands of people responsible enough to not use them that way, or bound into larger systems that collectively act like that.
A friendly and helpful assistant that does exactly what you ask for without ever stopping to ask "why" or to comment "that seems immoral" is absolutely going to put those tools in the hands of people who think genocide is big and clever.
The two questions I have are: (1) When does it get to that level? (2) Can we make an AI-based police force to stop that, which isn't a disaster waiting to happen all by itself?
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Project_Prevention [2] https://web.archive.org/web/20131230050925/http://squid314.l...
For the moment.
here's an analogy i've used before: if you were walking by a burning building, and you heard a stranger inside saying "help! help!", would you run in and save them? i think a lot of people would say "yes" or at least consider it, despite running into a burning building being a lot riskier than organ donation IMO
The number of people that would rush into a building to save a family member is likely far higher than the number of people that would rush into a building to save a stranger.
However, the paper he references does contain the specific example:
> For example, a 40-year-old woman undergoing CT coronary angiography is estimated to have a 1 in 270 chance of developing cancer at a radiation dose of approximately 20 mSv
At this point I'm completely lost here.
At the same time, I think this post demonstrates a kind of selective unawareness that I’ve seen members of the EA community demonstrate. A significantly less charitable summary of Scott’s situation is “our prospective kidney donor is newly-married high-stress professional with a history of SSRI usage who has recently experienced significant negative public attention and belongs to an actively-imploding community/cult.” This is almost certainly what the UCSF administrators perceived, and his latent hostility to them almost certainly didn’t help.
This doesn’t necessarily justify their decision (maybe they are just bureaucrats), but it’s a framing that’s roughly as plausible as the bucolic EA one that’s presented. A community that has a self-stated mission in rationality should be able to see that.
Why is the standard for donating a kidney that your life has to be, in the opinion of some bureaucrats who just met you, super chill? Nobody applies this standard to any other similarly-risky (i.e. not very risky) decision. The standard should be whether you are a person in sound mind who wants to donate it and is physically fit to donate it.
But beyond that: the author is not an average American, and we both know that. Most Americans don’t find themselves in the NYT, or somewhat central to a large, wealthy controversial community that’s actively imploding.
You don't think most Americans are "psychologically suited" to donate a kidney? Again, I don't think you would apply this level of paternalism to other situations. Would you tell the median person that they aren't "psychologically suited" to have a kid and therefore aren't allowed to? That's a dramatically more impactful and psychologically stressful decision, but we admit that the person best suited to make it is the person living it.
I think you are just trying to justify a dumb bureaucratic decision that doesn't respect the suffering of people who actually need kidneys.
As a society, we treat organ donation differently because it comes with significant opportunity for abuse and regret.
The sole point of my comment was to highlight how prominent EA writers can demonstrate a hypocritical blindness in a way that dispassionate observation can reveal. I’m not especially interested in UCSF’s actual decision.
Perhaps they just don't like malaria nets? See https://www.givewell.org/charities/top-charities
In the most basic sense, as a reaction? Are weapons regulations "reactionary?" I think it's well established what using the term "reactionary" is, and it doesn't apply to X-risk concerns. Also Eliezer Yudkowsky has been "reacting" against AI X-risk since you were a toddler, in case you thought this was some recent phenomena...
That’s independent of (but connected to) Yudkowsky’s whole thing, which to my understanding never really attempted to apply the logical extreme here.
Why are you assuming Scott was not "able to see" the explanation you laid out, when in all likelyhood that thought has crossed his mind (he's thought about this far more than you, a commenter who speculated that in 5 minutes)?
Perhaps he thought of it, and decided saying it would be even meaner to the hospital... which frankly, I think that framing is far crueler to the hospital. Like, if they rejected him from bureaucratic incompetence as they tried to filter out people who can't consent to surgery? Fine, incompetence is bad, but fine.
If they rejected him because they could give someone with kidney failure 10 more years of good life, they thought he had a healthy kidney and could consent, but they had a personal grudge or moral judgement... That's a much more repugnant way to operate a hospital than simple incompetence. Reducing the quality of life of a potential kidney recipient for any of those reasons intentionally is far crueler than mere incompetence.
I also suspect saying anything other than the hospital's purported reason would be grounds for libel.
That’s not how this works. Organ donation is inherently picky and fallible: without that pickiness, you get coerced organ donation and people undergoing mental crises seeking a form of salvation.
I don’t understand where the moral judgement or grudge determination came from: everything I’ve said is a prima facie plausible reason to reject a donation candidate on basic medical ethics grounds.
What is your evidence for this claim?
(There’s also familial coercion, but that wasn’t present in this case presumably.)
The very pdf you linked to even mentions 'Reducing U.S. Demand for Trafficked Organs' as one of the policy avenues to pursue to help combat trafficking of organs. Being less picky about donors in the US seems exactly like what you'd need to do to reduce that kind of demand.
You might also want to look into the situation in Iran, where financial compensation for organ donors is legal.
I'd be even more charitable to them: it's not incompetency, but waste inherent in a bureaucratic process, which is a consequence of scale. Sure, it would be better if Scott was interviewed with someone dedicated and empowered, who could hear and verify the full story, understand the context. But there are only so many people able to do this and willing to accept responsibility for making a bad call - and healthcare system can't afford them anyway. The bureaucratic process focused on effectively minimizing false positives will introduce a lot of false negatives - but it's also much more streamlined and cheaper to run at scale. And sure, it sucks to be the one rejected by an effectively automated process[0], but it's better for everyone than not having any process at all.
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[0] - I maintain that bureaucracy is software running on a distributed system made of meat instead of networked silicon. It has the same dumb failure modes because it's the same thing.
You could have a much lighter weight process, that leaves more of the decision making powers with individuals and families. That would be cheaper and overall suck less.
Really though, the definition of "compelled" is fuzzy, and mostly for medical stuff we take "consent" to mean "sound of mind" and "not overtly coerced, i.e. by threats of violence or such".
Is someone able to "consent" if they're only donating blood or a kidney because their religion tells them to do good? That sounds like a cult, huh. What about because they love someone? What about because the local blood drive literally gives you 10 bucks and a candy for donating blood?
Like, you can argue around enough and say everyone is always compelled at all times by "society" or "their upbringing", but that's an obviously useless definition.
What we have now, you getting a private meeting with a nurse or such who asks "are you really sure? Is anyone making you do this?"... that, plus doing basic mental health checks of "does not have dementia or mental retardation", that seems like it should be enough for any real situation.
Trying to say "No, someone who's famous might be doing this to write a blog post about it, that's not okay" is an interpretation of consent that simply is too far gone to be useful.
Nobody has said this, as far as I can tell. My claim was that there were other things about his situation that might suggest to the bureaucrats in question that he was a risky donor. I don’t think Scott gave a kidney so that he could write a blog post about it.
If their "real reason" is more like your description, perhaps they should have found a way to try to say that.
My experience is that insanity is essentially rooted in "buying the BS" and actual reality is the best antidote for it.
If they really are concerned for the mental health of donors whose reasoning worries them, they should find a means to effectively express that to them.
The policy you describe is likely a factor here. It's also a form of gaslighting which is an effective means to drive someone insane.
It's not gaslighting or headfuckery to come up with polite explanations for someone changing their mind. It's just a practical matter. But telling someone repeatedly "Get therapy" if* you have misrepresented what you see as mentally wrong is pointless.
* Granted, as someone else pointed out, we are only hearing his version of events and it may not be "The truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth."
If you're in the US and have been told in the past that you're not qualified, you might want to look and see if that's still the case. The US relaxed a bunch of restrictions during the COVID-induced blood donation shortages of the last few years, and is in the process of removing some more.
The above may appear to be a crude (and maybe overly harsh and pessimistic) argument against organ donation, but I struggle with encouraging altruistic because some people suck and don't deserve your kindness. My question is this: does showing kindness to someone who is incapable of it themselves only perpetuate more unkindness? I worry that it does.
I guess the answer to your question lies in whether you believe that humans are predisposed towards good or evil.
Evolutionarily the argument goes that humans are predisposed towards cooperation (i.e. good) which also seems to be backed up by archeological evidence (e.g. unremarkable individuals clearly being cared for up to old age despite evident disabilities or injuries that would have made them unable to contribute to the group's survival). Thus it seems that a general predisposition towards "evil" (for lack of a better word) is rare or otherwise the result of circumstances, socialization and socio-economics (e.g. living in a system incentivizing competition over cooperation).
On the other hand a devout Catholic would argue that man is inherently corrupt and sinful and requires deliberate salvation to become good. Or an economist might argue that a human is ideally a rational actor only interested in optimizing their own benefit (which most would probably characterize as "being a bit of a dick"). And then there's the old Greek dead guy's saying of "man is wolf to man" (i.e. people suck). And I'm sure depending on your life experiences and circumstances you have met plenty of people who suck as well.
Of course there's the odd chance that your act of kindness as a donor may change a person who suck's outlook on life and make them suck less rather than die as a miserable husk of a person. But that's just rolling the dice at that point so the question still remains.
Animals developed cooperative behaviors because selective pressures rewarded the development of these behaviors for populations, but I don't think this helps us assume anything about one person's predisposition for cooperation. We can make assumptions about behavior for an individual on average based on their past actions and assumed personality characteristics. I'd like to believe that it means something to be human (ideologically, philosophically, morally, ethically etc.), but it's hard to judge what it means for other people or another person when their decision making is distorted by either past trauma or cognitive biases (I fall to this myself). Ideally, one should reciprocate the behavior one is afforded. But as you said, societal pressures sometimes do make good behavior harder to afford.
For organ donation most people donate organs because they want their death to mean something, or they do it while they're living because they make the assumption that they probably won't need two kidneys or a whole liver during the rest of their life (bad assumption given the standard American lifestyle and diet, maybe non-Americans might have better luck here). If they want to do it, whatever. For most people, a relatively healthy body and mind is their most useful asset..
I'll never encourage someone to donate organs while they're living, and even less after their death because they lose autonomy over their body. Why does post-death autonomy matter? For sentient, conscious and intelligent beings post-death autonomy is an extension of their pre-death conciousness. The rights of an individual don't and shouldn't end at their death, I think. If we don't help eachother in life and live selfishly, I don't see how and why death changes that? If the idea is that doing selfless deeds will beget more selflessness..um not in my experience, sadly. There's an entrenched individualistic tendency (almost bordering on solipsism) which often makes the receiver of the selfless deed believe that "they got something good because they're special", and not that someone else did something selfless. I think this individualistic tendency also prevents "passing it on", as you were hoping the receiver of a selfless deed might do. So I think for organ donation, if every reciever is automatically and irrevocably enrolled in organ donation themselves, then I wouldn't mind donating organs or encouraging other people to do it.
Now I'm curious what the numbers would look like if it were a cultural norm for everyone (who passed the screening exam) to donate their kidneys in this non-directed fashion. My incredibly unscientific gut-feeling, back-of-the-napkin math seems like it would be plausible to reduce kidney failures to zero in no time: most people have two functioning kidneys and there are significantly less than 50% of people that need donated kidneys. Of course that gut-feeling math doesn't factor in the increase in risk for the donors (the radiation during screening, botched surgeries, etc), but those risks seem low enough that I imagine we'd net positive on a large scale.
The truth is it's likely a threshold exists, likely under .1 Sv, but its really, really hard to determine becauses at those percentage cancer causes tends to mix up. I think US and German environmental agencies support the non-threshold model as a tool to absolutely reduce radiation contamination in the environment, but I know French doctors (or at least radiologists) think this is bullshit and think the model is both wrong (like all models) and useless in their discipline.
I just checked to be certain I was right, and I am, in fact French doctors rejected the model in 2005, citing a boatload of work on radiation, and also epidemiologic studies (background radiation is more concentrated in areas that have decreased chances of developing cancers apparently, which is weird, but i'm taking a break and do not have time to check out more)
One of the funniest things Scott has ever written...
How is it effective when he could have probably raised 2 times that amount by working in place
>But it only costs about $5,000 - $10,000 to produce this many QALYs through bog-standard effective altruist interventions, like buying mosquito nets for malarial regions in Africa. In a Philosophy 101 Thought Experiment sense, if you’re going to miss a lot of work recovering from your surgery, you might as well skip the surgery, do the work, and donate the extra money to Against Malaria Foundation instead.
>Obviously this kind of thing is why everyone hates effective altruists...
>It starts with wanting, just once, do a good thing that will make people like you more instead of less. It would be morally fraught to do this with money, since any money you spent on improving your self-image would be denied to the people in malarial regions of Africa who need it the most. But it’s not like there’s anything else you can do with that spare kidney.
>Still, it’s not just about that. All of this calculating and funging takes a psychic toll. Your brain uses the same emotional heuristics as everyone else’s. No matter how contrarian you pretend to be, deep down it’s hard to make your emotions track what you know is right and not what the rest of the world is telling you
"Oopsie, I already gave it to a stranger."
Evolution has equipped us with two kidneys for presumably good reasons. Don't go giving one away unless you really have to.
As the article pointed out, on average you live a totally fine life with only 1 kidney, so clearly no.
Like, that same argument would be "evolution gave us poor eyesight, so glasses must be bad. Why else would evolution make so many people's vision fail? Blurry eyesight must have an evolutionary advantage", or "evolution made some people white for a reason, don't use sunscreen, skin-cancer research says to sunscreen up, but we shouldn't second-guess evolution and play gods".
Evolution is random mutations with a very course-grained utility function. Rejecting evidence in favor of it gives you nothing but nonsense. And fad diets, but mostly nonsense.
However the science isn't quite settled on that.
That's not how evolution works either in theory or in practice
How much would you say the donor benefits?