A new generation of mathematicians pushes prime number barriers
quantamagazine.org
quantamagazine.org
A more accurate depiction would not have a bunch of prime curves starting from 0, but would have each one sprouting from its prime just when that prime is passed over by all existing prime curves.
You can test if a number is prime in polynomial time, much faster than a sieve. There’s no need to test every divisor to know whether a number is prime or not.
Algos like RSA generate large primes millions of times every day—-there’s nothing to take on faith.
It takes a short time to generate such a number but a very long time to decompose it, but this is a different problem than telling whether a number is prime.
ECC doesn’t require primes and so is safer in that respect although I’ve been hearing that ECC might have structural deficiencies that causes a swing back to RSA for the most secure applications.
You seem to be claiming that the ability to determine whether a number is prime or not is extremely difficult and that it would break (some) cryptography if it were no so. My stance is that (some) cryptography would not be broken unless factorisation of large numbers into two large primes becomes easy.
Can you clarify how you think that some cryptography is broken by a relatively simple test of whether a large number is prime or not?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AKS_primality_test
I'm not sure why you would expect this to break all (or any) cryptographic protocols.
What makes primes hard, and also interesting, is that they seem to be extremely unstructured, we believe they behave like a kind of random number generator, even though they are clearly not random. In fact many of the theorems and conjectures mentioned in the article actually hinge on this. Random numbers are unpredictable on a small scale, but on a large scale they have very nice distributional properties, whereas more structured ones of similar growth rate will often have undesirable restrictions on them.