OpenBSD 7.4
openbsd.org
openbsd.org
[1] https://www.openbsd.org/images/ImHappyBecauseEveryoneLovesMe...
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Louis_Wain
[3] https://arthive.com/artists/11470~Louis_Wain/works/466546~Im...
Announcement mail: https://marc.info/?l=openbsd-announce&m=169746103423179&w=2
On the Linux side these are called "vti" devices, and they're simpler to use than most other methods, and also the default when interacting with cloud service providers IPSec gateways.
IPsec is implemented on many/most network routers/firewalls, and so can be plugged into existing infrastructure perhaps.
I read some quote from the BDFL once where he said something about breaking changes being good because you’re “in a better place” but I feel the BC breaks are too aggressive to rely on pf directly in anything but small commercial applications. If you want to to tinker and break your home network fine.
>> Read through and understand this process before attempting it. For critical or physically remote machines, test it on an identical, local system first.
>> Read configuration and syntax changes and the package upgrade instructions. There were several configuration changes and changes in packages that may require planning before starting the upgrade.
Sometimes it can't be done, because the changes are entirely orthogonal, but trying your best is quite helpful.
Or you just do like Linux apparently seems to do and introduce a new software firewall every few years :D
https://www.openbsd.org/72.html
https://www.openbsd.org/73.html
Likewise there has been several other versions that did not have songs either in the past.
https://www.openbsd.org/lyrics.html
So probably there will be more songs in the future too, even if not every release has a song.
Once booted, run fw_update and syspatch to make sure the firmware and system is up-to-date.
> Fix a bug in the handling of SCSI drives in the bootloader on the luna88k architecture.
> Correct undefined behavior when using MS-DOS filesystems, fixes imported from FreeBSD.
> On arm64, use the deep idle state available on Apple M1/M2 cores in the idle loop and for suspend, resulting in power savings.
> Update AMD CPU microcode if a newer patch is available.
When put to scrutiny OpenBSD fails the same way any other operating system does(https://isopenbsdsecu.re/about/)
Mind you, that was a great improvement over things like Windows NT, but "this is super secure as long as you don't do anything with it" is not as incredibly useful as it sounds like at first.
In the base install are many useful things (including a web server IIRC, though the port is not exposed by default), and those are audited and have that excellent track record.
Then when you install extra things, they are usually limited by what user they run as, and usually have pledge/unveil run (limiting access to predetermined/approved syscalls and parts of the file system) so they can't break other things if compromised.
The unique security features are nice but really there's a lot to say about how simple an OpenBSD system is to use and configure.
Connected to 123.4.002.312
Welcome to OpenBSD 6.2!
login:
Hacker: Dammit, it's an OpenBSD system. We'll never get in!I knew it was deployed at a few non-tech oriented fortune 500 companies (eg not banks or tech firms) as last as 2016, but I've been out of that market since.
Given the world runs on Linux servers, its pretty obvious that is probably the most secure.
Outside black boxes like M$ and Apple, FOSS OS level seems quite secure. How often do you see Linux malware caused by OS in the wild? Sure you install wordpress and never update it and get a cryptominer installed, but its not like anyone is pinging a server with a picture and an overflow error is causing a Pegasus exploit.
That's not obvious at all, and judging by CVE rates appears to be untrue.
They have done a lot of good, but they primarily equate security with code quality which is very short-sighted.
Here's a neat resource for OpenBSD's mitigations, some of which were/are novel, though it may not have been updated recently (2019):
To be considered a secure operating system, you need to have more mechanisms in place to protect against various threats, and the OBSD developers actively resist that. I'm familiar with their innovations and solutions, and I think they fall far short.
* Do not calculate IP, TCP, and UDP checksums on lo(4) interfaces.
But I get why they did it, it probably makes sense in most real-life scenarios
> Packets sent over loopback got their checksums calculated twice. In the output path they were filled in and during TCP/IP input all checksums were calculated again to be compared with the previous result.
Avoid this by claiming that lo(4) supports hardware checksum offloading. For each packet convert the flag that the checksum should be calculated to the flag that it has been checked successfully. Keep the flag that it should be calculated for the case that it may be bridged or forwarded later.
A drawback is that "tcpdump -ni lo0 -v" reports invalid checksum. But that is the same with physical interfaces and hardware offloading.
OK dlg@
What is the use of ed25519 x509 TLS certs, which TLS clients support that and which CAs would sign that?