Widely accepted mathematical results that were later shown to be wrong? (2010)
mathoverflow.net
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It's kind of a philosophical question at this point about what actually comprises a valid proof, if other mathematicians can't make use of it.
So the conjecture is still mostly considered unproven. That could change at any point but there have been no real advances in some time.
This is an understatement. He developed a completely different branch of mathematics through papers that spanned hundreds of pages with very dense and very different ideas from mainstream mathematics.
If it was just slightly obscure, maybe all but half a dozen mathematicians in the world might be able to understand his work. As it stands, at it's best, his proof is so opaque that even the brightest (Scholze) can only kind of understand it. At it's worst, they've rightfully identified it as flawed and that even Mochizuki himself doesn't understand that it's wrong.
[1] Section 1.12 of https://www.kurims.kyoto-u.ac.jp/~motizuki/Essential%20Logic....
The assumption at this point is that it's broken.
The onus is on Mochizuki to either clarify the proof or use the tools of the proof on some other already established problem to show their validity.
Edit: Wikipedia mentions some such false proofs but doesn’t say how widely accepted they were:
The Busemann-Petty problem (posed in 1956) has an interesting history. It asks the following question: if K and L are two origin-symmetric convex bodies in Rn such that the volume of each central hyperplane section of K is less than the volume of the corresponding section of L, does it follow that the volume of K is less than the volume of L: Voln(K)≤Voln(L)?
Its such a dense avalanche of concepts. If you coded up a few examples using actual values to run the calculations in the much-less-dense format of code (say js or python or fortran) how many lines of code would it be? Fifty? Hundreds?
The code to calculate whether any possible cross-section of K is greater than the corresponding cross-section of L is trivial if they are both (hyper)spheres. If they are polyhedra (polytopes), then it would be a lot more involved. And if their boundaries are defined by even more complicated surfaces, it could be fiendishly difficult.
The relationship between declarative statements about infinite families of continuous objects, and imperative code that can be implemented on a discrete computer in finite time, tends to be very very non-trivial.
And it's a famous proof too: Euclid's very first proposition: "On a given straight line to construct an equilateral triangle."
Euclid's proof assumes that two circles intersect, but there is no axiom to ensure this. There is no Principle of Continuity.
Euclid Book I was written 2,300 years ago. I think it's reasonable that some "additional" axioms were occasionally implied. As [0] states, "[that] gap is filled by adding a 'circle–circle' axiom, according to which if circle C has a point inside circle K, and also a point outside circle K, then there is a point lying on both C and K." I'm not sure, but I feel like that might be reasonable to do for a reader of Euclid Book I in 300 B.C.
So is the proof "invalid"? Yeah maybe, according to modern definitions. But I don't think the logic of that part of the proof was actually flawed, just under-presented.
0: https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10472-018-960...
This goes back to the question of what are the axioms and what is a proof.
I guess Euclid would just disagree.
If I recall correctly, it was some characteristic of electrons in the atomic structure.
At the moment I can't find a reference. Anybody remember this?
But there is the "Monty Hall problem", where many mathematicians believe(d?) the incorrect result.
Then, someone springs the probability for the problem they poorly described and feels proud they fooled us all!
I _hate_ the Monty Hall problem for this reason. It’s not a function of statistics but rather a function of an author’s technical writing ability.
I don't think it is just poor wording.
And the idea that probabilities can shift based on Monty's knowing where the prize is certainly not intuitive, in part because many of us do not intuit accurately about probability.
> Suppose you're on a game show, and you're given the choice of three doors: Behind one door is a car; behind the others, goats. You pick a door, say No. 1, and the host, who knows what's behind the doors, opens another door, say No. 3, which has a goat. He then says to you, "Do you want to pick door No. 2?" Is it to your advantage to switch your choice?
I would just point out the obvious that the game show host will never pick the door with the car.
You could say that the wording given kind of implies the always, but it's not completely clear. So, the claim that it's almost always worded poorly is reasonable.
Left unspecified: does the host _always_ follow this exact procedure unconditionally? Does the player know this to be a fact?
Is the hosts algorithm exacly:
1) let the player choose a door 2) open _a_ door that was not the players choice that the host knows contains a goat 3) let the player change choice if they'd like
If it's not, then depending on what the host's algorithm is, then it's not even a question of probability or the odds might differ. Also depending on what the player knows or doesn't it may stop being a question of probability.
"vos Savant herself was flooded by a surge of disbelief. She received more than 10,000 letters from readers of her column, the vast majority of whom were absolutely convinced that she was wrong. Among them were many PhDs and a strikingly large number of mathematicians. One understanding mathematician kindly offered vos Savant some comforting words: “You made a mistake, but look at the positive side. If all those PhDs were wrong, the country would be in some very serious trouble.”"
The important takeaway is that the probability is not 1 divided by the number of doors left. And that is true no matter how many doors he opens, if it's a fixed nonzero number.
If you ask yourself "at what point did the odds stop being 1 in 100", the answer is obviously not "when he opened the last door out of many" or "midway through opening the many doors", so it has to be when he opened the very first door. And if opening the first door out of 90+ changes the odds, it's hard to see a reason why opening the first door out of 1 wouldn't change the odds.
Is the limit of 1/x equal to the limit of 2/x; is ±infinity_1 equal to ±infinity_2?