From the Last Pass blog about a recent incident:
Cloud-based backup storage – contained configuration data, API secrets, third-party integration secrets, customer metadata, and backups of all customer vault data. All sensitive customer vault data, other than URLs, file paths to installed LastPass Windows or macOS software, and certain use cases involving email addresses, were encrypted using our Zero knowledge model and can only be decrypted with a unique encryption key derived from each user’s master password. As a reminder, end user master passwords are never known to LastPass and are not stored or maintained by LastPass – therefore, they were not included in the exfiltrated data.
https://blog.lastpass.com/2023/03/security-incident-update-r...In other words, the thieves went to the bank vault a d stole your safety deposit box but can't access it because they need your key, which only you posses.
If I can store my passkeys in 1password (or lastpass etc) then nobody needs access to my physical phone. They just need access to my password manager's password.
I agree that for many many people password managers are way better than alternatives. But they don't magically make everything safe.
It's like MFA. "it is all safe now because we will send you a code via SMS" and the people fall for social engineering attacks that make them disclose the code the attacker just had the bank send to them.
I doubt such people will be a le to safely use a password manager or passkey for that matter. Passkey are just new enough that we have not had widespread news about how crooks were able to find the weak link(s). Probably on the human side again like in many cases.