You're making an assumption that the NSA cares about the efficacy of cryptography for other people. Why would they care about that?
Hypothesis 1: because the NSA sees evidence that more efficient cryptographic algorithms are easier to crack for them.
To give some weak evidence for this: if you need brute force to crack the cipher (or hash function), a more efficient algorithm need less computation power to crack.
Hypothesis 2: A more efficient algorithm is likely to become applied in more areas than a less efficient one (think of smartcards or microcontrollers). So if the NSA finds a weakness or is capable of introducing a backdoor in it, it can decrypt a lot more data from more areas.
see: colonial oil pipeline hack
Industries with secure fences that are regularly patrolled are entirely different to industries with partial coverage by unpatrolled rusty fences and a freestanding door frame that has a titanium unpickable lock.
Passwords get compromised that's a fact.
How the single employee password that got breached was obtained is still (AFAIK) a mystery - but this will always happen ... given many employess, at least one will eventually make a mistake.
After that, the VPN had no multifactor authentication, the network had no internal honey subnets, canary accounts, sanity checks, etc.
High-quality crypto alone does not make for secure systems.
And systems can be secure with lower quality crypto if the systems are robust.
It's not entirely known how every step of that attack went down, but "breaking low quality crypto" hasn't factored into any incident write up I've ever seen.
However, nearly all ransomware uses rsa. Therefore in this particular case, high quality crypto caused harm.
(To state the obvious, I'm not advocating for bad crypto, just discussing this case).