Your idea doesn't help. Historical proof of routing transactions doesn't mean you will route all transactions.
>Sybilling users, will be forced (statistically) to reveal their excess hops.
There are no excess hops in the attack I am describing.
>Sybilling users, will be forced (statistically) to reveal their excess hops.
There are no excess hops in the attack I am describing.
Otherwise, if there are no extra hops, then what is the attack? A single router (posing as many) gets transactions into blocks as fast as anyone else?
As soon as he starts Sybilling that data to earn more fees or censoring it, every recourse I mentioned (not just may last comment) makes it unsustainable and unprofitable comparatively - opening the door for others to take his spot.
If your point the whole time was a censorship operation through Sybilling, the user can identify that quickly AND honest nodes will seek out those users. I addressed it earlier - the more extreme the censorship, the greater the incentives for other nodes to remedy it themselves.
Yes, please scroll up. Two different attacks were explained along with saying this article only solves one of them.
Do you have any specific critiques? I'm not going to guess your meaning if you aren't going to address my points directly.
As above, you're not describing a sybil attack. Adding a bunch of 1st hop nodes to a network doesn't mean that those nodes are conducting a sybil attack.
If you want to leverage them in an attack, you would have to have them send their TXS to a central block producer that gathers the TXS from all of these first-hop nodes and then tries to use all of their collected-work to orphan the blocks/work from honest nodes in the network. If you work through the paper, you'll see that this attack is provably-costly.
You could theoretically avoid the penalty if you gave all of your 1st hop nodes the same keypair, but in that case you don't have multiple identities on the network and you don't have a sybil attack...