Official U.S. government information about the Global Positioning System (GPS)
gps.gov
gps.gov
> The death struggle: NRL wanted a two-dimensional system, and Parkinson and the Air Force wanted three dimensions plus time. The NRL patent called for atomic clocks in the user equipment, which would have made them prohibitively expensive. Parkinson and the Air Force wanted atomic clocks on the satellites instead, which would greatly simplify the GPS user receiver if atomic clocks could be modified to fly in the high-radiation environment of space. It wasn’t going to be easy to do, but space-qualifying atomic clocks turned out to be possible. NRL had tried to orbit a laboratory atomic clock, but it had quickly failed under the intensity of space radiation.
> With these modified concepts all defined, Parkinson spent the next three months trying to, at least, convince the key players in DoD not to say no. In December 1973, the Defense System Acquisition Review Council reconvened and voted yes. It was not that everyone in the military liked what they saw. Many navigation officials in the services liked the systems they had such as TACAN, VOR, DME, LORAN, etc. The Air Force was particularly opposed to GPS and no doubt preferred more airplanes.
* Embedded PDF: http://www.brightcopy.net/allen/avne/60-9/index.php#/p/20
I've read a lot of the design papers from the 60s and 70s that formed GPS. The initial design was a 3-satellite constellation that would only cover Viet Nam. Options considered [1] included a receiver broadcasting to the satellite (wouldn't scale infinitely) or having an atomic clock in each receiver (high cost and weight). The expectation would be that there were about 100 GPS receivers worldwide: those installed in USAF and USN planes, and possibly some in USN ships or US Army tanks.
One constraint they eventually settled on was that a receiver should be portable (less than 50kg) and inexpensive (less than $500k adjusted)[2]. It just goes to show how far we've come from what was at the time considered ambitious in its size and cost goals.
[1] https://www.xyht.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/3-5-redacted... page 57
[2] https://www.xyht.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/3-5-redacted... page 73
Edit: just scrolled down and saw that my comment is a bit redundant with syncsynchalt's :)
- GPS costs around $2B/yr to continue operating
- Most of this comes from the defense budget
- This year, because of shenanigans, the NDAA has _not_ yet been passed b/c there are significant and controversial amendments in the House version
- We're careening towards a government shutdown
I'm not saying this _will_ happen, or _should_ happen ... but if GPS went off with the rest of the government, would Congress reach a resolution faster?
Even the typical “premium” cellphone will receive all 4. (I know some Android manufacturers disable the used of BeiDou, but they can still receive it.) The iPhone 15 Pro’s tech specs mention “Precision dual-frequency GPS (GPS, GLONASS, Galileo, QZSS, BeiDou, and NavIC)”.
While in other countries, presumably your phone turns on the additional sources.
Edit: Using GPS Test: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.chartcross...
The problem is really just that while premiums consumer devices support basically all GNSS providers, that's not true of a lot of devices. There is a lot of cheap/old/specialized systems out there that are still GPS only.
In the case of a GPS shutdown, I'm not worried about my iPhone 15. However, what is currently in place and certified for flight in a 30 year old 757? Have they gotten around to generic GNSS support or is it just GPS? I honestly don't know and would rather we didn't have to find out the hard way.
All common handset devices used in CONUS (every iphone, android phone, etc) will ignore BeiDou signals. Would love if someone hacked the GNSS firmware to make it usable, but haven't seen it happen yet. If you travel outside the CONUS geofence these signals will show on the device, but FCC has some mandate requesting a block, so it's blocked.
This is correct for smartphones and the likes (all handsets??), though not entirely correct for all GNSS receivers. For example, I regularly use receivers with uBlox F9P chipsets with BeiDou enabled from factory [0].
>Would love if someone hacked the GNSS firmware to make it usable, but haven't seen it happen yet.
If we ask the Broadcom or Qualcomm engineers nicely, they might tell us how to unblock them for their smartphone chipsets in the US. I might’ve seen it before :)
[0] https://www.digikey.com/en/products/detail/ardusimple/AS-RTK...
- service members will not be paid
- some post and base services, commissaries and medical procedures may be stopped
Note that legislation has been proposed but not adopted to make sure that military personnel are paid even during a government shutdown. Note also that key military promotions/confirmations have been blocked for months in the Senate. It really seems like Congress does is not currently taking the military and national security seriously.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2018%E2%80%932019_United_State...
[2] https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/5895
[3] https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/6157
[4] https://www.npr.org/2023/09/27/1201956915/government-shutdow...
One man in the Senate is responsible for this one.
Non-essential civil service (a substantial part of DOD operations) will not be working come Monday (unless an agreement is reached by then) unless they are on multi-year funds. Program offices and large portions of logistics are largely staffed by civil service at this point so this could have huge impacts on military readiness.
One man bears special responsibility, but as the recent confirmation of 3 top appointments shows, there are mechanisms that could be brought to bear. My (limited) understanding is that Senate holds can be ended with a cloture vote, so any 60 Senators could agree to move the nominations to consideration.
He argued that in 2013 under Obama, the OMB really turned the screws and hired contractors to fence off even national monuments which were otherwise unmanned anyway. Complete with signs announcing why they were fenced off. They wanted the public to feel the pain and associate it with Republicans (which seems to work, historically the GOP gets the majority of blame for shutdowns).
I think it's unlikely anybody is going to turn off GPS because the gov't "shutdown". I think the larger risk is that they will stop paying air traffic controllers, while expecting them to come to work anyway. That'll work for a while, but eventually some of those controllers may opt to stay home.
As to your larger point, pointing out errors in the social consensus is intrinsically inflammatory, as it upsets most everyone's neat little boxes they conceptually pigeonhole things into. That's unfortunate, but I don't think I said anything unnecessarily inflammatory - rather just tying together concepts each claimed by the red and blue tribes that they mostly use to talk past each other.
I think the political showmanship here is that it's easy to have an above-the-fold image of a "closed due to shutdown" sign in front of the Lincoln memorial that's immediately comprehensible, but there's not a great pic to show more substantive but dry government work that doesn't happen or gets delayed. It's hard to visually instantly convey "you're still paying all your taxes but you're getting a whole lot less government right now."
If you want to bring attention to the everyday person, turning off GPS would definitely get their immediate attention.
Though, to the OP's point about GPS, WAAS is operated by the FAA, so it isn't clear to me whether not passing the defense authorization would affect it in the near term.
Oh hell yes. GPS is the basis of trillions of dollars of business globally. Just look at sea shipping and aviation alone. Would a lack of GPS ground every commercial plane? Maybe.. maybe not... but it certainly would be a huge disruption.
The first time it happens everyone would just drive hard to making sure all "GPS" systems were actually multi-system GNSS systems. Which is already true of most consumer phones, but I imagine there are still plenty of GPS-Only stuff out there. After the first GPS shutdown and the time for retrofit, everyone would have support for Galileo etc... and the Europeans would be standing there going "SEE!!!! I told you we can't trust the Americans!". And they'd be right.
It would not. Aircraft have other navigation systems they can use instead, such as inertial reference and ground-based VOR navigation. And where there's radar coverage, they can be vectored by controllers.
This probably couldn't be used to keep up with the volume of air traffic today, but it would be enough to get existing flights down safely.
For landing, ILS is still very common, and doesn't require GPS either. An aircraft planning to land at an airport without ILS will have no trouble finding a nearby diversion airport that does have it.
Even as more ground-based navigation beacons are decommissioned, retaining enough for such an emergency remains an active consideration.
And pilots can land with a visual approach and still have ILS.
You would still have ADSB with your altitude, and I beleive heading and airspeed.
Because of the existing requirement to be spotting traffic and being over 1000ft away from other planes, they should be fine.
ATC should still have radar vectoring for their airspace.
I assume planes use more then just GPS, and use galileo and the other networks like consumer GPS do.
For light aircraft getting lost in the old days one hack used to be to fly low till you came to a motorway and read the signs. I imagine most such pilots these days would pull out their phone and open the maps app. Commercial flights of course have more high tech stuff like radio beacons.
Planes, ships, cars, trucks, food delivery - it would be a humongous impact.
GPS is pure magic from the perspective of someone a few centuries ago.
> Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS), such as the American GPS, Europe's GALILEO, China's BEIDOU, and Russia's GLONASS, play an essential role in modern warfare. Despite their different technical specifications—like frequencies and orbits—these systems are designed to be compatible, allowing for greater positional accuracy. However, their signals are susceptible to various forms of interference, such as jamming and spoofing. While there are security measures like anti-spoofing in place, these are not foolproof.
* https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2023/09/26/phasing...
For example, use a signal encrypted with a key not known to the enemy. That prevents spoofing.
Jamming can be pretty much eliminated by using phased array antennas. They can reject signals coming from the wrong direction. To fully block a military unit receiving GPS, the enemy would need to have ~30 planes in the sky over the unit, between the unit and each GPS satellite, broadcasting the jamming signal. Pretty infeasible for them.
There are other ways to make jamming far far harder. For example, if you are happy for your GPS receiver to be always on and have an atomic clock, you can make a new signal that replaces the 1024 bit PRN codes with multi-gigabyte codes which are secret. That effectively means rather than the enemy needing to overpower the real signal, the enemy needs to be billions of times stronger than the real signal to prevent you decoding it.
How did you arrive at this number?
And any decent military receiver will do that, precisely to prevent jamming.
All of which transmit on the same 3-4 frequencies:
* https://gssc.esa.int/navipedia/index.php?title=GNSS_signal
so you'd only have to have high-power transmitters on those and you can block things.
Do it from a plane, or drone, and directional antennas become less effective as the jamming is coming from the same direction as the real signal (the sky).
And now you need to do that 30 times when there are 30 visible satellites.
I am aware of the spot beam functionality, which has higher power, which could help with overcoming noise:
* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GPS_Block_III#Military_(M-code...
The biggest recent help against jamming was the introduction of the L2C signal on a different frequency with the Block IIR-M satellites, and then the more powerful L5 signal on Block IIF.
You can, if the spot light is strong enough, and the person in question isn't floating in deep space. Just keep adding power until the light reflected by the person's surroundings is strong enough to blind them.
> Not to mention the tricks they use to make RF signals directional to both send and receive.
Makes me wonder if there's an RF equivalent of getting permanently blinded by laser light scattering off random objects in your line of sight.
Current areas where jamming is being detecting.
Incidentally, there has been a recent escalation in this: over Iraq commercial airline pilots have been reporting increasingly successful GPS spoofing, with GPS positions being shifted by tens or hundreds of nm, the clock being shifted, etc. In some cases this has exposed bugs in aircraft software where it has not successfully recovered the GPS position even after leaving the affected area, leaving them with degraded navigation all the way to the destination.
This is not as dire as it might sound, as there are plenty of other ways for an aircraft to determine its position, though it certainly reduces the margins for error in some cases. But it’s interesting because such spoofing should be extremely difficult to carry out successfully, especially on a moving target like an airliner.
In that particular instance, but:
* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electronic-warfare_aircraft
Waiting for drones:
The US DOD is not as confident as you are, as they looking at backups/alternatives:
> DOD primarily relies on GPS for accurate PNT data, which is essential to effective military operations. However, multiple threats can render GPS data unavailable or inaccurate. DOD recognizes the threats to GPS and is taking steps to address them by developing more robust GPS capabilities and alternative PNT technologies. GAO was asked to review DOD's acquisition of alternative PNT technologies.
* https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-22-106010
> To fully block a military unit receiving GPS, the enemy would need to have ~30 planes in the sky over the unit, between the unit and each GPS satellite, broadcasting the jamming signal. Pretty infeasible for them.
All GNSS signals live on a finite number of frequency bands: L5/E5, L2, E6, L1/E1:
* https://gssc.esa.int/navipedia/index.php?title=GNSS_signal
* https://www.geospatialworld.net/blogs/gnss-frequency-bands-f...
* https://www.tallysman.com/gnss-constellations-radio-frequenc...
* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Satellite_navigation#Frequency...
> The ITU have allocated the following L-band frequencies to GNSS (bold are aeronautically used):
> *GPS, the centre frequencies are 1575.42 MHz (L1), 1227.6 MHz (L2) and 1176.45 MHz (L5).
> *GLONASS operates as frequency divisional multiple access (FDMA) and there are two operational centre frequencies 1602 MHz (L1) and 1246 MHz (L2) and at 1207.14 MHz (L3). GLONASS over this decade will also introduce Code Divisional Multiple Access (CDMA) similar to GPS.
> *GALILEO has a range of frequencies assigned in the L-band as follows:
> ** E2 – L1 – E1 – Centre frequency 1575.42 MHz (band from 1559MHz – 1591MHz).
> ** E5A – Centre frequency 1176.45 MHz (band from 1164 MHz – 1188 MHz).
> ** E5B - Centre frequency 1207.14 MHz (band from 1188 MHz – 1215 MHz).
> ** E6 – Centre frequency 1278,75 MHz (band from 1260 MHz – 1300 MHz).
* https://pbnportal.eu/epbn/main/Overview-of-PBN/PBN-Concept--...
A handful of planes (or drones) focussing on those few frequency ranges can do a lot of mischief.
And this is not theoretical, but observed events:
> Russia has been thwarting US-made mobile rocket systems in Ukraine more frequently in recent months, using electronic jammers to throw off its GPS guided targeting system to cause rockets to miss their targets, multiple people briefed on the matter told CNN.
* https://www.cnn.com/2023/05/05/politics/russia-jamming-himar...
IIRC, I remember reading that the NSA has cipher(s) where the decryption 'algorithm' is completely than the one for encryption, i.e., just because you have the decryption code doesn't mean you can encrypt.
So think something like AES, but where the 'distributor' encrypts something, gives you a key and an algorithm, and you can decrypt it. But you cannot use the same algorithm to encrypt to send back anything.
For the life of me I can't remember where I read it (which book), so have never been able to dig into it more.
For example consider solar radio noise at frequencies that are partially reflected, partially transmitted by the ionosphere.
Do you consider it possible for an SDR to geolocate by comparing multiple antenna signals say:
1: "direct signal" : sun -DOWN-> partial transmitted through ionosphere -DOWN-> antenna 1 aimed at sun
2: "geography / terrain fingerprinted signal" : sun -DOWN-> partially transmitted through ionosphere -DOWN-> reflection on Earth -UP-> partial reflection from ionosphere -DOWN-> antenna 2
Or any suggested variations? (reflection from moon for example).
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ionospheric_layers_f...
i.e. can Western citizens prepare to still have geopositioning in case of an adversarial (successful) first strike against GPS and Galileo where the citizen refuses to rely on adversary positioning systems.
You can do the same with radio frequencies and a phased array antenna if you like.
I'm not sure if other approaches would perform better.
Telescopes are impeded by clouds.
During night there is no line of sight to the sun, so I concede my rudimentary idea or question has similar drawbacks.
I don't know if it's been deployed, but I would not be surprised.
"The main error sources that impact the instrument design are the number of collected photons (related to the detector size and the integration time) and the timing accuracy."
Detecting and filtering for appropriate X-rays would seem to require a large and thus expensive detector.
Being able to self-locate during aerobraking (as described in following URL) is a very neat application though...
https://web.archive.org/web/20170316044511/http://gsp.esa.in...
I wonder what materials withstand the heat and plasma during aerobraking, yet are transparent enough for X-rays?
Totally feasible. DECCA and LORAN-C basically work on the same principle. have a number of transmitters at known locations and measure the phase/interference to get location.
However, there are other ways. Visual navigation is totally possible (think SLAM, but with a pre-computed map)
I may be wrong, but I would hazard SLAM would require an enormous amount of data
yeah, this is true. Passive radar does the same thing. its passive because the system isn't transmitting, something else is.
SLAM data can be pretty sparse. The keypoints for a city the size of london is under 100gigs. (although that depends on your algorithm)
but if you think about the amount of effort required to make GPS work, keeping an active visual map of a country isn't actually that much in comparison.
If you don't know frequency, you need to jam a wide range of frequencies. Defences like frequency hopping make use of this. Bluetooth uses this for example, to prevent inadvertent jamming. In GPS, frequencies aren't secret.
If you don't know the code, you need to jam with as much power as the benefit of the code. For GPS, thats a 10x 1024 bit code, which provides 43 dB of processing gain. This can be increased almost without limit, as long as you don't plan to move much during the code period. There are clever methods to make encryption keys double-up as PRN codes that the enemy doesn't know.
For direction, it depends on the receiver. Your phone has an omnidirectional receiver, so the attacker is 'on par with' the real signal. A military directional phased array system might have 200 elements, and therefore 30db of gain.
Add that up, and the enemy needs to use far far more signal power than the real signal to 'outshine' it. Turns out that's pretty much impossible - and if they get near to doing that, your biggest problem is probably being cooked by their jammer.
citation needed there. GPS typical signal strength is -125dBm.
For ground based stuff, its pretty simple to overpower the band so that nothing can hear it.
A GPS Digital Phased Array Antenna and Receiver (2000): https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA452307.pdf
but thats still like -70dbm at best. That's about the level of being a few meters away from a wifi AP level of power.
a 1 watt(RF) jammer is going to cast a large cone of non-GPS even with a phased array antenna.
Downside: This only works if your movement over the 1 second period is predictable, to a small part of a wavelength. If you're moving unpredictably, you'll have to give up a few db's of coding gain.
* https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2021/december/bri...
* https://skyandtelescope.org/astronomy-news/u-s-navy-resumes-...
GPS was one of those systems needing intensely calculated orbits, Dr. Gladys West was responsible
https://www.afspc.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/170746...
>The 2024 GPS Testing for Critical Infrastructure (GET-CI) event is set for the fall of 2024.
>This event provides an opportunity for CI O&O and manufacturers of commercial GPS receivers used in critical infrastructure to perform equipment evaluations in a rarely available live-sky spoofing and jamming environment. For the 2024 GET-CI event, S&T will create a live-sky GPS environment primarily for fixed infrastructure applications but will also support some ground-based mobile applications.
I'm guessing there are aspects of this prepared interference that are unique.
We've had a number of planned & unexplained outages/jammings in the US. I recall a planned one shaped like an inverted cone, with the impact broader area at higher altitudes. I was able to math the cone-point, somewhere out west and at a low alt.
Diff sites track them.
ref: https://gpsjam.org/
“SOUTHEAST ATLANTIC COAST: GPS Testing Information THE GPS NAVIGATION SIGNALS MAY BE UNRELIABLE FROM 20 JAN 2011 - 22 FEB 2011 FROM 0000Z - 0245Z DUE TO TESTING ON GPS FREQUENCIES USED IN SHIPBOARD NAVIGATION AND HANDHELD SYSTEMS. GPS SYSTEMS THAT RELY ON GPS, SUCH AS E-911, AIS AND DSC, MAY BE AFFECTED WITHIN A 150 NM RADIUS OF POSITION 30 49.09N 80 28.18W. DURING THIS PERIOD GPS USERS ARE ENCOURAGED TO REPORT ANY GPS SERVICE OUTAGES THAT THEY MAY EXPERIENCE DURING THIS TESTING VIA THE NAVIGATION INFORMATION SERVICE (NIS) BY CALLING (703) 313-5900 OR BY USING THE NAVCEN WEB SITE'S GPS REPORT A PROBLEM WORKSHEET AT WWW.NAVCEN.USCG.GOV.”
I specifically remember it because I was trying to navigate my roommate and I to the Atlanta IKEA but my phone showed me as being, like, south of Macon. ~100mi of error.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Terrestrial_Refe...
> The user range error (URE) of the GPS signals in space is actually the same for the civilian and military GPS services. However, most of today's civilian devices use only one GPS frequency, while military receivers use two.
> Using two GPS frequencies improves accuracy by correcting signal distortions caused by Earth's atmosphere. Dual-frequency GPS equipment is commercially available for civilian use, but its cost and size has limited it to professional applications.
> With augmentation systems, civilian users can actually receive better GPS accuracy than the military.
Is it fully true ? So the only advantages of the military GPS is that the codes are unknown and that it is more jamming proof ?
To respond to my question. With long term measurements and the help of the L5 band it is possible to obtain sub-millimeter accuracy [1]!
[1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_Positioning_System
About 500 reports from people saying "GPS on my phone isn't working" and the US Coast Guard and Department of Homeland Security replying that "perhaps your phone is broken".
(This is where we pitch one sentence villainous plots right?)
Don't get me wrong, I have plenty of qualms with the US government, but walking into a discussion on say, foreign aid spending programs and saying "The Government will spend this money almost entirely in ways that advances its global agenda" is just sort of a Duh moment.
I'm sorry, this is a very long way of saying "so what, who cares, what are you proposing?"
* https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/air-transport/2023-0...
There was/is speculation that spoofing may have been used in the capture of a US drone: