> “During the safety stand down, aviation commanders will lead discussions with their Marines focusing on the fundamentals of safe flight operations, ground safety, maintenance and flight procedures, and maintaining combat readiness,” the statement said.
It is pretty damning and disappointing that this action is warranted. Too much spending on tools and not enough on soldiers.
1. Make Tough Requirements
2. Get Prototype
3. Prototype attracts some interest
4. Now the brass additionally wants capabilities X, Y, Z
5. Prototype now costs twice as much and is more failure prone, and actually less mission-capable due to all the bolt-ons
6. Program costs goes up due to all the changes
7. We can't afford this!
8. Cut unit acquisitions by 50%
9. Wait? Our unit cost just nearly doubled because the real costs were all in design/R&D?
10. Now we REALLY can't afford this.
11. Cut orders by another 75%
12. So finally approximately 10% of the original order actually gets built, at a total program cost 2 or 3x what it was supposed to be, and a unit cost that's massively huge.
13. Program fails in the mid-to-long term due to maintenance costs and falling spares inventory.
HBO did a great made-for-TV movie on this called the "Pentagon Wars", which while fictionalized is only about 20% actually made up: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ir0FAa8P2MU
Great in that it is entertaining, but I would not take it, or the book it was based on, completely at face value:
> The Pentagon Wars was made to be a comedy first and an adaptation of the Pentagon Wars book second. It was never meant to be an accurate portrayal of the Bradley program and it shows. You're getting Hollywood taking an an axe-grinding, half-true memoir as fact and then playing it for laughs.
* https://old.reddit.com/r/WarCollege/comments/erpmjm/having_j...
See also perhaps:
> Although the Bradley destroyed many enemy tanks and experienced fairly low rates of casualty in the First Gulf War and the Iraq War, the vehicle’s recent battlefield performance was not acquired through efficient planning and project management. The origins of the modern Bradley span decades of troubled development; the involvement of many stakeholders; inflexible and questionable requirements; a failure of contractors to make design tradeoffs for fear of losing capability; billions of dollars in R&D costs; and numerous Congressional interventions, including House Armed Service Committee hearings investigating Bradley testing protocol.1 The Bradley has been described at different times, by military officers and historians, as a weapon that means “all things to all people,” a “quintessential hybrid,” and “a proverbial camel...that does nothing well”.2
* https://user.eng.umd.edu/~austin/enes489p/lecture-resources/...
> 8. Cut unit acquisitions by 50%
> 9. Wait? Our unit cost just nearly doubled because the real costs were all in design/R&D?
> 10. Now we REALLY can't afford this.
> 11. Cut orders by another 75%
> 12. So finally approximately 10% of the original order actually gets built, at a total program cost 2 or 3x what it was supposed to be, and a unit cost that's massively huge.
Oh they've learnt from that well enough. Why do you think we're ordering so many thousands of F-35s? They've kept the unit cost perfectly on-budget! Just don't ask about the total program cost.
The Bradley was designed as an IFV from the ground up, not a bastardized APC. The Bradley came in under budget. Those two facts invalidate essentially the entire film...