The comment above refers to Hume's 'induction problem' [1].
> we've never successfully answered Hume's general skepticism about the existence of causality as something that is real outside of our own minds
The quote seems to imply a strong consensus, but [1] disagrees.
The phrasing "the existence of causality as something that is real outside of our own minds" sounds like philosophical idealism [2]. One can take that view without discussing causation at all, seems to me. Forgive the following blunt questions: how is philosophical idealism either (a) useful or (b) testable? To me, currently, it seems to be neither.
Maybe I'm missing something? For those that get value from it, what are some practical take-aways you get out of thinking about Hume's 'problem of induction'?
I'm very much into philosophy, but I admit I don't see a lot of utility in digging into this outside of historical purposes. It feels to me that the tools from inferential statistics combined with some deeper study on causation are far more useful and enlightening than trying to figure out the historical context around Hume's writing here. I'm glad other people do it, for sure, but what I've skimmed doesn't "grab" me.
WRT causation, I often return to the idea of "no model is perfect, but some are useful". There are many times when we build useful models that -- when combined with proper experimentation -- very strongly indicate causation. The laws of physics, for example. As soon as people get involved, it gets messy.
[1]: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/induction-problem/
[2]: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/idealism/