Quiet is a founding member of Tor's Onion Services Resource Coalition, which started in response to last year's DDoS against the Tor network, which affected onion service connection times. Alongside a small circle of other affected products we helped Tor raise enough to hire ~2 full-time engineers to work on onion service reliability, which had been a bit underfunded because onion services only represent a small share of Tor's existing usage.
Yeah that will not happen.
It could be a Chinese dissident, it could be someone accessing a child porn forum.
When authorities go to track down the IP that sent requests to another, your IP will be the one listed on that request with no ability to trace back what IP actually sent the request so it will be difficult to not pin you for whatever was accessed.
The child porn traffickers and other problematic users are all on Tor already. With the growing number of users their proportion will only decline.
[citation needed]
This is why it is important to bookmark ExoneraTor [1] so that one can prove the IP in question is/was a Tor exit node accepting that it would still be a PITA to deal with boots-on-neck and legal fallout.
That said one could block some of the known illegal sites via DNS and IP null routing on the exit node at the risk of the Tor network flagging it as a malicious exit node.