Presumably if MIT had actually discovered the nature of consciousness we wouldn't be reading about it in some tabloid. The research may be less bad than the article suggests, but there's no way it's as good as the article suggests either.
Presumably if MIT had actually discovered the nature of consciousness we wouldn't be reading about it in some tabloid. The research may be less bad than the article suggests, but there's no way it's as good as the article suggests either.
Can science truly explain where consciousness comes from? I would argue it cannot, because consciousness is a subjective experience, and is not objectively measurable.
Related to that question: Is consciousness really subjective? Is it not the only thing I as a person can experience objectively?
EDIT: I don't understand why I am beeing down voted? I am just trying to explain my point of view. I don't think religion can prove anything with certainty, either. Nobody can. You can just make more or less strong assumptions.
Theories with predictive power are the essence of science and models are optional, not the other way round. Science is not materialistic, it would be valid even if the world we perceive was "fake", a virtual simulation for example. As long as it's consistent enough for us to make predictions, it's all good.
I was thinking about Math or some subfields of Computer Science where you don't need any predictions (I'd think other disciplines have these purely theoretical subfields as well, but I dunno). I am not sure what the formal definition of a model is, but I think you'd agree you need some kind of non-trivial logic argument, otherwise it becomes, well... trivial ("X happens because we assume X happens").
Maybe I should have left that optional-remark or explained it further, it might be the reason I was downvoted in the beginning. First I also had a (semi-)joke in there about gaining citations being the ultimate goal of science, people might have though I was one of those fundamental Christians mocking science. It's very easy to get misunderstood if all people know about you is what they read in a comment of a few lines.
But I'm in perpetual discomfort with the way contemporary science is shunning anything "subjective" like it's the plague. Yes, we get it, you ("you, Science") despise uncertainty, and the subjective domain is deeply fuzzy and non-rigorous. But it leads to this robotic, industrial approach to things that should be more human - see the way hospitals work, for example.
I don't have any solutions, either. I'm just saying there's something rotten in this particular Denmark.
The question behind the perception of consciousness a key one behind the issue of mind/matter dualism: imagine an empiric proof, somebody builds a powerful computer which simulates a human brain to perfection yet mind/matter dualiasts won't feel that this "being" which talks, expresses emotions etc is anything more than a simulacra, a [soul|mind|...]less machine.
I think that usually when two persons disagree, either at least one of them is wrong, or they are not talking about the same thing.
Yet, it's difficult for two persons to align to the definition of what they are talking about, when one them won't accept that definition as something which is hits what's being discussed: imagine that I argue with a matter/mind dualist and tell "hey, my experiment proves that the neurological processes behave in exactly the same way", he will answer "so what, there is more in it than mere neurological processes".
Where is the "subjective" part in all this? The fact that you cannot even prove that I have a [soul|mind|...], the only "proof" you have is that I look like you, I'm (as far as you can tell) made of the same flash, was given birth in a similar way as you... so you just assume I behave internally as you do, so you can transpose your subjective experience to others.
Both point of view generally assume that our consciousness is general, not only mine or yours; the difference is whether the consciousness is a pure emergent phenomena of matter alone or "something else".
So the subjectiveness of the perception is only used as a tool against the provability, against the acceptance of any empiric proof; which is understandable, as the empiric proof in itself, when done in terms of matter, works in the framework of mind materialism, and as such becomes invalid as soon as you undermine the very material nature of mind.
In simple words: mind/matter dualiasts won't accept any proof based on matter.
That's why they are usually deemed as anti-scientific: because scientific thought strives to search for explanations of the natural phenomena which kind be defined in such a way that it can be falsified by observation.
Any explanation that by definition is not suitable for any kind of proof because disconnected from the rest of the physical phenomena is by definition non-scientific.
So IMHO, this is the heart of the discussion, not the "subjectivity" of the mind, that's only an excuse.
PS:
Interesting read: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Minds_I
Anyway, for most neuroscientists results like this are far closer to conformation using an interesting technique than truly groundbreaking research.
There's no cognitive dissonance if you believe that the brain influences consciousness but aren't committed to the idea that the brain is the source of consciousness. E.g. you could believe that the brain is a reducing valve, a la Huxley, and there is no cognitive dissonance there at all.
The world created in days -> but a "day" could be a million years. Evolutionary theory -> but <creator> is driving the evolution etc...
Like empiricism.
As far as science goes (or I understand it) the brain is just a neural network, which gets activated based on inputs and produces some outputs, like a computer does. Neurons can also self-activate, but that is not really the point. The point is consciousness would not be required for that. When look around me I see things. If my brain would just do input/output, there would be no need for me to see anything. I would just act without seeing/hearing/feeling consciously. I don't claim I have any idea about anything, but I feel like something is not adding up here on a fundamental level. I don't even know if other people experience the same thing or if they do indeed just act on inputs and have no idea what I am talking about.
I wonder if what I said made any sense to anyone and if any philosophers were considering the same thing.
Does it help if you view your consciousness as both being produced by the brain, and used as an input - i.e. a key part of a feedback system?
Maybe, depends how you fill in those words. I guess you could write a computer program that has self-awareness, in the sense that it is able to talk about itself. That is not what I meant.
Does it help if you view your consciousness as both being produced by the brain, and used as an input - i.e. a key part of a feedback system?
I'd even say that this is what most likely is going on, but it opens a completely different can of worms, with questions like: Does the part responsible for the consciousness (let's call it soul for lack of a better word) survive after you die? This realization tipped the scale for me from "No, that is just wishful thinking." to "I have no clue, but it is slightly more likely that it does, than that it does not.".
It's very annoying that I can barely talk about this without using words, which have been claimed by people, who hold believes I consider completely irrational.
Long term memory is a physical change in the layout of a neural network. Spend long enough walking around a new city and there is an abstract but physical map that's actually stored in the layout of neurons in your head. At the same time pieces of that layout represent locations on the map and how they connect to other locations. Think of an entrance to a parking lot and you might have a fairly static picture of the location linked to the choice of where that will take you if you go there. (So short term memory is now a neuron that cycles, a network that picks which target network to activate, and a network that represents something, plus feedback to turn on and off the targeting.)
So what's consciousness? It's the ability to think about things as abstractions. When you say Apple to your self your actually activating neurons that keep cycling Apple over and over. Picture yourself tossing a ball and your thinking thinking about starting the cascade of muscle memory that causes you to through something while picking the perimeters of where you want the ball to end up and how hard you want to to hit the target, and possibly the position you need to be in to actually be able to through the ball. You can play around with the outcomes of if I do this that will happen by checking what neural net's predict the outcome will be. Chess is a great analogy for this, players don't think about moves as picking a piece up and moving it somewhere else, but what it means when the piece is in a new location. Though experience, education, or just thinking about things you can even train these neural networks to get better at those predictions.
Of course the actual implementation of these things is horribly complex, and many of the specifics are not all completely understood / studied. Also, chemicals play a major role, there are actual chemicals that represent things like pleasure in the brain. EX: Cocaine mimics the mostly hard coded chemical reward response for things like having sex by blocking the dopamine reuptake transporters. http://serendip.brynmawr.edu/exchange/node/1704
PS: Still I hope this simplified model helps you understand what's going on.
So what's consciousness? It's the ability to think about things as abstractions.
No, it's not! (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consciousness). Artificial NNs can also model memory (see Hopfield networks). However, I just used them as an analogy. Maybe Zombies work better for you and the Philosophical Zombie Wikipedia page does a better job of explaining the idea (thanks again xyzzyz).
These networks also connect to and build off of other abstractions so ((((peanut) + butter) + Jelly) + Sandwich) is built from more than one of these networks. Try and think of a pile of peanut butter next to some grape jelly. No problem it's brown next to purple.
Now try and do that for peanut butter next to a peanut butter and jelly sandwich. Most people feel something odd happen on the second one because they are reusing the peanut butter network for both of those. For me, I can't focus on their colors at the same time.
For a great subjective description of this watch: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cj4y0EUlU-Y
Getting back to Consciousness, it's turning on these abstractions by choice. I want to think about Apple so I activate the Apple network and suddenly experience Apple. And it's the same network as if I had just read the word or saw a physical Apple. Language also get's mapped to this which is part of why philosophers think about thinks like platonic ideals yes there is an ideal Chair it exists and it's the Chair classifier in your head.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problem_of_other_minds
I don't think it makes any sense to talk about this any further, we might as well be speaking different languages. Otherwise you could also comment here, http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=3747462. Naveensundar did a better job explaining it.
Can a sophisticated car engine be conscious? Can a Ferris wheel be conscious? I can definitely map various bits of computation to a car engine and a Ferris wheel. If you need organic matter to have consciousness, can an extremely complex car engine made of organic matter be conscious?
One can brush aside all these rigorous questions, like almost all neuroscientists, and adopt a fideistic attitude that basically stipulates a materialistic view.
Please read more about the hard problem of consciousness [1]. There will be lots of people who will disagree, but the materialistic view of the mind has lots of cracks in it [2]. One needn't even look at [2], as so far no one has given a non-gibberish answer to [1] which doesn't appeal to one or other common fallacy.
[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_problem_of_consciousness
This is probably a stupid question (my favorite kind): Are there good arguments for why a car engine isn't conscious? Isn't it just the "other minds" problem in a different form?
As it stands, it's completely unknown why subatomic particles have precisely the mass and charges they need in order for matter to exist, even though the chances of that are supposedly trillions and trillions against one. Perhaps because matter is designed to tap into consciousness, and the more evolved the matter the more complex the slice of consciousness it can capture. That would be my working theory at least.
The SEP article below is probably the best I can find right now which talks about almost all viewpoints.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness/
There is an extremely good and entertaining argument in Penrose's book Shadows of the Mind against consciousness being computational (but the book has quite a good number of flaws in its other arguments).
From a reductionist and materialistic physical standpoint we only have fundamental particles and the forces in the universe. None of these seem to be related to consciousness. It is seems magical to say that these particles then interact in complex ways to produce something fundamentally new.
David Chalmers [1], the guy who came up with the hard problem, has written a lot on this.
The first thing I searched for on that SEP page was "Popper", because my "how do we know a car engine is not conscious" stems from trying to apply falsifiability to my intuitive notions. What I take from "other minds" is that other people's consciousness is not falsifiable; taken to its natural conclusion, it seems to me that the non-consciousness of an engine is also non-falsifiable. Which is actually pretty cool, to a philosophical simpleton such as myself :-)
So my question is: is there something I can read that specifically links concepts of consciousness to Popper-derived falsifiability ideas?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solipsism#Falsifiability_and_te...
I see your email in your profile. If I come across something more solid I will pass it on to you/edit this comment.
http://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/Consciousness_Studies
It tackles a lot of the philosophical problems around consciousness. I haven't read the whole thing because it's very technical and not always the best written, but what I've read is kind of interesting.
in my mind a thermostat is a brain with just two points of being, top cold-warm enough.
i wonder what does an engine feel?
(To learn more about Terence McKenna, start with these:
http://www.matrixmasters.net/salon/?p=254 (also part 2 and 3)
A couple of times, I would feel that my limbs are getting bigger and bigger, while my head (possibly my mind) remains the same. I was observing it just outside my head. Not too far away, possibly from my own eyes but outside my head as my mind though still at the same position, has disconnected itself from the head. I knew I was in bed, I was arguing my own self about the feeling being unrealistic. But I remember I couldn't reason out, I felt as if I will be crushed by my own body - slowly and painfully. There is no physical pain that I could feel, just an intense fear of that it will come.
I don't think that these were near death experiences - possibly just hallucinations. Unfortunately, they were so real to me that to this day, I am in a way, still scared of them. On the other hand, I want them back because they were so real and so scary - because at no living moment in the rest of my life have I felt a similar emotion, a real fear of that magnitude. I am sharing this because I cannot believe that a psychological/mental experience can be more real than what I had felt; that NDEs is more real - that they need afterlife.
Religious theory is amazingly complete with scope to explain everything, may be with inconsistencies but still everything. Existence of God would explain everything - because he is omnipotent. The power of religion on the other hand is reducing because after so many years of scientific experiments we are able to experimentally verify alternative theories that explain much of what was unexplained before. We don't need God for minuscule things, not anymore. As of NDE today, sure physiological and psychological theories cannot explain everything about NDEs, but I believe that they will in future.
You mind works the same way. Apply a little voltage to this part of someone's brain and they are now having an out of body experience. It's just like a hardware interrupt in that it has meanings on several levels including the physical (QM) in all it's glory as well as the subjective. But, if you cut out that little area of someone's head and apply the same voltage it's not meaningful to suggest that those cells are having an out of body experience. In that context the experience is both the cascade that happens and the cells that are part of that cascade.
It's also worth considering that there's a positive correlation between impact factor and retraction rates. http://retractionwatch.wordpress.com/2011/08/11/is-it-time-f...
All in all, while Nature doesn't publish obviously bad science, it's less clear that it publishes better science than average.