Yes, they broke the ability for GitHub CI to checkout repos…
Yes, they broke the ability for GitHub CI to checkout repos…
https://docs.github.com/en/actions/security-guides/security-...
after hearing similar stories from frontend developers who haven't even heard of "npm ci" or use range pinned dependencies on production systems, im almost never going to be sympathetic on blaming the package maintainers over developer ignorance following basic security guidelines
If I don't trust GitHub, why am I storing my source code on it and running CI via GitHub actions?
There are also some security gains from ranged pinning. Suppose I pin my library to `1.1.x` instead of `1.1.0`, when a security patch comes along for some CVE, my service will automatically run the `1.1.1` patch release the next time we deploy it.
I would say the likelihood of a developer getting lazy and not bumping a dependency causing a security incident is higher than a supply chain attack if you're already using reputable libraries.
Let's be frank, how many developers care enough to go into the 10 repos they've ended up owning to go and change their `actions/checkout@v3.1.6` to `actions/checkout@v3.1.7`.