Joys and pains of insects
scientificamerican.com
scientificamerican.com
Bee hives in particular have collective temperaments, and being around a group everyday for awhile changes how they perceive your presence. For example, those who carelessly crush too many workers, will have their body odor associated with a threat. Accordingly, one may find your proximity to the hives will not be tolerated for the season.
There were studies which tried to inject fake food-source location data into bee dances, and it showed even simple individual insects could distinguish nonsense.
It is arrogant to apply our own emotional constructs onto these creatures, but one should certainly respect the fact they are alive and understand the world in their own way.Note, the bees can teach you a lot about resource management in complex distributed systems. In a way, the 1U rack standard could be seen as the IT hive cell structure.
"Bee" good to each other, =)
In more ways than one: https://xkcd.com/1439/
I have admired the various dragonflies across north Texas. A wide range as you might say. From urban to rural lakes, I spot them, the most magnificent flight system I’ve seen.
And they eat mosquitoes.
At my residence a juvenile dragonfly accidentally made it indoors. I spent a good 30 minutes off and on guiding it back outside. It wouldn’t survive here in captivity I’m not qualified.
Here’s the interesting part:
There is a beautiful adult green dragonfly on this property that when I walk thru the pathway where it lives, it engages and either leads the way, shows off, or in general does things that unless you really believe in the nature and nurture overlaps, well, I’m just glad to participate.
I think this is a good question, and I get why it's hard to do animal research at more statistically significant scales, but for me the current evidence is uncomfortably close to "behavioral psych, but for bees", right down to the fun pop-sci conclusions ("bees like to play!"), which again, cute! but overstated as something that "science tells us".
(This is all separate from the larger question of the relationship between response to external stimuli and emotional states, which just seems hard to answer.)
[1] https://europepmc.org/article/med/27708101
[2] https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S000334722...
A little more controversially, I think being in a state of 'flow' (aka that state most of us see as the epitome of intellectual existence) almost definitionally means you're not 'self-aware'. You're wholly focused on the activity rather than yourself.
More generally, any routine situation where people spend a lot of time in a semi-dissociated state. I don't think people are actively conscious most of the time, consciousness is more like a supervisor task that pops up to intervene when the baseline circuits governing moment-to-moment behaviour reach a certain level of perplexity.
sentient
Having sense perception; conscious.
Experiencing sensation or feeling.
Having a faculty, or faculties, of sensation and perception.
The property humans have is reason. And yes it’s observably not always exercised.What we think of as 'sentience' is surely a combination of things happening in our brains that all animals have to different degrees, rather than an on/off switch that's only present in certain animals and at certain times. It's just that most people's conscious experience is boring enough (unconscious -> wake up -> go to work -> go home -> go to sleep; I can do algebra but my cat can't, etc) that a simplified 'conscious or not' model is generally accepted.
Obviously even when you're on autopilot you're above a certain threshold of sentience because you're still having conscious experiences. You would react if you were to see something dangerous or feel something painful. I still think it makes sense in this context to say that humans are sentient most of the time.
I think it's reasonable to assume that intelligence is orthogonal to consciousness. I can imagine an AI that is very intelligent but has no subjective experience. Similarly, I can imagine a creature that has a very rich range of subjective experiences, but is unable to understand and change the world around it. Obviously these are just thought experiments and we don't have good theories of what consciousness and intelligence really are, but I think it's consistent with our current understanding of biology and neuroscience.
Seems fair. We don't judge human intelligence based on a large group of people either.
But if you truly care about the feelings of insects or plants you should switch to a plant based diet as you'll probably indirectly kill at least an order of magnitude fewer plants and insects, the majority of which are consumed by practices related to industrial farming (large scale deforestation, waterway pollution, feedstock).
> Add studies showing that even plants and fungi have senses and try to avoid harm
https://yourveganfallacyis.com/en/plants-are-alive
> since you kill plants and indirectly insects even on a plant based diet
https://yourveganfallacyis.com/en/vegans-kill-animals-too
"Crop fields do indeed disrupt the habitats of wild animals, and wild animals are also killed when harvesting plants. However, this point makes the case for a plant-based diet and not against it, since many more plants are required to produce a measure of animal flesh for food (often as high as 12:1) than are required to produce an equal measure of plants for food (which is obviously 1:1). Because of this, a plant-based diet causes less suffering and death than one that includes animals."
This approach would require purchasing a half from a local farmer who raises 100% grass fed animals and makes his own hay.
The hay definitely kills some animals when harvested though. It would be interesting to quantify the death impact (calories of beef produced per bale of hay) of a hay harvest and compare that to the death impact for some staple vegan foods, and see how things stack up.
Edit: The need for hay is a climate based one. There are places where cattle can graze for more or less days in a year. Hay is used a winter feed in places where winter forage is unavailable.
The resource intensive nature of animal agriculture causes more harm than it's immediately apparent (deforestation, biodiversity loss, eutrophication ...).
https://www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/publications/grazed-and-co...
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/may/31/avoiding...
There certainly is if you take quantity into account. To quote the page linked to by unfairly-downvoted sibling comment:
> Regardless, each pound of animal flesh requires between four and thirteen pounds of plant matter to produce, depending upon species and conditions. Given that amount of plant death, a belief in the sentience of plants makes a strong pro-vegan argument.
Despite how almost every scientific and engineering break-through in history always has had its roots traced to none-anthropocentrism thinking (of that time), and tech has advanced so much in the past 50 years, yet we still live in rather anthropocentric systems, espeically socio-politically. This is really sad. A lot of problems and sufferings (as well as the inability to find solutions) we have created for ourselves as a civilization are in retrospect clearly the direct products of excuses, both for the exploitation (of "others") and the normalized incompetency (of the self-entitlted "us"), that which we bestow on ourselves.
I really hope within the next 50 years things will change.
related project: https://0a.io/
I'd worry exactly about how this shift might inadvertently overlook the ethical considerations, especially given the sheer volume of conscious beings involved.
Right wing propaganda then turns that into "they want to force you to eat bugs".
The silly 'But where do you get your protein?' was repeated so much that it inevitably lead to 'they will give us bugs'.
That seems to be a personal thing.
Not really. Animal agriculture is the leading driver of deforestation, biodiversity loss and droughts, and its other effects on the environment include significant greenhouse gas emissions, water pollution, and soil degradation.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Holocene_extinction
The current rate of extinction of species is estimated at 100 to 1,000 times higher than natural background extinction rates, and is increasing.
https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-01448-4
Humans are driving one million species to extinction
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/brv.12974
More losers than winners: investigating Anthropocene defaunation through the diversity of population trends
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2022/oct/13/almost-7...
Animal populations experience average decline of almost 70% since 1970, report reveals
https://www.jpost.com/environment-and-climate-change/article...
Mass extinction of Earth's wildlife is closer than we think - study
https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/sciadv.1400253
Accelerated modern human–induced species losses: Entering the sixth mass extinction
https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2019/05/natur...
UN Report: Nature’s Dangerous Decline ‘Unprecedented’; Species Extinction Rates ‘Accelerating’
https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/14/21/14449
How Compatible Are Western European Dietary Patterns to Climate Targets?
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jun/07/insect-d...
Insect decline a threat to fruit crops and food security, scientists warn MPs
https://www.nature.com/articles/s43016-023-00795-w
Vegans, vegetarians, fish-eaters and meat-eaters in the UK show discrepant environmental impacts
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320356605_Agricultu...
Agriculture production as a major driver of the Earth system exceeding planetary boundaries
https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/26231772/
Biodiversity conservation: The key is reducing meat consumption
https://www.eurekalert.org/news-releases/917471
Feeding 10 billion people by 2050 within planetary limits may be achievable
A global shift towards healthy and more plant-based diets, halving food loss and waste, and improving farming practices and technologies are required to feed 10 billion people sustainably by 2050, a new study finds.
I have not heard this but I can believe that's what people think, however it seems a bit weird to me, do these people think insect meat is not meat, like some people consider fish to be somehow vegetarian?
I wouldn't look too closely for a consistent ethical basis in vegetarianism and veganism, both of which require drawing an arbitrarily defined line between living things it's okay to kill and eat and living things that it isn't, and then treating that as axiomatic. I respect the motivation, but not the result - we all draw our own lines, but it takes an unreasonable amount of brass in a person to try to argue their line should be good enough for everyone.
This assumes that mosquitos perceive time as we do. While all living things operate with the same molecular building blocks and physical laws, I don't know that perceiving time is as low level as that, so qualitatively what is an instant for us could be a long time for a much smaller organism.
It's a fallacy to think that we only think with our "mind". We think when we "try something out"; we think with our "gut"; we "take a walk"; we "sleep on it". We toss rocks, fiddle with rosaries, bow to mecca. All of these engage other parts of our body, even parts of our environment. (How do people make friends with a river or the wind? How do they perceive seasons? What is the epistomological basis of "Saturnine"? Why do we name some inanimate objects, in particular ships; and why feminine?) By my lights if you carry your smartphone all day, it's a part of you; I avoid making it a habit for this very reason.
I've had serious astigmatism my whole life. I also managed to function uncorrected into my forties. My "vision" was extremely good, especially in a natural environment. Astigmatism means everything isn't in focus at one place at once, and there are interference patterns; so I'm hard wired to see certain patterns. So imagine that fly's eyes. The individual units don't focus to the best of my understandings. Think about them as individually manufactured, and maybe the quality control isn't what you think it is. Maybe it's expected that some focus near and some focus far; maybe some even suffer from e.g. astigmatic conditions. If AI can classify images from raw JPEG images, it's reasonable to suspect that it can integrate sensor data from multiple heterogenous units incorporating light sensors.
So at some level it builds a model. The question has to be how much introspection the control unit can bring to bear on that model and does that help it interact with its environment in a more efficient or effective way.
One day I was watching a paramecium and I saw something that was not described in the books I got in school in college, even. These books always simplify things so the world will be more like they want it to be: When they're talking about the behavior of animals, they always start out with, "The paramecium is extremely simple; it has a simple behavior. It turns as its slipper shape moves through the water until it hits something, at which time it recoils, turns through an angle, and then starts out again."
It isn't really right. First of all, as everybody knows, the paramecia, from time to time, conjugate with each other they meet and exchange nuclei. How do they decide when it's time to do that? (Never mind; that's not my observation.)
I watched these paramecia hit something, recoil, turn through an angle, and go again. The idea that it's mechanical, like a computer program it doesn't look that way. They go different distances, they recoil different distances, they turn through angles that are different in various cases; they don't always turn to the right; they're very irregular. It looks random, because you don't know what they're hitting; you don't know all the chemicals they're smelling, or what.
One of the things I wanted to watch was what happens to the paramecium when the water that it's in dries up. It was claimed that the paramecium can dry up into a sort of hardened seed. I had a drop of water on the slide under my microscope, and in the drop of water was a paramecium and some "grass" at the scale of the paramecium, it looked like a network of jackstraws.
As the drop of water evaporated, over a time of fifteen or twenty minutes, the paramecium got into a tighter and tighter situation: there was more and more of this backandforth until it could hardly move. It was stuck between these "sticks," almost jammed.
Then I saw something I had never seen or heard of: the paramecium lost its shape. It could flex itself, like an amoeba. It began to push itself against one of the sticks, and began dividing into two prongs until the division was about halfway up the paramecium, at which time it decided that wasn't a very good idea, and backed away.
So my impression of these animals is that their behavior is much too simplified in the books. It is not so utterly mechanical or one-dimensional as they say. They should describe the behavior of these simple animals correctly. Until we see how many dimensions of behavior even a onecelled animal has, we won't be able to fully understand the behavior of more complicated animals.
--From Surely You're Joking Mr. Feynmann
“I think, therefore I am” has been the gold standard for millennia, but is falling into a crisis in the face of thinking machines that are algorithmically incapable of an inherent sense of existence.
LLMs have demonstrated that symbolic intelligence is a product of a vast corpus of symbolically represented memetic data. It can be taught to and interpreted by both biological and digital neural networks, and it enables us to reason about the world. Much of what we understand as being human lies within this cultural-linguistic framework of data, so it is unnerving to watch a machine parse this data with a similar facility as a person.
Despite their uncanny ability to access and express the memetic code of human culture, LLMs are merely windows into human intelligence, devoid of an existence or a self outside of symbolic manipulation.
On the other hand, we experience a state of “being” that is impulsive and emotional in character, that can exist without the use of symbols or tokens. In this framework we can experience pain, pleasure, desires, needs, happiness, and distress. We have no reason to expect that this experience exists within a large language model, and we can derive that this is the critical feature of sentience through the process of elimination now that we have evidence that “thinking” can exist outside of “being”.
Yet, we can see clear evidence of this experience in other animals, including insects.
Is it then, “I feel, therefore I am?”
This has extremely profound implications across the board that we have yet to touch on as a species.
One of the most obvious and far reaching of these implications is what it is to be human.
If we are to accept that a sense of being does not a human make, and neither does the ability to think in symbolic terms, then what?
Are we -primarily- genetic in nature, or primarily memetic creatures?
Which is less human? A specimen of homo-sapiens with no access to the memetic code, or an LLM augmented dog that shares both our experience of existence and our culture?
What if it were an LLM enhanced honey bee?
We can easily presume that a lab gestated biological human, given access to culture is fully a human. What if they were gestated from fully synthesised germ cells? What if they were modified to include synthetic inference instead of biological inference, but maintained the biological sense of self? What if it was all digital?
We have a new tool to differentiate the human experience, and it is going to change humanity in ways we have not even imagined yet.
On the one hand, if you asked what’s the most complex intelligence humans have created, or where ChatGPT falls on intelligence spectrum between bacteria and humans, the median HN response might be somewhere between chimps and humans.
On the other hand, if you asked what’s the most complex life humans have created… maybe an attenuated virus vaccine would qualify? We’ve mapped the entire brain of a nematode but have no idea how to get an artificial version of that to actually behave with the agency, goals, motivations, etc, of a nematode.
But most discussions about ASI assume that it’s both “intelligent” and “alive”. Are we really close to creating “human-level” “living” “intelligence”, or are we really far away? How many of the discussions that make analogies of ASI and humans to humans and chimps are conflating “intelligence” and “life”? Does it even make sense to do so?
This is the deep implication of data == calculation identity.
You categorically reject that an LLM running in a loop could have a sense of being, however, neither you nor I have experienced what it is like to be an LLM, if it is like anything at all. You're making assertions about the inner state of something you've only observed from the outside.
The point is often repeated, but it's an important reminder. We have been alarmingly wrong before about whether other beings feel pain (compared to contemporary consensus), based on just what we could see from the outside, and the idea that humans occupy a higher special place.
I think that you're very quick to see "clear evidence" in animals, but not in digital large language models. Both, you've only seen from the outside.
If you're trying to improve upon Descartes, how can you be so certain about what's outside your own head.
My conjecture is that LLMs give us the example to separate thought from feeling by category.
And we can individually experience both tokenized/symbolic experiences and non-tokenized states of being.
LLMs cannot function, by definition, without language. But we know there is an experience of being without language.
LLMs are an access algorithm, like human thought, to the vast n-dimensional memetic data-store.
The data store imbeds the calculations, like a multiplication table vs arithmetical multiplication… or it might be more accurate to say that the mathe-memetics embeds infinite lookup tables in a finite space- it is compression. The algorithm to decode this compression into comprehension is much simpler than the encoded intelligence.
So now we suppose that thought, at least, does not require the experience of being that can be accomplished without language.
Of course, there could be “magical” happenings outside of the token processing algorithm in an LLM, but I think that the “it could be magic” hypothesis can be ignored as untestable.
Take a sufficiently big LLM, remove the input and the output, but let it run in a loop regardless, in a complete vacuum. Past the encoding and decoding layers, there is still math, computation, some sort of thinking happening, there is just no clear tie to human language anymore.
The LLM with inputs and outputs sheared off is not useful to us, but if you keep it running, how would we know whether or not it has a sense of being, inside? If you presuppose that it did not before, it still doesn't after, of course.
A stroke of the ventral pons can sometimes leave people entirely unresponsive. No language, no observable behavior. Except for some of them, who can still move their eyes. People with locked-in syndrome do not very much 'function', but they are as far as we can guess, still conscious.
Being quadriplegic, they lose almost all external stimulus, they can't feel very much in that sense. They still have intelligence, and emotions, and thoughts, by extrapolation from those whose eyes still move to those more thoroughly disconnected.
Furthermore, some people don't have an "inner voice". They simply don't use language for thinking, only for reading, hearing, and talking. These people have an inner experience that is pure thought and intuition, without translating it into any particular language in their head.
So, we already knew that there can be experience of being without much or any language. Language happens, mostly, at the interface with the outside world. I think LLMs give us new data points to think about being, but not in this particular way. We already had being without language.
Certainly small humans are born without knowing any language, language comes from the outside in, much in the way that the experience of being doesn't.
>So now we suppose that thought, at least, does not require the experience of being that can be accomplished without language.
That's reasonable to suppose in the abstract, but then applying that supposition to LLMs is just as untestable as your other hypothesis. We simply aren't aware of any way to know.
Otherwise, I could apply the same supposition to people suffering of the most comprehensive forms of locked-in syndrome, who we are pretty sure still think, but show otherwise no externally observable proof of their inner experience of being. Just a disconnected brain, floating in the dark, sending action potentials in a complex loop.
I think this reduces to a feeling that LLMs are categorically different, because they look so much simpler, and so different from us. If we were cleverer, perhaps we'd think of ourselves as relatively simple, too.
The locked in LLM still uses tokens, which is language. It cannot operate without these tokens.
My conjecture is that since LLMs are built on a technology designed to mimic biology (neural networks) that they probably work in a very similar way to us.
But also that thinking symbolically, as an LLM does, is only part of the experience of existence.
Other animals arguably experience self awareness, and have passed the tests that we use to demonstrate this. Even some insects.
This non-linguistic part is what I am arguing that LLMs do not possess (discounting magic), ergo have no sense of self. It might be inherent in modelling a corporeal existence, or inherent to some other process of being.
I do not posit however that this neural function of self could not be replicated. Actually, since it is apparently possessed by insects, I would suggest that it may actually be very, very simple, some kind of neural REPL perhaps.
Regardless, LLMs in their current form do not seem to possess this sort of self awareness.
Im pretty sure we could achieve it though if we worked on it a bit… but should we?
I think that's incorrect on a technicality. Input sentences are tokenized, but then the first step is to convert tokens into their high-dimensional embeddings. LLMs work with high dimensional piles of numbers, which start as embeddings in the first layer, and quickly become a nigh-incomprehensible weighted average of many different low-level computations, until something statistically interesting comes out the other side again
>But also that thinking symbolically, as an LLM does, is only part of the experience of existence.
I think the symbols are entirely an interface used to communicate with us. Two neural networks can be grafted to one another, making a deeper whole, and information will flow between the two using a shared floating-point representation far away from anything humans would recognize as language, tokens, symbols. LLMs internally are really piles of highly-dimensional numbers, which turns out to be really hard to interpret, despite efforts
Whatever else they're doing that is not the part manipulating symbols, it's clearly a very different "existence" than the one we have. I agree that it doesn't really look anything like our experience of existence.
But I think it's much harder to pin down the part that we think they don't have, in a way that won't be begging the question, or exclude some humans and some animals that we normally think of as conscious and feeling pain.
>This non-linguistic part is what I am arguing that LLMs do not possess (discounting magic), ergo have no sense of self
That's an interesting argument, but I think the devil is in the details, and whatever this non-linguistic part is, it will be very hard to define without risking begging the question, or without defining it as some sort of intangible property that cannot very well be proven to exist.
In a strict sense, I think we can create in principle (and up to your definition of what language means) large multimodel transformer model that uses nothing recognizable as language, but nervertheless have vision inputs, a robotic frame, and are able to mimic some simple animal behaviors. We can surely train robots to pass whatever tests we use to demonstrate self-awareness, we can probably even indirectly get this behavior to emerge without explicitly 'training on the test set', but I think that wouldn't be convincing, it'd be a cheap trick.
If we want to define the something else that isn't language, that we want to use to determine which beings have a sense of self, it needs to be robust enough that I can't create a simulacra that has the property, but that we strongly wouldn't expect to have a sense of self. (And robust enough that not having that thing really implies no sense of self)
>I do not posit however that this neural function of self could not be replicated. Actually, since it is apparently possessed by insects, I would suggest that it may actually be very, very simple, some kind of neural REPL perhaps.
I would worry that not only can it be replicated, but that it could be taken to the absurd by minmaxing the dumbest digital neural network that notionally has the non-language REPL property we want, until the property starts to look absurd.
I'm thinking for instance of Integrated Information Theory (IIT), a really clever idea to define consciousness mathematically. It's a really fascinating proposition, but unfortunately very quickly reaches absurd conclusions, like some repetitions of simple digital circuits being vastly 'more conscious' than we are.
I think whatever the non-language part is that we want to use to recognize a sense of self, it may run into the same problems as IIT. We simply can't put our fingers on whatever it is that we think makes us special, and any single thing we try to isolate can be replicated in a simpler model and taken to the absurd.
>Im pretty sure we could achieve it though if we worked on it a bit… but should we?
I'm sure we could outdo Nature in cruelty. My hope is that we care more about suffering than she does.
Do we know that? What is a language? I learned that a language is an abstract mapping between arbitrary symbols and meaning. Why is it so hard to imagine that consciousness cannot exist without a mapping between ideas (abstract symbols) and objective reality (meaning)?
The implications of this from an ethical perspective deeply call into question out overall ethical framework, and I’m not talking about only the way we treat animals. I suspect there are fundamental structural problems with our entire ethical scaffold from the foundational level.
> Hylozoism is the philosophical doctrine according to which all matter is alive or animated, either in itself or as participating in the action of a superior principle, usually the world-soul (anima mundi).
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hylozoism
> Architect Christopher Alexander has put forth a theory of the living universe, where life is viewed as a pervasive patterning that extends to what is normally considered non-living things, notably buildings.
I don't understand that. Anyone knows that a cat or a dog or a lizard or a chicken can feel pain, that's so obvious. How can scientists deny something so obviously obvious ?
If you try to turn the scale into a category (not conscious, doesn't feel pain vs conscious and feels pain) you will have to haphazardly throw a dart somewhere based on vibes.
My personal vibes say Sydney does not feel pain, but many animals do. I'd love to learn more and see some interesting replies, although empirically, it's pretty hard to change people's opinion on a sensitive ethical topic like this.
If we were wrong, that would potentially be very bad.
If I grow human neurons in a dish, such that they are connected in 2D layers to approximate the linear algebra in GPT-2, and the human neurons start generating tokens that express hurt, is my petri dish monster feeling any more pain, now that the substrate isn't transistors?
It has to be something more subtle than the contents of the program in isolation, or the substrate in isolation, otherwise it's easy to reach very non-intuitive results that we won't like by transposing whatever we've tried to isolate to a less familiar situation.
The thought experiment is that a group of bio neurons can perform the same simple mathematics primitive that artificial neural nets use (demonstration: you can do a simple fused multiply-add in your head). So there is in principle a way of hard-wiring them that will approximate the function that a digital neural net based on matrix multiplication computes
Then it's a matter of taking your digital tokens and converting them to the encoding you use for your bio-neuron circuit, which is maybe a concentration of calcium in presynaptic neurons, a voltage, or whatever else is more convenient.
You don't directly take a brain and feed it tokens somehow. You emulate a digital circuit on squishy substrate in an extremely inefficient way, such that it runs the exact same program/does the exact same computation with a substrate made of biology instead of transistors. You make an injective function from boolean functions to cells and proteins, just to belabor the point that in principle GPT-3 can talk like GPT-3 and say it feels pain, without a single transistor being involved.
We are very, very far from asking the same questions as Deckard, and sharing his doubts.
Such sophisticated capabilities (to understand and imitate our behavior to that extent) are clearly beyond those of animals, and animals express emotions even when no humans are present and even when their evolutionary history has not involved interaction with humans, so we can rule out the imitation hypothesis when it comes to animals. Thus, the comparison to AI is fairly nonsensical.
You can find a "scientist" that will tell you whatever you want as long as you sponaor their "research".
Look at the cigarette tests, or cola tests, or whatever else is sponsored by polluting companies. Very easy to get a shill.
Not to mention that lots of research is manipulated or straight out faked.
There is also a subset of people who dont have any empathy, especially if they pay depends on it.
Doctors not so long ago operated on newborns without anesthesia for the same reason.
The idea was that newborns aren't "complete" (which is true) and that their pain system wasn't fully active yet (which is wrong), something about myelin if I remember correctly.
Anesthesia is not something to be taken lightly, and if you can operate without it that's one risk less.
Yes. And? A few years ago I watched paper wasps hunt caterpillars to dismember alive and chew up into meatballs, then fly them home to feed their baby sisters. Would the wasps have been more virtuous to embrace pacifism, and let their sisters starve? Were the caterpillars ennobled by whatever suffering inheres in being torn apart? Was I wrong to document without interfering, or would I have been wrong to chase the wasps away? It was beautiful and hideous to watch, enough of both to beggar all the human concepts I know of how the world "should be". What I do know is that all life in this world subsists on death, and we are not so special as to escape that - not while we live and kill to eat, nor when we die and are eaten in our turn.
That's not a question of should or shouldn't, just a statement of what is. Certainly it takes some reckoning with, at least for anyone who isn't satisfied merely to revel in base sadism. But it seems more ethically hazardous to try to establish a concept of which life it's permissible to kill and not care one way or another about it - "biological robots", one might perhaps say, forgetting this name has been given by humans to other humans well within living memory, and also that every such line we've drawn in the past we've gone on to rub out on "learning" - rediscovering, more like - that, no, this doesn't after all suffice to pretend we're not "really" killing, not in a way that counts.
It's clear that many creatures feel pain, it's less clear that it causes them anguish or distress in the way we would experience it.
But clearly, it's not what is going here. What you see here is human being outrageously denying the obvious wherever some information is inconvenient for whatever goal was currently set in its mind.