Ask HN: 2023 Lāhainā fire parallels to the 2018 Camp Fire
Similarities of the two incidents:
- Intense winds
- Powerline-sparked fires
- No mass notification alarm, e.g., didn't use the Amber alert system
- Inadequate, chaotic evacuation
- Mass casualties
- Extreme property losses
- Residents delayed and barred from returning to properties due to slow government procedures
There was electric utility company negligence in 2018, e.g., not turning off power when they (PG&E) knew there was a problem with 100-year-old bare wire powerlines held by worn-out fasteners. I'm curious what the investigation in Hawaii reveals why the power wasn't cut to all but critical infrastructure.
While I wasn't in Maui and can't imagine jumping in the ocean, I was in Paradise on November 2018. There was no alert. We knew it was serious because of the sounds propane tanks exploding as we were leaving.
1. Integrated firestorm preparedness action plans for fire departments, state fire protection, and municipalities, including mass communication through the Amber Alert system.
2. Require electric utilities to conduct wind hazard risk assessments on their grid, monitor the weather, and having staged windstorm plans and planned and unplanned shutoffs for public safety.
3. Municipalities ought to seriously cite properties for excess fuel, including trees and landscaping, near structures.
Insurance companies shouldn't be so quick to just hike premium rates or sit passively on the sidelines, but could be lobbying and actively pressuring federal through local entities in order to proactively reduce their exposure and avert future calamities. Because, as I see it, there is a great deal of normalized negligence, incompetence, and inadequate leadership in American government and the regulation of electric utilities and real property.