> presumably because a simultaneous engine failure had been too ridiculous for Boeing engineers to contemplate
This is hard to grasp, esp. given the presence of a RAT. You're giving engineering time to add a device specifically made to handle loss of all engines, but don't spend the time to write the corresponding procedure?
> ...had determined the fuel weight by multiplying the the number of dripsticked liters by 1.77, as indicated by the documentation. However, unbeknownst to the pilots and the fuel crew, this multiplier provided the weight in imperial pounds; the new, all-metric 767 was based on kilograms, and required a multiplier of 0.8
Darn, how many of these incidents will we require until we finally get rid of the metric system once and for all!
> The internal investigation into the incident laid the blame partially upon Captain Bob Pearson and First Officer Maurice Quintal, who should have observed the Minimum Equipment List (MEL) and grounded the aircraft since it lacked functioning fuel gauges
This is an interesting take - and as the pilot of the plan it certainly should rest on you that you're responsible for all to be in working conditions before you leave. However combining that it was apparently a frequent failure, with the corporate culture that's outlined, it's a good cautionary tail about resisting the pressure when something's wrong but "everybody's doing it anyways".