On the surface this seems pretty decent game theory wise, particularly if you implement annual or bi-annual trading windows with a delay in trade execution (I.e. a trade must be publicly declared 120 days before it is executed) and if those restrictions stay in place long after their tenure in office to discourage prioritizing short term returns over long term stability.
AFAICT, forcing lawmakers to invest in total market index funds (with only buy/sell and maybe stop-loss; where total market is defined as an index fund tracking every publicly traded stock in proportion to its value) where it is difficult to make short term trades with insider knowledge of major market moving events would align their incentives with both our retirement accounts and improving a major slice of the economy.
One might say law makers would circumvent this regulation by having friends and family make the trades on their behalf, an outcome Id welcome; it’s easier to catch them making illegal trades when they have to coordinate to make it happen.
I think it would also mean a significant portion of your compensation as a lawmaker is a direct result of developing the markets. In some ways, regulation like this looks like performance based compensation.