Google and HTTP (2018)
this.how
this.how
This has got to be some of the most hypocritical bullshit I've ever read.
This all-text website, wherein the author espouses the benefits of "the open web" and rails against the corporate overlords who would destroy the web... this all-text website won't even load unless you enable third-party JavaScript access from FOUR external domains[1]. A fifth domain loads a font from - you guessed it - Google Fonts.
This has got to be satire.
[1](https://i.imgur.com/rKj4Xkv.png)
P.S. Nobody's mentioned encryption as a means against against surveillance. You might be fine browsing websites openly in HTTP, but the poor soul in China might just appreciate transport-level encryption and encrypted DNS when they choose to read whatever innocuous pro-democracy blog their country has deemed unsuitable.
example from 2019:
https://meduza-io.translate.goog/cards/zhiteley-kazahstana-z...
This enforcement is ridiculous. I've wondered if I had chance at a law suite against goggle (and their lapdogs at mozzila foundation) for calling some of my domains "illegitimate" because I use self-signed certs.
Just because I didn't pay twate, or get my cert from someone else who paid twate, doesn't mean my site is "illegitimate". Luckily for me, I'm not trying to launch the next twitverse. I use those domains for my own work, they're not out there to be popular.
The article never delves into the world of small network attached devices, some of which are in use long long after their manufactures have been purchased and shut down by the same asshole trying to make you throw it out because it's encryption algorithms are too old, or, Oh No!!!, it uses http for it's webinterface.
In the end, https only is goggle power play propped up by fanboi-ism...
"Then don't do the thing you disagree with? It's a free and open web"
"Why don't you start with agreeing with my position first?"
"Yeah, whatever, feel free to die fighting against it"
I think advocating against somethig, generating a discussion, moving the Overton window is a valid, almost necessary thing. (I admit sometimes they threaten the things I like (or me), but most of the time, it's OK.)
Perhaps "agreeing" was a bad choice of word, instead discussing, debating, or just letting me know your opinion about the matter.
Why isn't it? By navigating to a domain (or searching for it), the user is arguably making an intent statement ("I want content on $domain"). Ensuring that the user doesn't get spam, malware, etc. instead seems well within the scope of the browser.
There are plenty of local http sites due to German's (reasonable) distrust of US companies and a propensity to roll their own
The later sounds far more plausible than an ISP trying to get sued to the ground.
Tell that to mobile providers who can downscale my twitch and youtube videos and require premium to have higher resolution...
Get a free certificate from Let’s Encrypt, set up redirects, and then add the Strict-Transport-Security header to further secure the site and reduce network traffic from the redirects.
Your only new external dependency there is Let’s Encrypt, which is run by a non-profit. And if you’re ever unhappy with them, you can always switch to another provider and most people won’t even notice.
Chances are that the answer to all those questions is “no, the Western-run Let’s Encrypt will not be ok with all that” and if it were for the push to come to the shove (or whatever the expression is) they’ll be more than glad to invalidate that certificate (or worse, to compromise it without letting you know).
Granted, the same thing will most probably happen with one’s DNS provider and with his/her ISP, but why have another dependency if one can avoid it?
That said, I agree with you that there is some level of risk here, even if it is small. That’s why your ability to switch is so important. Even if they became aware of you and they decided to revoke your certificate, you would just switch providers. Because of that, they have no meaningful power over you. If it ever becomes difficult to switch, then things are getting bad.
> or worse, to compromise it without letting you know
What does that mean? The certificate either passes validation or it doesn’t. They aren’t able to change the content on your site or anything like that.
They could say that your certificate passes validation while, in fact, said security has been already tampered with on your side, giving your website's visitors a sense of false security.
This isn't how the Web PKI works. In order to tamper with your site's traffic, Let's Encrypt (or another CA) would need to issue another certificate for your site with a key that they (rather than you) control. This would be detected via CT[1], which your browser (unless it's Firefox) is already using.
And note: by design, any CA in the trusted set can already do this, regardless of whether you use them or not. The things that are stopping them are that it's (1) not in their interest to do so, (2) it's detectable due to CT, and (3) would result in their root being hell-banned by the browsers.
[1] https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/15/technology/google-ai-pent...
A NSL sent to the operators of a CT log cannot stop the log operators from logging inauthentic certificates: each CT log is a timely and append-only signed ledger of all certificates issued, meaning that any deviation between logs would also be detected and treated as a sign of mis-issuance or compromise by the larger Web PKI. What's more, certificates need to be logged as a matter of validity: an order compelling log operators to refuse a certificate would effectively ensure that the certificate never becomes valid. That's what makes CT nice: anybody who wants to create a malicious certificate needs to do so in a way that's globally detectable.
It can be fun to play mind games about shadowy agencies, but that's not really how these things work: if you're of sufficient interest to a country's intelligence service, then they're going to spearphish you, exploit your phone, steal your TLS session keys, your cookies, or do any number of other much less visible things to get the access they want. And, if they're competent, they will get it[1].
[1]: https://www.usenix.org/system/files/1401_08-12_mickens.pdf
There’s no evidence that LE has ever done this, much less ever considered it, much less even has the basic technical ability to manually intervene in the DV process.
Currently LE looks like neutral infrastructure that would never do such a thing. But so did CloudFlare, right up until the point where they suddenly weren't.
CA:s do not control the traffic, they just say if a key is associated with a domain.
Again: this entire thread exists because you (baselessly and incorrectly) speculated that LE has censored people. We’ve now moved on to baselessly speculating about what LE could do, which is approximately as useful. Which is to say: not.
If LE wanted to make a clear committment to content-neutral operation it could do so. It has taken a different tack in its ToS, even if it hasn't been pushed to the point of applying that in practice yet.
A full explanation is available on LE's forum[1].
[1]: https://community.letsencrypt.org/t/according-to-mcclatchydc...
If you want to be inclusive of old clients that may not be able to do modern TLS, you can serve the same content on http and https, but reference your favicon on https and serve a STS header with it. Clients that understand STS, will internally redirect to https, clients that do, but can't reach your https for whatever reason, will be able to continue with HTTP.
If we had some alternate addressing schemes in the browser that could do trust, I'd be much happier. Like, can dat protocol be a secure origin? Or like, if the goal really is just to secure users, maybe we need to let opportunistic encryption be something users can opt in as secure (even though it can be mitm'ed at the start).
Let's Encrypt has changed the game. It's great that https has so very very suddenly gone from frustrating & business class only to something even the casuals can easily do. But still, I'd love some less centralized systems for trust to be available, some visible known alternative paths demonstrating that there are diverse options at these lower transport/security layers of the network stack.
Yes it does: https://blog.cpanel.com/how-to-configure-and-manage-lets-enc...
You can't use ACME to get a cert without said extension.
Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that in practice in general Let's Encrypt is not usable with cPanel providers.
In the context of this conversation, people were talking about how Let's Encrypt certs can easily be used to enable HTTPS, and my point is that that's rarely possible with cPanel hosts.
* Woman views information on abortions or reproductive health care in a jurisdiction that persecutes over that
* Queer person views information pertaining to LGBT services/issues in a jurisdiction or LAN that would punish them
* Person views information on protests
* Person reads the news about a crime[1]
TLS does not solve this problem entirely (SNI/DNS leaks, traffic shape analysis) but it helps.
I would not expect search engines/browsers to try to determine if a site publishes 'controversial' content especially since that depends on who you ask.
[1] https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2021/06/05/fbi-...
For those use cases, people should really be using Tor instead. In that case, if the website is public, HTTPS doesn’t really serve a purpose since the exit node isn’t going to get any private information.
Perhaps HTTPS does help if the sensitive information is hidden in a wide-ranging domain (e.g. Reddit, Twitter) and because support for it is so widespread. In those cases, HTTPS is likely already supported.
However, if the politically sensitive but public information is on a small domain, such as a personal blog or informational topical site, HTTPS serves almost no purpose there since it’s obvious what your activities are from the domain. In that case, one should definitely rely on Tor.
What central control? Your browser uses a trust store and there are multiple independent (but collaborating) groups that decide what CA:s to trust.
The rest of your supposed drawbacks seem like they would be the same in any system with encryption, right?
Just because you can choose from one of several central authorities doesn't change the fact that you are reliant on them to authorize the user's ability to establish a network connection with you.
I'm not saying I'm against TLS, far from it. But it does carry costs, and I'm surprised somebody so passionately against TLS would omit this argument.
The bigger problem with TLS is that it adds so much brittleness and complexity (do you know how many times I've broken ACME/LE python dependencies by accident?) and increases the time-to-first-byte for so many sites, especially if you're not getting your hands dirty with nginx and OpenSSL internals.
(Even if you are tuning all the right knobs, one thing we didn't realize was that at some point using an EV SSL certificate (before Chrome removed the UI benefits of doing so) began causing a massive increase in TTFB that there doesn't (didn't?) seem to be any way to avoid, so we ended up moving to regular TLS/SSL certs w/ Let's Encrypt not for the free cost of entry but for the reduced initial connection time. I can't remember the exact details now as it's been some years, but I think with EV SSL there's a secondary cert or revocation lookup to a remote url even if you have correctly configured ocsp stapling.)
We encrypt everything we can with TLS to protect the privacy of our members.
Since TLS is per-connection and the page-cache is per-file, any software crypto needs to encrypt from a common source in the page cache to a per-client buffer (eg, it cannot happen in-place). So this introduces an extra memory read from the page cache and write to the per-client socket buffer. We use the non-temporal version of ISA-L, so as to write full cache lines into the socket buffer, and not pay for an extra memory read as part of a read-modify-write update of a partial cacheline. So software crypto basically doubles the memory bandwidth requirements over no TLS (or NIC TLS offload).
From the MicroMirror Project.
Let's Encrypt/ACME make encryption accessible enough in theory. That said, we're not there yet. Domain names still need to be easier to buy and use, and more software should use ACME by default (like Caddy does).
The question that Google seemed to ignore (and still does) is "how do you expect a newly unboxed network device to ship with a non-self-signed SSL certificate?" The workaround some manufacturers have come up with is more repulsive than the original (There was one Chinese manufacturer that tried to get a signed certificate for a domain, then mapped that domain to 192.168.0.1 and shipped the private ssl cert w/ every router iirc. TP-Link has their own weird workaround where they give you a domain to log in to the router instead of the IP, and their router MITMs the connection and redirects to HTTP.)
Google forcing everyone to HTTPS is one thing, Google forcing everyone to HTTPs and universally treating self-signed HTTPS connections as scams is another.
[0]: https://neosmart.net/blog/lets-stop-punishing-iot-devices-th...
This trick but for individual devices is fine, even recommended. But of course if the keys are each different that costs more than shipping devices which are identical...
You needed to know the IP for the device still (in our case we still had a central service keeping track of it), but the principle works. For cheap IoT I guess the cost of the certs can be too large though, we couldn't use letsencrypt due to limits on the number of certs per domain.
I would have went with a slightly different suggestion: Self signed certificates should not throw up any warnings that wouldn't appear for the same site visited over insecure HTTP, since the latter is strictly more dangerous.
For an unknown server, they're strictly equivalent: trusting a self-signed certificate is the canonical "private chat with the devil" example. You could argue that it prevents some other unknown adversary from reading your traffic on the line, but that's a weird threat model (why would an adversary even bother, when you'll accept any certificate they give you?).
More fundamentally: a policy among browsers to trust self-signed certs if the only other option is HTTP is way easier for an adversary to MiTM: instead of attacking TLS itself, they can redirect your entire connection to an inauthentic server with a self-signed certificate. Not throwing up any warnings for that case would mean that browsers would automatically trust the inauthentic server.
I'm not arguing to remove warnings when going to a site with a self-signed cert. I'm arguing to add warnings to insecure HTTP until it's at least as scary as going to a site with a self-signed cert is today.
Self signed certificates are completely pointless and they should never be trusted without manual confirmation. You have no way to verify who's generating these self signed certificates, you may as well use HTTP if you're going to accept self signed stuff.
HTTPS is not only about "asking user for data" It is also: - preventing third party from spying on you - preventing third party from altering the content presented to the user
Yes, yes, 20 years old websites do not have https Is running a 20 years old software a good idea, on the internet ? Of course not
What is the point of this post ? I read the "why google really wants you to use https" and failed to find any sense in this
Is this meaningless ?
Lots of networking equipment works over HTTP only, still.
I am actually really pissed off that I can not use Chromium password manager to save HTTP credentials for these devices.
MikroTik has supported https for a very very long time, though it comes disabled by default and even if it didn't it wouldn't work because it requires the user creating/importing a cert to use with it.
At least the cert manager is quite intricate and they have a video (assuming the device has a valid WAN IP) on how to set it up with letsencrypt.
---
Only a few of the barriers presented by HTTPS:
Clock sync would be a requirement for access.
A recent device would be a requirement for access (not everyone can afford a new one).
Site admin keeping up with certificate registration would be a requirement.
Approval from the centralized certificate authority would be a requirement.
Server's self domain name matching accessed domain name would be a requirement.
These are all real scenarios where real people can be denied access to information that is crucial to them, up to the point of survival.
Just a few of the reasons why all my websites still allow HTTP.
HTTP is also way faster on slow connections.
---
If you have Internet access, NTP trivially gives you this.
> A recent device would be a requirement for access (not everyone can afford a new one).
That's literally the point I addressed in the comment you replied to. Computers that are over 20 years old are still capable of connecting to websites using modern TLS.
> Site admin keeping up with certificate registration would be a requirement.
No, ever since ACME came out, certificate renewal can trivially be fully automated, with zero admin work required when one is about to expire.
> Approval from the centralized certificate authority would be a requirement.
Which is trivially granted as long as you actually own the domain you're trying to get the certificate for.
> Server's self domain name matching accessed domain name would be a requirement.
You can get multiple certificates and have the server use SNI to send every client the right one, or get one certificate with a bunch of domain names.
> These are all real scenarios where real people can be denied access to information that is crucial to them, up to the point of survival.
This is like saying that it's dangerous to go outside because there have been real cases of people being killed by meteorites.
This is not always true, and the user is not always at liberty to change the clock settings on their device.
> That's literally the point I addressed in the comment you replied to. Computers that are over 20 years old are still capable of connecting to websites using modern TLS.
This is just not true. I do a lot of testing, and there are many devices as young as 5 years that cannot access some websites due to TLS incompatibilities. I have a very nice device that's 10 years old which I use daily that experiences this on a regular basis.
> No, ever since ACME came out, certificate renewal can trivially be fully automated, with zero admin work required when one is about to expire.
Automation breaks, and certificates expire. I encounter websites with broken certificates almost daily.
> Which is trivially granted as long as you actually own the domain you're trying to get the certificate for.
It is not trivial at all. It requires a lot of administrative work, and many people around the world do not have access to this process at all.
> This is like saying that it's dangerous to go outside because there have been real cases of people being killed by meteorites.
No, it is like saying there are people out there who want to access information on the device they have access to, and we should enable them to access that information as much as possible.
Can you name the specific models?
> Automation breaks, and certificates expire. I encounter websites with broken certificates almost daily.
How many times have you seen that where the expired certificate came from Let's Encrypt? I'm guessing never, and that when you've seen it, it's always been from legacy ones without any automation in use.
> It is not trivial at all. It requires a lot of administrative work, and many people around the world do not have access to this process at all.
It only takes a few minutes to set up. Who has the required resources to own a domain but not to use Let's Encrypt?
I fail to find any;
As I mentioned in other comments, there are many possible areas where HTTPS can present a barrier to a user's access to your resource. Some of these I listed in another comment, which I copy below:
---
Only a few of the barriers presented by HTTPS:
Clock sync would be a requirement for access.
A recent device would be a requirement for access (not everyone can afford a new one).
Site admin keeping up with certificate registration would be a requirement.
Approval from the centralized certificate authority would be a requirement.
Server's self domain name matching accessed domain name would be a requirement.
These are all real scenarios where real people can be denied access to information that is crucial to them, up to the point of survival.
Just a few of the reasons why all my websites still allow HTTP.
HTTP is also way faster on slow connections.
---
this does happen
If the law forbids ISPs to show ads or modify the content in any way, then they won't do it.
Why that statement, because any law to ban ISPs from doing this will be met with millions in political investment by said ISPs to prevent it. Since the average person doesn't care about this issue it's a losing proposition.
Here's an example: a person goes to say Reddit, and clicks on a HTTP link about a new recipe. It's possible for a link to a malicious site being injected in the page. These were pretty common in developing countries.
Why do you think "handling user data" is the only reason to employ encryption? What if the website is serving up static content that seems completely fine to you or I but the user is in a legal situation where they would be in trouble for reading it? What if the user is somebody the local police are trying to frame, so the request was normal, the response was normal, but the response was replaced with something illegal so the police can arrest for possession? Why should every router on the path be able to see what I'm reading, what I'm reading web pages about medical conditions? Why do you insist that everyone should collectively make technical decisions that serve to enable this kind of thing?
This isn't hypothetical. A country once used their position of owning the local telecom to inject javascript into web pages that would DDoS another website they didn't like. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Cannon .
The web moved from HTTP-over-TCP to HTTP-over-TLS because it fixes real problems. One of the common mistakes people make when thinking about security is trying to imagine the attacks themselves and then only defending against those. Your imagination is not the limit, you're up against the collective creativity of everyone else. Encrypt your stuff and remove a whole category of possible problems.
I am pro-HTTP for these use cases for as long as browsers have more serious warnings against self signed certs, old SSL/TLS versions and weak algo choices than the warnings for HTTP.
Hardware deserves to be supported as long as it physically works rather than as long as its embedded TLS stays supported
Of course. All traffic needs to be encrypted. Why must these not be encrypted?
> I am pro-HTTP for these use cases for as long as browsers have more serious warnings against self signed certs, old SSL/TLS versions and weak algo choices than the warnings for HTTP.
IMO, HTTP-over-TCP support should have been removed from all browsers years ago, solving your self-cert vs HTTP problem.
Good solutions for the LAN use case have been rather weak so far. The two categories of solutions are a) a CA for your LAN. People are OK using this for things like dev servers on localhost, but what you want is to have router that issues DHCP leases also issue IP certs for local devices. b) TLS-TOFU for self-certs. We can even do this over the public web too, but we can also treat self-signed certs on LAN vs. public web differently and report when the identity behind the IP has changed. (Generally a bad idea over the public web because we want to allow key rotation, but that might be fixable by adding multiple keys or some hack like publishing the next key into .well-known/next-key or something -- I'm riffing here.)
> Hardware deserves to be supported as long as it physically works rather than as long as its embedded TLS stays supported
Why? Or put differently, if the manufacturer has stopped providing firmware updates, they've unsupported it no matter what the rest of the world has done. Why should the rest of the world compromise security by design in order to only partially not-break a hardware device that the manufacturer doesn't support? In this one exact scenario? Maybe in the future we can provide a small ethernet-to-ethernet (or wifi-to-wifi) device that wraps a single old TLS device and provides a modern interface to it, if support is that important.
Until I hear a convincing story of how I will do the usual lan tasks of
- connect to my router to fiddle with settings
- see the management interface on my printer
- join my parents network and do things for them without having to explicitly trust a CA
- And most importantly, see consumers who don't understand any of those things be able to do these things all out of the box
I can't see how it is a viable expectation
I totally love encryption. It's great. But seriously: what domain will I visit to fix my pppoe settings. Who's going to control that domain, and who's going to renew the certs for it. Because if the answer we will expect consumers and SMEs to trust a certificate authority created by a factory with its own crappy security practices, I'm not sure how that's an improvement
Otherwise we are breaking things to "fix" something that doesn't "fix" anything. if someone is MITMing my lan, it doesn't matter whether my router is TLS or not. it's compromised
Big companies and governmental branches have their own root certificates.
To remove HTTP is the biggest mistake humans have made with the internet so far.
But it will trigger a reaction that deprecates both companies and governments:
Edit: Loving the down vote without comment and now the whole submission is flagged.
Google really does not want HTTP around. They seem threatened by it?
https://groups.google.com/a/mozilla.org/g/dev-security-polic...
25W Atom 14nm CPU is the best middle ground between 80W Xeon and 15W Jetson Nano. It is what you need to load balance saturation of 1Gb/s = Final decentralized node.
StarCraft might be playable, StarCraft 2 however will be a privilege.
Get your facts straight!
I'm talking about the future, not now.
Please link to the Atom benchmarks that show how slow they are on relevant server tasks. I remind you I'm talking about 14nm with 8-16 cores.
The burden of proof is on the people who make the (ridiculous) claims.
We had $1/KWh in EU this winter.
With that price you are paying almost $1 per day of running your 65W computer.
That's $30 per month just to keep the computer gaming during daytime.
There is no roof for how high prices or inflation can go.
Other gear are more important than entertainment, people will not consume games when they are hungry or cold (though computers help with that somewhat).
I'm going to go out on a limb here and say that nuclear is heating the planet more than CO2, the efficiency of nuclear is 35% so for every KWh of electricity you heat the planet with 3 KWh.
3KWh that the planet has to radiate into space that did not get added during any time before.
We are slowly boiling the planet, like frogs in a casserole.
Eventually you wont have the energy, money or time to play anything.
No it is not, especially in the context of running home computers. Why do you think that?
money is infinite
No it is not.
We had $1/KWh in EU this winter.
Average price is about 0.22 Here is some actual information.
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php...
That's $30 per month just to keep the computer gaming during daytime.
No it is not. 65W is the max amount of power. 10 hours a day every day at max is still a little over $4 per month. TVs, refrigerators electric heating and air conditioning are all 20x the impact of an average computer.
I'm going to go out on a limb here and say that nuclear is heating the planet more than CO2
You should not go out on a limb for anything. You should read and stop guessing.
Where are you getting your ideas? Source something, link anything that supports what you are saying.
They tell us to worry about man-in-the-middle attacks that might modify content, but fail to mention that they can do it in the browser, even if you use a "secure" protocol. They are the one entity you must trust above all. No way around it.
I serve nothing worth encrypting and never will.
For auth. I use: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2289
Quantum safe for eternity.
It's not hard to convert to HTTPS
and it doesn't cost a lot.
The reason is that the only free and "easy" solution is Let's Encrypt. And they make it a pain in the butt.
You can get a certificate for domain.com by putting a file into domain.com/.well-known/ - so far so good.
But you cannot get a wildcard certificate for domain.com this way.
For no reason as far as I know. Who owns domain.com but not bla.domain.com?
And I don't want all my subdomains listed in a public directory. So only a wildcard cert makes sense for me.
Which means fiddling with DNS entries every 3 months. Or setting up some complex, brittle scheme to automatically update those every 3 months. Which then depends on the API of some name server provider. Which will work differently for every provider.
> For no reason as far as I know. Who owns domain.com but not bla.domain.com?
Many, many services[2]. DNS is fundamentally hierarchical, but not in a way that implies authority or control: the owners/operators of `com.` should not be able to obtain a wildcard certificate for `*.com.` and thereby read the traffic of `google.com`, `facebook.com`, etc.
[1]: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6125#section-7.2
Google and HTTP - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=16461923 - Feb 2018 (58 comments)
SMTP (TCP 25) and HTTP (TCP 80) are the pillars of the internet.
As the author said, many old http sites that have been on the web for more than a decade are rarely maintained, if at all. Removing access to these sites in totality would definitely take a large percentage of them offline for good. This should be avoided.
Your argument is also adjacent, if not identical, to pro-censorship dogma, which I am against.
Said no one.
If I want to the public library and the fire extinguishers didn't work the fire marshal would put a lock on the door. If the shelves fell over and smashed the patrons they'd be sued out of existence. Just because something is 'public' and/or a 'library' doesn't mean there isn't a necessity of upkeep to ensure it's not a danger to others.
I think I asked a reasonable question.
I would argue that locking the doors on a library for non-working fire extinguishers is an overreaction and fairly authoritarian. If there was a sign on the entrance that told library-goers that there are no currently working fire extinguishers and to use their own judgment on whether or not to enter the building, what’s the harm in that? The vast majority would walk out unscathed with a book in their hand.
I'm pretty sure this is the direction websites are going. HTTP isn't going away, but users will start getting more explicit warnings in the coming years.
fargo.io
scripting.comI have to disagree with this one. I have written networking applications with X Window UI in C from scratch only by reading man pages.
There is so much that this post got right.
> It's like a massive book burning, at a much bigger scale than ever done before
The internet is not a passive medium. The information highway is actually a decent description, much like the road if people don't maintain their cars they become a danger, so the internet is the same.
SPF is a old and horribly broken standard, and should not be relied on for at least 10 years now. DKIM and DMARC is the way to go for outbound SMTP.
Google didn't break SMTP, spammers did.
Google and Microsoft still killed email with their unreliable spam filters, but SPF alone was never enough.
SMTP still works fine though.
None of the major email service providers (or 'behemoths', as you call them) use IP blacklisting anymore. They abandoned that idea years ago. IP addresses are ephemeral, especially when IPv6 is used, so IP blacklisting simply does not work anymore. If we were to use IP based blacklisting we'd have blacklisted the entire IPv4 address space by now. Yes, like any other SMTP service they will block IP addresses momentarily if you misbehave, but never permanently.
All major spam filters are content based, and reputation is always on the domain level, not IP level.
If you properly configure your email infrastructure, and you don't spam, then deliverability really shouldn't be a problem.
Google doesn't provide access to results past the first 5 pages or so anyways, they have a track record for destroying the internet.
https://web.archive.org/web/20230704151648/http://this.how/g...
All other arguments you're presenting about HTTPS being easy (it is, have you tried Caddy) are moot. It's the sites that were made before Google took over control that aren't maintained that are at issue. And the idea that a for-profit company that no one should trust is saying they're the only ones you have to trust.
And the fact that many of us adopted the web because it was a platform that no company controlled. If it had been presented as Google's platform I would have run the other way and would have advised you to do the same. But now I'm invested. My freedom as a developer depends on the integrity of the web. And a web controlled by Google isn't the web.
Google has a nasty habit of taking control of open protocols and then trashing them.
Roll up your sleeves, make some quiet time and actually READ THE DOCUMENT.
Breaking the web is the issue folks.