The interesting question is if there is a bot net spreading in Germany since the 17th of June. What would be the likelihood of that going undetected. If you like conspiracy theory, the rise in one country could point to state actors.
Germany hosts a disproportionate amount of sensitive data because it's the location of choice for cloud providers storing things for EU member countries.
One weird thing to me: You are right about "lots of fiber" -- specifically Frankfurt Internet Exchange is (was?) the busiest in the world for a long time. Why does non-urban, non-commercial (retail) Internet access suck so hard in Germany? It is the topic of endless (but understandable) crying by German residents on HN!
To cut a very long story short, what should have happened a long time ago in Germany is to treat internet access at a reasonable speed (however that is determined) like access to electricity or the plain old telephone system: It's the law you get connected like everyone else at the price everyone else pays, even when you are in a very rural setting. Leaving that decision to commercial interests, has lead to very slow or unavailable rural internet infrastructure because either the price would be ridiculously high to become connected or the companies would lose money.
It's political failure, plain and simple.
Looking back in time, the original sin was committed in Germany in the early 80s when the SPD run government understood that fiber optic networks were the future for the telephone system and television distribution. They had a 30 year plan to convert West-Germany's telecom infrastructure to fiber. That was way before the internet, but would that plan have been enacted, Germany would have sat on a high speed fiber infrastructure in the 90s when the Internet exploded onto the scene.
Unfortunately the conservative CDU government under Kohl immediately scrapped that plan when they came into power and went for cable as the distribution medium for TV and the telephone system continued to operate on copper at least on the last mile. So here we are in the 2020s with crappy cable modems and crappy DSL connections. (Where available.)
Lack of competition and laws tailored to the privatized Deutsche Telekom: If I dig up the street to put fiber optics, they may join in for free. So may I, if they dig up streets - they just don't.
(e.g., if you single-handedly double the network traffic, then an outside observer can figure out what ingress/egress traffic is yours)
And German federal government have a history for covert shitposting.
And German federal government have a history for covert shitposting.
The closest article I can quickly find is about Germany intelligence informants doing the same in meatspace though.
> There was a "risk that sources of the intelligence service (Office for the Protection of the Constitution) could goad each other on to undertake bigger actions;" in other words, the system threatened to create an "incendiary effect."
https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/german-police-d...
I work in a German institution. I was recently hacked by such a botnet recently (lessons learned: use AuthorizedKeys, allow only one SSH user, proxy all http connections to a webhoster, and check your SSH and UFW logs often!)
It setup a virtual environment where it downloaded some kind of Tor node and ran some sort of code that used 100% of my CPU. My guess is crypto-mining. I purged the account, deleted everything before I could do forensics, but I checked the logs for the connections and they all came from Russia.
My fear would be that someone still is trying to gather a critical mass of nodes to contact controll servers via TOR to cause mass havoc in a single country from within a single country. Generally IMHO Germany would be a good target for destabilisation currently. But I think and hope this could just a bit of overinterpreting. Probably one would need a good statistic on the subnets the users come from.
I hope to be wrong but I am afraid you are overestimating the technical competency of the average ISP.
ISPs certainly have the tooling and the positioning to be able to detect C&C channels, outgoing DDOS attacks, and compromised customer premises equipment. But do they? And if they do detect any of it, do they take action? When is the last time you heard about an ISP disconnecting a paying customer because of the customer's compromised device(s)? When is the last time you even heard of an ISP notifying a customer about such a thing?
Two months ago, my router was compromised and joined to some sort of botnet in the capacity of a DNS resolver. I would never have been able to detect such WAN-side traffic if I hadn't had a special setup on my part. My ISP was the first to hear when I'd detected it, and I sincerely doubt that they receive many such reports, especially with logs as evidence.
Can you imagine receiving a phone call, "Hello, this is your ISP! You're pwned! Please follow through these remediation steps as I prompt you: ..." You'd undoubtedly think it was a phishing scam. Because ISPs just don't seem to care about abuse.
They will send you copyright strikes and prosecute you for BitTorrent, but it does't seem like they'd lift a finger to prevent the next big DDOS or spam factory originating from their own customers.
But I've never received a threatening letter about piracy. ISPs in my country simply don't send those.
I often used to poke holes in my firewall and run VPN or ssh servers that were discoverable using my dynamic DNS service. My ISP never got involved with that. Of course, that was a case of me running a server for my exclusive use, rather than some sort of public web or login server that would have randos sending traffic across my link.
The only somewhat professional player is the Deutsche Telekom, which was kinda the Bell of Germany and got privatized in the 90s, when the phone network was also opened to other players. They are more expensive though. Other than that, you might be lucky and have some small regional ISP that's competent enough. Otherwise there are just two other companies left that offer service nationwide, after a lot of mergers.
But it's possible they were just passing on abuse reports from the numerous targeted victims of this botnet who bothered to complain.
The intrusion point was a Linux system with a 3 letter password and ssh exposed on a nonstandard port. So if you're someone who still thinks the bad guys won't find your computer because you changed the port, know that that is very outdated thinking.
This seems trivial to figure out with an analysis of the connecting IPs - which is absent on TOR's report page.
I'm also a bit confused why no one here on HN has asked about the connecting IP data (at this writing). Are these commercial IPs, dynamic (biz/residential) IPs or a mix? If they're mostly dynamic IPs, are they from more than one ISP?
TOR has country of origin data so it seems reasonable they'd also have network of origin.
All that said, I don't precisely know how TOR determines country of origin. Entry node data would seem to be the likely source. However I've long assumed that entry nodes are public supplied, like Relay and Exit nodes. Within that assumption it isn't clear to me how that data would flow to TOR - while maintaining anonymization of traffic.
A minor addendum: Looking at the csv file, it looks to me like traffic began drifting above the mean about June 6. From there I see a ramp-up, growing at an increasing rate.