In both cases, an older version of you is "extinct", meanwhile, the latest version of you does not have any recollection of becoming extinct.
Now the doc is replacing parts of your brain with silicon. It's posited that it makes no difference to your mind. Because of that, is your consciousness still in your body? Very probably.
So I'm not following their logic.
How do you reach this conclusion? The only conclusion I can reach is that an identical consciousness is certainly in both bodies. (And as soon as both bodies are making new memories, you have a "fork", where the two persons stop being identical)
So I will not take the teleporter any more than I will shoot myself.
> What is the difference between slowly replacing your cells a few at a time through biological processes, and instantly replacing all of your cells through the teleporter?
If you believe that you die when your cells are replaced (because you are in the old cells and thus can't be in the replacement), then I understand your point of view. But if you're saying that slowly replacing you is different than quickly replacing you, then I would be super curious to hear the logic for this! (This is a sincere comment, I am not seeing the logic myself and would really like to understand it)
The problem with the teleportation is not even that it's a quick replacement... it's that it's not a replacement at all. You're building a clone somewhere else, and destroying the original. You could build 50 clones at the same time on 50 planets if you wanted - and of course none of them would be you, there's zero chance you're preserved. So, you're dead, even if to the rest of the world it makes no difference.
Is that clearer?
In your first paragraph, you say that we can take for granted that when an original is destroyed, having a replacement will preserve consciousness. Then, in your second paragraph, you say the opposite - that destroying an original would NOT preserve consciousness, even if there exists a replacement.
There must be some key assumption which lets you not see this as a contradiction. Maybe you believe that there is something extra-cellular which wouldn't get replicated in a teleporter?
If both are identical I don't see why both aren't equally me.
> because I am on Earth, and I can't be in both bodies.
Why must there be a single continuation of "me"? I wouldn't necessarily consider this true even under current medical technology - we can split the brain in two and have two parts that do not directly communicate.
What if the process is symmetrical (one body in, some kind of mitosis occurs, two bodies out at equal distance)? Does one get assigned "the real me" at random? If both have the same memories/personality/train-of-thought and experience the process as continuous, why not both?
I'm probing to get a better understanding of your belief system. How does it hold up under symmetrical cloning?
> What magic would transfer your consciousness into this clone?
I'll label:
* PM: Physiological "me" - personality, memories, train of thought, currently instantiated as a brain
* IM: "Immaterial" "me" - a "soul", impacted by the PM. May impact the PM or just be an observer (depending on variant of dualism)
From what I understand, you believe there's an IM controlling a PM, and the IM is a different kind of stuff that would not be cloned. The IM generally follows the same PM, but could be "shaken off" from too-large changes. On cloning of PM you think this happens (at the instant of cloning):
IM New soul
| |
PM PM
IM
/ \
PM PM
PM PM
IM IM
| |
PM PMIf you posit that teleportation is equivalent to spaceship, and that a single consciousness cannot inhabit two bodies, then what is your hypothesis about the more-or-less instant transfer of that quality to a remote planet's newly created clone?
Consider IM to be any immaterial "self" that you believe wouldn't be included in the clone - doesn't have to be a soul as various religions may conceptualize.
> and that a single consciousness cannot inhabit two bodies
I believe there could be two bodies with identical personalities/memories/train-of-thought/etc. (whatever we label as consciousness) at some instant, but they would diverge due to different environments and not have any kind of special link between them.
> what is your hypothesis about the more-or-less instant transfer of that quality to a remote planet's newly created clone?
In my view it's just included in the clone - there's nothing extra that hasn't been cloned that needs to be transferred afterwards. If you totally clone an ocean, it has the same waves.
Which cell is the “real” one when it divides? Which branch of a tree is the true tree?
Both versions of you have equal claim to the past, as long as the copy is truly identical.
If the ship is completely destroyed and a perfect replica rebuilt elsewhere, is it the same ship? Almost certainly not.
If the ship is slowly replaced over time, is it the same ship? As a matter of form or psychological continuity as posited in the question, almost certainly.
At least in the Ship of Theseus paradox, there is the case where you take the old replaced parts and construct a ship from those parts - which is an interesting question, is it the original ship? In this case, the only thing consistent about the ship is the design. Take mass manufactured goods then - are they the same article because the have the same materials?
If it's a perfect replica (as you said in your original comment) then by what parameters is it different from the original ship? Sure, cooordinates might be different, but cooridnates can change. If the exact replica switches places with the original, then even that difference would disappear.
By the way, I am strictly speaking about this topic in the context of the thread we are in. If a replica is built according to exact blueprints of a snapshot of the original (and assuming no mistakes are made), then why would the result be any different than just replacing one part on the original with an replica part made according to exact blueprints of a snapshot of the original part?
Not to be obtuse, but... the speed.
Really this is a shortcoming of the thought experiment. Progressive replacement is subjectively more continuous than complete replacement. A better thought experiment would be to feed it out something like:
* What if we replaced every atom of you body progressively over 24 hours?
* What if we replaced every atom of your body suddenly all at once?
* What if we replaced every atom of your body, but delayed by 1s?
* What if we replaced every atom of your body, but delayed by 1 day?
* What if we replaced every atom of your body suddenly all at once, but moved about 1mm?
* *What if we replaced every atom of your body suddenly all at once, but a day later and moved by thousands of miles?"
In both cases (gradual and instant replacement), at any given moment, there exists only one entity with your consciousness and self of sense and continuous memories leading up to that moment.